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This dissertation addresses the ways in which government policies and agendas, media 
representations, local histories and perceptions influence marriage patterns across the Taiwan 
Strait. While socio-economic interactions between the Republic of China (Taiwan or ROC) and 
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC or Mainland China) have deepened in recent years, both 
governments continue to often have conflicting agendas and policies aimed at supporting their 
own goals. As a result, Taiwan promotes a policy of careful interaction with Mainland China 
which is reflected in Taiwan’s strict immigration policies with regard to Mainland brides who are 
considered a threat to Taiwan’s “population quality” (renkou suzhi).   
The PRC, on the other hand, has established policies aimed at increasing economic and 
social integration with Taiwan. Taiwanese men on the Mainland enjoy preferential treatment, 
particularly in China’s Special Economic Zones. As more people travel across the Taiwan Strait, 
the number of cross-Strait (PRC-ROC), marriages have increased on the Mainland.  Traditional 
marriage and kinship practices such as patrilocal marriages are often cited as primary factors in 
influencing women’s place in Chinese society (Davin 2008, Johnson 1983, Lu 1997, Watson 
1991).  However, a Mainland woman who marries a Taiwanese man and sets up a household 
near her natal home can have a very different experience. This practice, in turn, has in some 
cases led to more flexibility with regard to gender roles and mutual upward social mobility for 
both partners on the Mainland.   
MARRIAGE ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: 
MALE MIGRANTS, MARITAL DESIRE AND SOCIAL LOCATION 
Joseph Leo Cichosz, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
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Finally this dissertation contributes to the academic literature regarding cross-border 
marriage and “global hypergamy,” which usually refers to women from less developed, poorer 
regions who attempt to “marry up” by finding husbands in a more developed, richer area 
(Constable 2005).  In this study, I consider a very different situation; men who migrate from a 
more developed region (Taiwan) to areas that are being developed (SEZ’s). While most did not 
migrate for the express purpose of marrying, these unions formed as a result of the migration 
process. Examining these relationships reveal some interesting insights into the ways that recent 
shifts in the global economic landscape related to China’s economy influence marriage patterns 
and marital relations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
“My husband and I are from Hong Kong,” I overheard Mei, a local who was born and raised in 
Xiamen explain to a potential customer who was looking over the latest Italian fashions that had 
arrived in her shop earlier in the week. “We live in Xiamen because the environment is nice and 
the seafood is good” she added.  I looked at Ang, her husband, who was preparing a small pot of 
tea from his hometown in Taiwan for me to sample.  He showed no reaction to Mei’s comment 
and continued to explain why pure tea from Taiwan was so much better than tea from the 
Mainland that was rife with chemicals. A couple of months later in an upscale nightclub I heard 
Ang explaining to a friend who was visiting from Japan that he and Mei were going “home” for a 
few weeks to check on their store in Hong Kong. I soon learned that many of their friends, with 
the exception of those who were themselves from Taiwan, knew Ang and Mei as successful 
business owners from Hong Kong.  Hong Kong, a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic, international 
center, served as a surrogate homeland for the couple, helping them to side step any pre-
conceived notions that many people in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) have regarding 
  2 
Taiwan-PRC couples.1 Identifying themselves as Hong Kong people, in other words, was a 
coping strategy the couple employ in their day-to-day lives on Mainland China so as to avoid 
negative stereotypes about cross-Strait couples.  
Understandings about Taiwanese migrants and cross-Strait couples are related to 
historical and contemporary issues and experiences at the local, national and global levels.2 State 
ideologies and agendas, and political-economic programs, work to “link personal desires with 
state goals”(Friedman 2005:312). These issues converge with media representations and public 
discourse and can have a strong influence on the lives of migrants and their interactions with the 
local population. The study of cross-Strait marriage is one area that highlights the ways in which 
these factors enter what many consider to be the most intimate of spaces.   
Taiwan and the PRC have differing views pertaining to cross-Strait socio-economic 
relations, which are reflected in government policies and print media from both sites. While the 
PRC’s policies work to support its stance of integration with Taiwan, the ROC’s policies reflect 
its stance of cautious interaction. This study examines the ways these factors play out in the lives 
of Taiwanese migrants, particularly those involved in cross-Strait intimate relationships. Of 
primary concern are the ways that individuals involved in cross-Strait relationships and marriage 
respond to these representations and policies through daily “practice” (Bourdieu 1977). Those 
involved in intimate cross-Strait relationships can choose to enact or contest local understandings 
about them which, in essence, allow them to reconfigure their identities in relation to place and 
                                                 
1 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) refers to Mainland China. The Republic of China (ROC) refers to Taiwan. 
2 It is important here to note that in using the designation “Taiwanese” I do not intend to generalize across an entire 
population nor overlook the rich diversity of Taiwan’s aboriginal and minority groups. Further, my informants are 
not meant to represent the Taiwanese people as a whole but are the experiences of specific individuals who agreed to 
share their stories and experiences with me.  
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social space. The ability to accomplish this however, relies heavily on their individual 
personalities, their level of creativity and their initiative.        
The primary contribution of this dissertation is that it contrasts with studies of cross-
border marriage which focus on women who leave their natal home, often crossing regional or 
national borders to marry. While the bulk of marriage migrants are undoubtedly women, the 
topic of migrant grooms remains virtually unexplored (Charsley 2005, Han 2009). In those 
studies that focus particularly on greater China the tendency to focus primarily on women with 
regard to marriage and migration is particularly pronounced (Adrian 2003, Chen 2004, Davin 
2008, Fan 1998, Friedman 2010, Hsia 2006, 2007, 2009, Johnson 1983, Lavely 1991, Lu 2008, 
Ping 1993, Piper 2003, Schein 2005, Siu1993, Tan 2004,Tsai 2006, Tsay 2004, Wang 
2004,Watson 1991).3  An exception is Constables (2003) study which addresses the experiences 
of U.S. men and Chinese women who have married. In addition, Constable’s (2005) edited 
volume which focuses on cross-border marriage in Asia also included the experiences of men 
and women within the study marriage migration. In each of these studies, however, it was the 
bride who had migrated to her husband’s homeland. One exception is Han’s (2009) study which 
addresses the practice of some bachelors migrating to nearby villages for marriage as a result of 
the severity of the bride shortage in rural China.  
Piper and Roces (2003) in their edited volume have argued that conventional studies of 
labor migration tend to ignore marriage as a result of labor migration but rather uncritically 
categorize Asian female migrants as either labor or marriage migrants. In the course of my 
research I found that marriage as a result of labor migration was also overlooked with regard to 
Taiwanese men who migrate to the PRC. Rather, these men are viewed simply as workers, 
                                                 
3 Greater China refers to Taiwan, Macau, Singapore, Hong Kong and Mainland China 
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managers or business owners, when many are also husbands and fathers. This study builds on the 
work of Piper and Roces (2003) and offers a more nuanced understanding of male migrants as it 
points to the tendency in migration studies to conflate male migration with economic factors, 
while often overlooking issues related to family formation which can come about as a result of 
the process of migration.    
This study considers the case of men, who cross administrative and/or political borders, 
marry and settle primarily in their partner’s homeland. Exploring this practice can offer a fresh 
perspective from which to consider the connections between identity and place. More 
specifically, an important issue I consider involves the interactions between marriage migration 
and gender. For example, in the case of China in particular, patrilocal post-marital residence 
patterns are often cited as one of the primary reasons for women’s disempowerment (Johnson 
1983, Watson 1991). Johnson has argued that traditional Confucian marriage and kinship 
practices “have defined and shaped women’s place in Chinese society more than any other single 
set of factors”(1983:3). This raises the question, how do these dynamics change when the post-
marital residence pattern is neolocal? In some cases, I found that this practice benefited both 
partners as it resulted in mutual upward social mobility. In contrast to many Mainland brides 
who leave their natal homes and have less easy access to their natal family for support, Mei, for 
example settled in her hometown. Her family, who she regularly visited, lived across town, a 
short drive away. Ang benefited on several levels from preferential economic policies designed 
to encourage greater social and economic integration between Taiwan and the Mainland China.  
Mei and Ang also seemed to have more flexibility with regard to gender roles and identity.  By 
documenting the experiences of cross-Strait couples in Mainland China this project offers 
  5 
comparative data to better understand transnational marriage migration as it relates to social 
status, policy, discourse and gender. 
 Secondly this dissertation examines the ability of governments to influence marriage 
practices by asking why marriages between Taiwanese men and Mainland women have 
increased despite Taiwan government policies and discourse that discourage cross-Strait (ROC-
PRC) marriages (Chao 2004, Friedman 2010, Hsia 2007). Conversely why have the PRC’s 
efforts with regard to these marriages been so successful? I found that the increase in these 
marriages is closely related to larger global economic issues that foster increasing economic and 
social integration between the PRC and the ROC, which in turn are tied to government policies 
and discourses on both sites. The PRC’s economic policies effectively draw Taiwanese 
investment and people to the Mainland. However, the ROC’s policies aimed at controlling and 
limiting these practices have been largely ineffective as Taiwanese businesspeople have found 
creative ways to circumvent these policies to gain access to the economic opportunities on the 
Mainland. In addition the ROC’s domestic policies which discriminate against Mainland brides 
and their Taiwanese husbands residing in Taiwan, have resulted in more cross-Strait couples 
choosing to settle and remain in the PRC rather than returning to Taiwan.  
Finally, this dissertation  explores to what extent those involved in cross-Strait intimate 
relationships in the PRC create social spaces, which aid them in reconfiguring their identities in 
response to local, national, and transnational understandings of cross-Strait couples. Above I 
alluded to the ability of these couples to reconfigure their identities in relation to place and social 
space. The ambiguity of their identities as a couple, and their understanding of Minnan culture 
work to open up social spaces which offer them more flexibility with regard to identity.   
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1.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.2.1       Globalization 
 
Despite some scholarly disagreement, modern globalization generally refers to the increased 
movement of people, commodities, ideas and images around the globe as a result of 
technological advances and the spread of neoliberal capitalism4 (Lewellen 2002).5 Some 
theorists of globalization have characterized local areas as passive receivers of the active, 
powerful influences of globalization often lamenting the homogenization or McDonaldization  of 
culture (Ritzer 2000). The work of James Watson (1997), Inda and Rosaldo (2002) and Ulf 
Hannertz (1989), however, call attention to the fact that local populations perceive and modify 
the meanings of cultural imports rather than accept them wholesale. Watson’s (1989) study of 
McDonalds in Hong Kong, for example, revealed the ways that McDonalds has come to be 
viewed as a local phenomenon that offers teenagers a semi-private space where they can study 
and relax in a safe environment. Eriksen (2003) further explains that places are “both imbued 
                                                 
4 Neoliberal capitalism here refers to a “market ideology that seeks to limit the scope and activity of governing”(Ong 
2006:3). The PRC’s unique form of neoliberalism is discussed in chapter 4.   
5 Some have argued that globalization is nothing new but a part of a long historical process (Paterson 
1999,Tomlinson 1997), 
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with local meanings everywhere in the world and connected to pre-existing practices (2003:12).6 
Inda and Rosaldo (2002) used the term “customization” to describe this phenomenon.  
In this study the, “cultural imports” I am concerned with are not things such as 
restaurants, films or technology, but people. In this dissertation I consider the ways that local 
populations in the PRC “customize” the way they perceive and talk about Taiwanese migrants 
who are living in Mainland China. This local discourse is unique with regard to Taiwanese 
migrants in Xiamen, as Xiamen and Taiwan are both considered a part of the Minnan cultural 
area. As a result local understandings of Taiwanese migrants simultaneously spur discourses of 
cultural continuity and difference. This adds another dimension to this study, which is one of my 
primary interests, that is, the varying ways in which some Taiwanese migrants react (or not) to 
these perceptions in their day-to-day lives on the Mainland.   
Much has been said about the ways in which modern globalization has “radically pulled 
apart culture from place” (Inda and Rosaldo 2002:11), and the de and re territorialization of 
culture (Gupta and Ferguson 1997) that has occurred as a result of the increased movement of 
people around the globe. Grewal and Kaplan have argued that that the global and the local have 
become “indefinable and indistinct” (1994:11). In the course of my research however, I have 
found that even though local processes may influence and be influenced by global factors they 
remain distinct. This is reflected in the unique ways that cultural products are customized at the 
local level. My point is that while globalization has resulted in the thickening of the already 
fuzzy borders which delineate the global and the local, these terms are still relevant as each of 
them point to processes that have a profound influence on the lives of both migrants and 
sedentary populations. Given this, I hesitate to use the terms “translocal” (Smith 2001) or 
                                                 
6 See also Miller and Slater 2003. 
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“translocality” (Smart 2002) to explain this process as they tend to minimize the impact of larger 
structures such as laws and policies that are enacted at the national and international level. In this 
study I will regularly use the terms “local” and “global” with the understanding that they are both 
permeable constructs. I will also use the term “transnational” which generally refers to the 
cultural products and capital that move between and across nation states. In applying the term 
transnational however, I am interested in the theoretical aspects of the term (discussed below) 
and am not making a statement regarding Taiwan’s political status.  
 
 
1.2.2 Transnationalism 
 
The term transnationalism, in part, points to the fact that contrary to those who have prophesized 
that globalization marks the beginning of the downfall of the nation-state (Appadurai 1996), 
nation-states continue to play an important role in the movement of people, commodities, ideas 
and images. Glick-Schller (1992) for example, has argued that government policies greatly affect 
whether and how transnational communities form.  
In this vein, many scholars have demonstrated that the extent to which national 
governments allow migrants access to the rights of citizenship can have a profound influence on 
the possible choices available to them (Brennan 2004, Friedman 2010a, b, Hsia 2009, 
Manalansan 2003, Ong 1999, Piper and Roces 2003). Aihwa Ong suggests that the practice of 
transnationalism offers clues as to “how nation-states articulate with capitalism” (1993:3). Ong 
uses the term “flexible citizenship” to call attention to the “cultural logics of capital 
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accumulation…that induce subjects to respond…to changing political-economic conditions” 
(1999:6). Ong’s research highlights the connections between government policy, economics and 
the practice of transnationalism.  
Mika Toyota has convincingly argued that issues involving citizenship have become an 
area of contention between the state and those involved in transnational or international 
marriages because these unions “by their very existence challenge the state and the boundaries of 
its sovereignty” (2008:3).  Most recently Sarah Friedman’s (2010a) study of immigration 
interviews carried out with Mainland brides upon arriving in Taiwan, highlights the ways in 
which issues related to Taiwan’s sovereignty play out during these interviews.  Of particular 
interest to this dissertation is Wang and Belanger’s (2008) study which discusses in part, female 
immigrant spouses in Taiwan and how ROC government concerns about national security and 
“population quality” (renkou suzhi) influence their access to citizenship and work to situate them 
as “others”. Gaining access to citizenship is often cited as an important motivation for marrying 
across national or administrative borders. In the course of my research, however, I found that this 
was not a significant concern for most of my key informants. For some the benefits of settling on 
the Mainland seemed to overshadow any thought of moving to Taiwan. Given Taiwan’s policies 
regarding Mainland brides, economic considerations, and their relatively easy access to support 
systems on the Mainland, some women had no intention of moving to Taiwan and becoming a 
citizen. Further, the PRC’s preferential policies aimed at attracting Taiwanese investment and 
people to the Mainland coupled with Taiwan’s overwhelmingly negative portrayals of Taiwanese 
men who marry Mainland women influenced men’s decisions to settle in the PRC (Chao 2004, 
China Times Daily 2005, Friedman 2010b, Hsia 2009, 2007, Lin 1994, Lu 2008, Ministry of the 
Interior 2004, Taipei Times 2001, Tsay 2004, Wang 2008).  
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Scholars have long studied the ways in which nation-states influence identity. Harold 
Isaacs argued in the 1970s that “basic group identity comes into view most often dressed in 
national colors” (1975:171)7. More recently Akhil Gupta argued that nation-states as “hegemonic 
representations of …spatial identity” are primary “in an increasingly postmodern world” 
(1994:75). Begona Aretxaga noted that “invested with a kind of meta-capital the state remains a 
crucial presence, a screen for political desires and identifications as well as fears” (2003:393). 
My research demonstrates that certain personality traits such as initiative and flexibility can work 
to manipulate these “spatial identities” and improve one’s social location.  
The ways that gender articulates with transnationalism has also become a rich field of 
inquiry. One important topic of research has been to examine the ways in which gender roles are 
reinforced or reconfigured in transnational space. To better understand how gender operates in 
the context of transnational migration, Doreen Massey (1994) developed the concept of “power 
geometry”. Massey argues that some groups use their power and influence to initiate 
transnational flows while others, often those who migrate, are relatively powerless. Sarah Mahler 
and Patricia Pessar built on Massey’s work in developing the “Gendered Geographies of Power” 
conceptual model (2001a:445). Within this model, geographic scales, social location and types 
and degrees of agency are considered to draw attention to the differing ways in which gender 
operates within transnational space. Geographic scales refer to the idea that “gender operates 
simultaneously on multiple spatial and social scales across transnational terrains” (Mahler and 
Pessar 2001a:445). In using the term “social location” the authors refer to the power hierarchies 
in which individuals are embedded and how they influence the ways in which people “think and 
act” (Mahler and Pessar 2001a:446). With regard to agency, Mahler and Pessar acknowledge the 
                                                 
7 See also Benedict Anderson 1983.  
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importance of both individual initiative and imagination in the process of deciding if and how an 
individual will respond in a particular social location. While Massey’s (1994) model might be 
considered dichotomous in that certain groups “initiate flows and movement” while others are 
for the most part, “imprisoned by it” (1994:149). Pessar and Mahler’s model draws attention to 
the complexities of transnationalism, power relations on various scales, social spaces, and 
individual personality and creativity.  
To what extent are transnational migrants embedded, as Mahler and Pessar suggest, in the 
structures of the sending or receiving areas? In many cases transnational migrants ultimately find 
they do not “fit in” at home or abroad as a result of their experiences (Kelsky 2001, Manalansan 
2003). One could argue that this liminal state was influenced by socio-cultural structures in 
several contexts however, these structures do not ultimately inform how people think and act.  
This is clear when we consider the differing ways transnational migrants respond to their 
experiences which are at least in part related to individual characteristics.  
In my research, I found there is significant variation in the ways Taiwanese men living in 
the PRC navigate within the power hierarchies of both Taiwan and the PRC. As Mahler and 
Pessar (2001a) have argued, social locations are variable and, in some cases, related to individual 
initiative and personalities. For example, most Taiwanese men I interviewed found their social 
status elevated in the PRC on some level, while one of my informants, a Taiwanese man (who 
was economically successful and had lived in the PRC for a little over a year), lived a life of 
social isolation and fear. Scholars such as Constable (1999), Kondo (1990), and Margold (1995), 
have argued that a coherent, seamless, bounded and whole sense of identity requires a 
reconfiguration of one’s self-perception in relation to place. This suggests that those more adept 
at reconfiguring their sense of self, transition among and between spatial and social scales more 
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smoothly. Crossing national and administrative borders is one issue, but engaging the local 
culture and working within and across the social boundaries in the receiving area requires 
flexibility with regard to one’s identity.  This ability is similar to what Gutmann has referred to 
as “cultural creativity” that is “ the modus operandi through which people mirror, parrot, 
question, mold, reject, and change both their consciousness and their relationship to the world” 
(2007:xxvii). 
 In this dissertation I consider the ways in which cross-Strait relationships and marriages 
in the PRC, can offer both partners the social flexibility to reconfigure or reinforce their 
gendered identities in relation to the various social settings. As Gutmann has argued, “Ordinary 
men and women are themselves often acutely aware of and influenced in one way or another by 
the dominant often ‘traditional’ stereotypes about men” and I would add, women (2007:14). I 
found that in some cases the adoption of situational identities is a response to the common 
stereotypical view of cross-Strait couples, which calls into question the authenticity of their 
relationships.  
Pei-Chia Lan’s (2006) study of transnational domestic workers in Taiwan demonstrated 
the ways in which local populations maintain and enforce social boundaries in relation to 
transnational migrants from Southeast Asia. In the case of Taiwanese male migrants in Fujian 
Province however, ethnic and linguistic differences are seldom a factor in relation to Fujian 
locals, while perceived class differences often work in the migrants’ favor.8 One of the 
arguments in this dissertation is that forming close intimate relationships with locals in the 
receiving area can open up new social spaces. These require the migrant to reinforce or 
                                                 
8 This is connected to government policies in the PRC which offer Taiwanese migrants preferential treatment, 
particularly in “special economic zones”. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. Also see Chapter 5 
regarding the Minnan Cultural area which includes Fujian province and Taiwan. 
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reconfigure his or her identity more successfully in relation to the receiving society. This 
requires cultural creativity which can in turn contribute to their economic success and social 
status. This can also result in more egalitarian marital relationships. 
Cross-Strait couples living in the ROC however, face a very different situation. Friedman 
has argued that Mainland brides in Taiwan “face a more restrictive set of immigration 
naturalization policies than any other category of marital immigrant” (2010a:77, 2010b). A 
recent article in the Taipei Times reported that Mainland brides in Taiwan have organized and 
carried out several rallies in 2009 demanding that the wait for Taiwanese identification cards be 
reduced from six to four years, which is the standard for other foreign spouses (Taipei Times 
Oct. 29, 2009:2). In addition, they demanded that the ROC recognize PRC university degrees 
and professional licenses because even after gaining Taiwanese citizenship this policy often 
prevents them from finding suitable employment (Taipei Times 2009:2). In response, Chen Wu 
of the Taiwan New Inhabitants Association explained that looking down on Mainland brides is a 
result of years of Taiwanese propaganda which portrays Mainland Chinese people as poor and 
backward (Taipei Times 2009:2). His advice to Mainland brides however is “to be respected, 
they have to raise their own level first,” which implies that the problem is not years of 
propaganda but the low social and educational level of Mainland brides (Taipei Times 2009:2). 
This is not what one would expect from an agency that is meant to assist migrants in integrating 
into society. As with many earlier accounts, this newspaper points out that most of the men who 
marry Mainland brides do so because they are older, poor, often from rural areas and therefore 
cannot find Taiwanese women to marry (Taipei Times 2009:2, Taipei Times 2003:8, Tsay 
2004:15,Yiu 2004:1). Although many of these articles are conciliatory in tone, they nonetheless 
simultaneously reinforce common stereotypes about these couples.   
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Such characterizations are a reflection of anxieties that exist with regard to Taiwan’s 
current state of uncertain sovereignty. These anxieties are steeped in history and are tied to the 
dramatic changes and transformations that have taken place in China and Taiwan since 1949, 
when Taiwan was widely recognized as the “legitimate government of all of China” (Friedman 
2010:168). Since that time Taiwan has gradually lost much of its international recognition with 
the exception of 23 marginalized countries that still conduct official diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan (Friedman 2010:168). Meanwhile the PRC still views Taiwan as a renegade province 
which has always been a part of China. During the course of my fieldwork Xiamen was in a state 
of high alert because of the “Taiwan problem.” Each evening, a large cannon loudly fired in the 
direction of Taiwan. My contacts in Xiamen told me it was a warning. As the number of missiles 
aimed at Taiwan increased, and PRC battleships cruised the Straits, Taiwan was conducting its 
own military exercises to guard against an invasion. Nonetheless, all the while, people continued 
to migrate across the Strait. As China opened up more (Special Economic Zones) SEZ’s to lure 
more Taiwanese investment and people to the Mainland, Taiwan set up more strict immigration 
guidelines with regard to Mainland migrants, the majority of whom are Mainland brides 
(Friedman 2010a,b, Ong 2006). At this particular moment against such a backdrop of political 
tensions and saber-rattling, cultural difference is more vehemently emphasized in Taiwan, while 
cultural continuity is often touted on the Mainland. As a result, cross-Strait couples living in 
Taiwan, as we would expect, have a very different experience than those on the Mainland.  
Many studies have addressed the experiences of Mainland brides and in some cases their 
husbands living in Taiwan (Chao 2004, Friedman 2005, 2006, 2010a, 2010b, Hsia 2006, 2007, 
Tsai 2006, Tsay 2004, Wang 2008). Little, however, has been written about cross-Strait couples 
living on the Mainland with the exception of Hsieh (2001) who points to the ways that Mainland 
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mistresses and second wives are disrupting Taiwanese families, and Shen (2008), who discusses 
Taiwanese men on the Mainland who “purchase intimacy” from Mainland women. While some 
of these characterizations may be true, this dissertation aims to subvert stereotypical views of 
cross-Strait couples in the PRC by documenting their experiences.        
1.2.3 Marriage, Migration and Gender 
As discussed earlier, binary models and discrete classifications such as core/periphery, 
global/local and active/passive, have been highly criticized as they fall short of describing the 
fluidity and permeability of such categories and the lived realities of the post-modern world. In 
this vein, studies of migration, in which women are portrayed as either marriage or labor 
migrants have been rethought. As discussed in the introduction, Nicola Piper and Mina Roces 
(2003) pointed out some of the problems with an either/or scholarly approach and argued that 
many women migrants fit both of these designations, or move between them. Those studies that 
focus primarily on economic factors with regard to women’s migration, according to Morokvasic 
(1984), overlook non-economic or familial factors that influence their migratory decisions.  Mary 
Beth Mills’ (2001) study of Thai women labor migrants for example, shows that, economic 
necessity was not the sole or primary reason for migrating. Rather, for many young women, 
migrating to Bangkok became a rite of passage which often resulted in them acquiring social 
capital upon their return home (Mills 2001). Constable’s (1999) study of migrant Filipina 
domestic workers found that although many women cited economic obligations for choosing to 
work in Hong Kong, other factors including marital or family problems were often arguably 
more important. Hong Kong offered relatively more personal and economic independence for 
many of these women than the Philippines. Studies such as these problematize the concept of 
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“labor migration” simply as economically motivated and draw attention to the complexities of 
analyzing transnationalism and gender. 
Many studies concerning women and marriage migration have also been convincingly 
criticized for portraying these women as disempowered. Some studies describe women as being 
coerced or duped into leaving their homelands only to find themselves in highly vulnerable 
situations (Mix 2002, Thai 2003). Others conflate women’s migration with the trafficking of 
women and describe women as being “commandeered” or “circulated” much like commodities 
(Tolentino 1999:57-66, Ping 1993). Wang and Chang (2002) in their study of marriage brokers 
and their role in the formation of Vietnamese-Taiwan marriages refer to the competitiveness of 
the marriage market in that women are “required to accept reduced prices” for marriage (109). In 
response to such reductionist studies, that tend to depict women as desperate and their actions as 
economically determined, scholars such as Melody Chia-wen Lu call attention to the cultural and 
historic context in which such marriage migrations occur, arguing that marriage brokers in 
southeast Asia often take on traditional forms that involve “localized social networks in which 
women play active roles” (2008:126).9  
Counter to those studies that highlight material or economic interests as the primary 
motivations to cross borders for marriage (Tsay 2004),  scholars have discussed the importance 
of love and nonmaterial desires in  relation to cross-border marriages (Constable 2003, 2005, 
Jolly and Manderson 1997, Schein 2005) and have called attention to the agency of  these 
women and their efforts to transcend social, economic and class barriers by crossing national 
borders (Brennan 2004, Constable 2003, 2005, Kelsky 2001).  
                                                 
9 See also Constable 2003.  
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Studies of male migration however, tend to focus primarily and almost exclusively on 
economic factors and motivations. This brings up the question, why are men who migrate most 
often perceived of as motivated primarily by economic factors?10 Those studies that go beyond 
economic motivations and have focused on men’s roles in cross-border marriage tend to focus on 
men who cross borders in order to find a partner and bring her home (Constable 2003, Schein 
2005). The practice of men migrating, marrying and settling in their partners’ homeland 
however, remains virtually unexplored.   
Hsui-Hua Shen’s compelling study of Taiwanese male migrants in Mainland China, 
focuses on the “sexual consumption” of Chinese women’s bodies by men who, she writes, 
“exercise their economic power to satisfy their taste for sexual and manly power” (2008:72).11 
While the author explains that some of these men form longer-term relationships with Mainland 
women at times taking “temporary wives,” she argues that these relationships are based primarily 
on economic exchange (Shen 2008:61). Shen also claims that most Chinese women involved in 
these relationships are dagongmei (migrant working daughters).12 Although some of the people I 
encountered in the course of my research corresponded with Shen’s findings, I argue that such 
relationships enacted by economic disparity on a temporary basis are only one part of the wider 
picture of PRC-ROC relationships.  
As of 2007, there were over 270,000 legally registered cross-Strait couples living on 
Mainland China (China Daily 2007:2). The majority of these involved Taiwanese men who had 
migrated to the PRC, however Taiwanese male migrants in China continue to be overwhelmingly 
                                                 
10 Jeffery Cohen’s (1999) study in Oaxaca, revealed that male migration was connected to “life-cycle rituals” which 
included marriage and holding public office, but his study involves male migrants returning home with the social 
and economic clout to allow them to find a bride in the local area (55).  
11 The term “consumption” is somewhat problematic in that it gives the impression that women are passive and have 
little or no agency in this practice.  
12 In urban areas this is a derogatory term that implies these women are uneducated country bumpkins and casts 
them as purely as economically motivated.  
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characterized as wage earners and sexual consumers, but seldom if ever, as husbands. This 
oversight, it could be argued, points to a stereotypical view of the gendered identities of men in 
transnational space as primarily wage earners and/or sexual consumers.  In addition, Mainland 
women who marry Taiwanese men are often portrayed as either uneducated country bumpkins or 
scheming vixens that enter into these relationships primarily for economic gain, but this is not 
the whole picture. While in the course of my research I did interview men and women who on 
some level fit into these categories, there were also those that clearly did not. Ang and Mei, 
introduced at the opening of this chapter are both successful business owners. Mei considers 
herself an international business woman. She regularly travels to Italy and France to buy the 
latest fashions for her clothing stores. Ang, who has business associates and friends who do 
engage in the “sexual consumption of women’s bodies”, does not take part in this practice 
because, as he explained he would never do that to Mei (Shen 2008:72). Clearly, not all cross-
Strait intimate relationships are based on economic exchange devoid of emotion. . As Gutmann 
stated  in his important study, “If we look closely, we might just glimpse the creative efforts of 
people coping with the gender relations they have inherited from past generations while 
simultaneously striving to fashion new approaches as best they can” (2006:10).  
In this dissertation I explore this issue by highlighting the variability of PRC-ROC 
marriages on the Mainland and in turn challenging common representations of these marriages, 
which tend to portray them as cold, calculating, emotionless transactions, rather than legitimate 
relationships.  More specifically I examine interactions between these couples and men and 
women at the local level, as well as other Taiwanese migrants currently living in the PRC.  This  
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study addresses the ways in which cross-Strait couples respond to these representations that are 
connected to political, economic, historical, and cultural factors at the global, national and local 
level.   
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation is based on ethnographic field research primarily conducted in Xiamen, 
Shanghai and Zhenjiang. The bulk of my data was collected in Xiamen, from February 2007 to 
March 2008. I also conducted interviews among men and women in Shanghai and Zhenjiang 
from May to August in 2004 and 2005. I chose Xiamen as my primary field site because of its 
close proximity to Taiwan and because of the large number of Taiwanese businesses and 
manufacturing plants that were drawn to the areas special economic zones. In addition, as 
mentioned above both Xiamen and Taiwan are considered a part of the Minnan cultural area 
which added another interesting dimension to this study. I chose Shanghai as a secondary site 
because of the large number of Taiwanese businesspeople living there and because its reputation 
as a cosmopolitan city might offer me a different perspective with regard to local discourse 
involving Taiwanese businesspeople.  I visited Beijing on several occasions to get some varying 
perspectives on this issue. For the sake of comparison I also interviewed cross-border couples 
comprised of men from western countries who had migrated, married and settled in Mainland 
China, and their Mainland wives. 
Throughout my research I employed a number of research techniques. In the summers of 
2004 and 2005, in order to gain insight into local understandings about Taiwanese men, I 
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conducted interviews13 and participant observation with local residents in Shanghai and 
Zhenjiang, some of whom had worked for or knew someone who had worked for Taiwanese 
owned companies. For one month in 2005, I lived with the family of a mid-level manager of a 
Taiwanese manufacturing company in Zhenjiang and did follow up interviews in 2007 and 2008.  
In Xiamen, I spent a great deal of my time with my primary informants Ang and Mei, who 
patiently answered my questions and introduced me to other cross-Strait couples and Taiwanese 
businesspeople living in and visiting the area. After gaining Ang’s trust and agreeing not to share 
the information with his wife regarding “secrets between men” he regularly brought me along 
when entertaining other businessmen from Taiwan and the Mainland.14 These events took place 
in a variety of settings including karaoke bars, restaurants, massage parlors and coffee shops.  
Another of my key informants was Chin-Lung, a Taiwanese manager currently living in 
Xiamen. These interviews offered me a different perspective with regard to the day-to-day lives 
of Taiwanese managers in Xiamen. As his wife and family lived in Taiwan and his personality 
was less than outgoing, he lived a life of isolation constantly aware that he was an outsider, and 
often considered himself a target of both the local population and China’s Central Government. 
While Chin-Lung was not involved in a cross-Strait marriage his constant articulations about the 
differences between himself and the local people were a great source of information and worked 
to emphasize the anxieties experienced by some Taiwanese migrants on the Mainland. Chin-
Lung’s experiences and perspectives contrasted greatly with Taiwanese men who were more 
integrated into the local community. His inclusion in this dissertation serves to emphasize the 
importance of individual personality, cultural creativity and flexibility in the migrant experience 
                                                 
13 The majority of my interviews were carried out in Mandarin unless noted otherwise.  
14 Both Ang and Mei however, had no problem with me using this information in my dissertation. As Ang put it, “no 
one I know has the time or the interest in reading dissertations, let alone those written in English”. 
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particularly amidst the geo-political backdrop I briefly described above. Finally, my experiences 
with Chin-Lung offered a different perspective of what it means to be a Taiwanese male living 
on the Mainland.        
I interviewed locals in Xiamen, including a television producer who established a local 
television channel geared towards Taiwanese people living in Xiamen. Some of the most fruitful 
of my interviews took place in “The Way”; a local home converted into a bar that was frequented 
by local residents.  I spoke weekly with the owner, his uncle and his cousin, about my research 
and they were instrumental in providing me an entry point for speaking with their customers in 
an environment where many local men and women felt more at ease to voice their critical views 
about relationships between Taiwanese men and local women.  
My interviewees are not representative of China as a country, Fujian as a province or 
Xiamen as a city. Nor are they meant to be. In the course of my research I came to realize that it 
is often our informants who chose us rather than the other way around.  I am indebted to those 
who took the time to share their perspectives and experiences with me during such a tense 
political and social period. I do not intend to generalize my findings to a wider population but 
rather offer a different viewpoint than that which is commonly published.   
In the course of my research I also collected local and national newspaper and magazine 
articles that were related to the topic of cross-border marriages. While in the field I continued to 
collect on-line media sources (a project I began in 2005) from both Taiwan and the Mainland, 
both in Chinese and English, that broached the subject of cross-Strait marriages and government 
policies and programs that are related to this practice. I also monitored an internet support site 
for Mainland brides in Taiwan, and chat rooms based in the PRC that broached the subject of 
cross-Strait intimate relationships and marriage.  
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Throughout my field research I tried to remain fully aware of my positionality as a male 
researcher from the United States.  Most often my informants introduced me as “my American 
friend, Qiao Deng” (my Chinese name). The local residents I interviewed in Xiamen and 
Zhenjiang (relatively small cities by Chinese standards) were often visibly proud to introduce me 
as such. In many cases this worked to my advantage in recruiting interviewees. However, my 
Americaness also influenced the ways many interviewees responded to my questions. I was 
clearly an outsider and my subject matter, cross-Strait marriage and social relationships, often 
resulted in standard party-line responses regarding Taiwanese men living in the PRC. The most 
common of these was “they are just like us” or “we are all Chinese”. This was understandable, 
given that throughout the course of my fieldwork the PRC was promoting new programs to 
enhance educational and cultural integration with Taiwan, which highlighted cohesion and 
sameness rather than difference. As mentioned above, during the same period however, its 
military base was on high alert because of the “Taiwan problem.” I often wondered if the local 
population was also on “high alert” or at least very careful about how they responded to my 
questions. My connections at The Way were integral in getting past these initial responses.  
When I interacted with Taiwanese businesspeople in Xiamen they also made it a point to 
introduce me as their American friend perhaps in part, to enhance their images, as worldly 
businesspeople with international contacts. One of my informants would often “speak English”, 
although he only knew a couple of words. He would utter incomprehensible phrases to me 
followed by a smile or laugh to impress his business contacts. Another, realizing that I was a 
student began introducing me as “Dr. Qiao from America” which, given that I was older than 
most Chinese students, would not have made sense to his contacts  in their 30’s and 40’s who 
were  roughly my age. Many of these men were often in the company of meimeis (young 
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women) which worked to bolster or accessorize their images as successful desirable men. I found 
it rather ironic that I too was an accessory, often used to increase their social status. Like the 
young women that regularly accompanied them, I was also working, and my access to “work” 
was often contingent on my informants deciding to contact me (often on short notice) when they 
wanted to spend time together or attend a social event. At times it felt much like an exchange, 
which while sometimes making me feel uncomfortable, did also offer me the opportunity to 
collect useful data.   
While my being American often seemed to contribute to the brevity of some of my 
interviews with local Mainland people my position as a middle-aged male outsider who is 
married to a Mainland woman, did much to put my Taiwanese informants at ease.  First, I was an 
outsider, a laowai (foreigner) a group to which many also considered themselves to belong at 
some level. “We are all laowai here” one informant commented somewhat tongue in cheek. 
However, it is important not to overstate the extent of this commonality. Among other things, I 
was clearly not ethnic Chinese, and my linguistic skills while strong, are not on par with a native 
speaker. The fact I was a foreign man married to a Mainland women (my wife Qian is from 
Shanghai) often worked to deepen conversations regarding Mainland women as many of these 
men had relationships of some sort, with PRC women. In some way this assured my key 
informant (Ang) that I wouldn’t reveal his secrets to his wife about “men’s places.” The 
reputation of middle-aged Western men regularly having sexual encounters with Mainland 
women also led many to assume that I related to local women in the same way that many of them 
did. I was also roughly the same age as many of these men, which usually worked in my favor. 
As one of my informants explained “We are in our forties. We don’t need any problems. We 
should enjoy life.”  Finally, there is a sort of camaraderie between men which made me privy to 
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issues related to “empty talk between men” a term one of my informants used to refer to male 
bravado when in the company of other men. For example, one informant explained that while he 
might want to give the appearance of a man who regularly has many sexual encounters with 
young women, he has always been true to his wife. This led me to question the results of earlier 
surveys that concluded that over 70% of married Taiwanese men living on the Mainland have 
sexual relations with Mainland women (Chiu and Lin 1994), and subsequent articles that claim 
this number is too conservative (Hsieh 2001, Shen 2008). I would not be surprised if many 
Taiwanese men living on the Mainland, when asked this question by another Taiwanese man or 
woman would exaggerate this fact to bolster their status as successful desirable businessmen. 
While I contend that these numbers may be inflated, sexual relationships between ROC men and 
PRC women are prevalent on the Mainland.    
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE TEXT 
The following chapter entitled “Chinese Marriage: Tradition and Change,” is an overview of 
Chinese marriage law since the Qing Dynasty and the ways in which these laws were enforced 
(or not). This Chapter’s purpose is to put current marriage laws and practices in a historical 
context and to point out the uneasy relationship between government policies and marriage 
practices. One of the primary contributions of this chapter is that it highlights the ways in which 
marriage policy reforms are interpreted and enforced at the local level, and are therefore often 
skewed towards “traditional” ideas and practices. This form of localized interpretation and 
enforcement is clearly gendered as it is most often carried out by men. I argue that this is one of 
the primary reasons that many “traditional” expectations with regard to marriage and gender 
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relations continue to be so influential despite the numerous marriage law reforms that have been 
enacted since the Republican period (1911-1949).  This coupled with the long tradition of 
patrilocal post-marital residence practices wherein the bride marries into her husband’s family 
has effectively normalized the practice of women migrating for marriage. Mainland men 
however, who migrate for marriage are overwhelmingly understood as social outcasts.    
Chapter 3, “Marriage migration and Gender in China,” is comprised of two parts. The 
first, “crossing borders” focuses on the experiences of brides in the PRC and the ways that 
patrilocal post-marital residence patterns influence their day-to-day lives. This section also 
addresses the hukou (household registration) and the danwei (work unit) systems and their 
influence on domestic marriage migration in China. The second part of this chapter focuses on 
migrant grooms and local brides, their stories and the ways in which this form of marriage is 
viewed in the PRC.  I argue that while Mainland men who migrate, marry and settle in or near 
their wife’s natal home are often considered outcasts, husbands who migrate from abroad are not 
as they are not held to the same standard.  In this chapter I introduce three “marriage-scapes” to 
illustrate my main points.       
 Chapter 4 “Cross-Strait Socio-economic Relations: Policies, Practice and Change,” 
begins with a historical overview of cross-Strait economic policies and marriage law both in 
Taiwan and in the PRC. Their differing agendas with regard to cross-Strait interactions are 
reflected in both policies and media representations which offer a glimpse into the ways that 
each government works to police marriage practices. I also consider the ways that individual 
practices can influence larger structures, highlighting recent changes in government policies that 
have come about as a result of these practices. Finally, I examine the ways in which government 
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policies related to cross-Strait interactions and marriage have resulted in such a disparity in local 
understandings of cross-Strait couples.  
Chapter 5 “Transnational Business Class: Taiwanese Migrants and Social Locations,” is 
divided into 2 major themes. First I draw on Mahler and Passar’s concept of “social location” 
and focus on Taiwanese migrants living in the PRC and the social locations they occupy by 
considering the different ways that local people perceive and talk about these migrants in 
Shanghai, and Zhenjiang, pointing to the ways in which these representations are embedded in 
historical experiences and cultural factors. I also include comments from a chat room based in 
the PRC in which primarily Mainland women discuss their experiences and impressions of 
Taiwanese men. This section points to customization and the importance of local processes 
within the practice of transnationalism.  
In the second part of this chapter I focus specifically on Xiamen’s unique situation as an 
integral part of the Minnan cultural area, and the ways that this simultaneously produces 
discourses of inclusion and exclusion with regard to Taiwanese migrants. I briefly discuss a 
recent media campaign in the PRC which aims at improving the local perceptions of Taiwanese 
businessmen by highlighting the experiences of Huang Jinshan a Taiwanese “model” 
businessman who migrated to Xiamen. I explore the variability of social locations Taiwanese 
migrants occupy in Xiamen and highlight the importance of individual personality, creativity and 
initiative in influencing these locations. This section is based on interviews and my experiences 
interacting with Taiwanese migrants and is concerned with how they view themselves in relation 
to the local population and how this influences their day-to-day lives. I examine how social 
locations shift in relation to place and social space, focusing on how they respond to these shifts 
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which points to their ability or inability  to reconfigure their identities in relation to changing 
social and spatial contexts.   
 In Chapter 6 “A Cross-Strait Couple in Xiamen: Ang and Mei,” I focus on the coping 
strategies this couple in particular employs in their day-to-day lives to subvert or in some cases 
enforce local discourses about cross-Strait couples in Xiamen. I examine the different ways they 
create, maintain and manipulate social boundaries in relation to various social and spatial 
environments. In this chapter I argue that the practice of cross-Strait marriage can offer both 
partners the social space in which to manipulate these boundaries more smoothly and can result 
in upward social mobility for each of them. This however, depends heavily upon individual 
personality and cultural creativity.  
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2.0  MARRIAGE IN MAINLAND CHINA: CUSTOMS, LAW AND COMPROMISE 
“In the fifty years since the founding of the New China, there has not been any law that 
has caused such a widespread concern from ordinary people” (Ding Lu of the All China 
Women’s Federation  Jan 2001, commenting on China’s marriage law debates). 
  “Legal moralists do not understand how important the existence of private space is to a 
modern society”. 
 (Qiu Renzhong of The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences commenting on the 
revisions to China’s 1980 Marriage law). 
 
To fully appreciate the uniqueness of transnational and cross-Strait marriages in Mainland China, 
it is important to look at Chinese marriage and marriage regulation within a wider historical and 
cultural context. To this end, this chapter is an overview of Chinese marriage law since the Qing 
Dynasty. This section highlights the intersections of customary practices, marriage law and the 
compromises that have ensued.  The aims of this chapter are 1) to point out the ongoing uneasy 
relationship between the state and issues related to marriage and family regulation, 2) to discuss 
some of the compromises that have followed these laws and the unforeseen often gendered 
consequences that followed and 3) to put current marriage practices in a wider historical context.   
Given the ongoing debates in the United States with regard to what forms of marriage the 
state recognizes as “legitimate” it should come as no surprise that states have a keen interest in 
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regulating marriage and family formation.  Michael Warner (1999) has argued that marriage is 
an institution which works through regulation to connect personal desires to state goals (see also 
Friedman 2005). One of the primary considerations of this section is to tease out the connections 
between state building and marriage regulation by discussing the enactment and major revisions 
of marriage law and civil codes related to marriage and family that have taken place in China 
since the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). A popular proverb “fa bu ze zhong,” loosely translated 
states that once a practice has become commonplace, laws are unable to control this practice.  In 
this vein, I will highlight the ways in which some marriage customs and practices have 
influenced marriage laws and the enforcement of these laws by reviewing some of the key 
compromises that have taken place as a result of local practices. This section also provides a 
historical context from which current practices and ideas regarding marriage in China have 
emerged.  
Scholars have long argued that China’s social reforms including the 1950 Marriage Law 
and women’s rights policies that emerged during the Cultural Revolution, rather than improving 
women’s status in China, “have done more to restore the traditional role and structure of the 
family than to fundamentally reform it” (Johnson 1983:215).  Honig and Hershatter, in their 
study of how the social and economic changes of the 1980’s affected the status of women, found 
that while the situation has improved for women since 1949, gender hierarchy in China is “not 
withering away” as many families would still prefer to have sons rather than daughters 
(1988:340). In a later study, based on observations made in the early 1990’s, Cecilia Milwertz 
(1997) found that many pre-revolutionary assumptions about gender relations and marriage and 
family had reemerged. One clear example is the ideal of the “virtuous wife and good mother” in 
which the mother plays out her traditional role by expending countless hours and resources on 
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the education of her child (Davis and Sensenbrenner 2000). Given the continual revision of 
China’s Marriage laws aimed at improving the rights of women, how can we explain this re-
resurgence of “traditional” gender roles? Part of the answer is related to the historical 
intersections of marriage law and local practices.  
In the course of researching this topic it became clear that one of the ongoing challenges 
with regard to the establishment of civil codes and marriage law was how to reconcile state or 
national policies with local customs and practices. For example, in the early 1800’s a Qing 
magistrate in Guanxi province became aware of the practice of natolocality, in which the bride, 
following the marriage ceremony returned to her natal home where she was allowed intercourse 
with one or more lovers, only returning to her husband’s home to give birth to her first child 
(David 2001:64). Regardless of the child’s biological father, the child was considered to be that 
of the husband and wife, and was integrated into the father’s lineage (David 2001:64).However 
when the magistrate attempted to prohibit this practice referring to it as “illicit intercourse,” he 
was opposed by local notables who claimed that this was no threat to civil law and merely 
delayed the effects of marriage (Bourgon 2004:103). Ultimately, the magistrate was told to 
“mind his official duty” (Bourgon 2004:103). The Qing Dynasty was known for its strict code of 
moral conduct and the harsh penalties it imposed on those who failed to comply, including 
delayed strangulation and beheading (Ebrey 2004:420).  The following excerpt however, from a 
Qing code proclamation addresses the local customs in Zhangzhou (Fujian province) and urges 
locals to reform these practices.15 
 
 
                                                 
15 The wording in this proclamation is uncharacteristically softer than was the standard for Qing proclamations that 
generally listed the crime followed by the required punishment (Huang 2001).  
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It should be understood that the marital relationship between husband and wife is chief  
among the human moral relationships. The rites and laws regarding betrothal and engagements 
are very strict. However, the customs of this region include what is called “looking after 
someone,” that is, living openly with a woman who is neither a wife nor a concubine. Another is 
called “elopement,” when two people who are not betrothed seduce each other and flee in 
secrecy. No violating of the rites and breaking of the law is more serious. The offenders should 
urgently reform so as to avoid punishment (Bary 1999:749).  
 
This passage points to one of the basic characteristics of the Qing code which upheld the 
ideology of the state but also (often through a sub-statute) recognized local practices (Huang 
2001:157). The primary reason for this was that in the Qing dynasty civil codes related to 
marriage, family and inheritance were categorized as “minor matters” that were “supposed to be 
dealt with by society itself” (Huang 1998:6). When such disputes failed to be resolved at the 
community level and were brought to the court, magistrates preferred to defer to “kin mediation” 
rather than rule on these cases (Huang 1998:12). When they did rule on issues concerning 
marriage and family, however, more often than not the ruling came at the expense of the rights of 
women and children. For example during the Qing dynasty the selling of wives and daughters 
was illegal, but the practice was so widespread in some areas that the courts considered it a 
“plight of the poor” which needed to be “treated with sympathy, not punished by law” (Huang 
2001:161). The practice of ignoring or reconciling local practices with overarching laws relating 
to marriage and family is not a recent phenomenon in China (See also Ebrey 2004). Nor is it 
uncommon for the results of such compromises to be gendered.  
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While issues related to marriage were generally considered minor matters there are 
exceptions.  What has been termed the “Qing Imperial Chastity Cult” refers, in part, to the 
obsession with upholding the chastity or purity of daughters and wives during the late Qing 
(Sommers 2000:10). One example is a sub-statute (945) passed in 1725 that protects married 
servants (but not unwed ones) from unwanted intercourse with the master of the household 
(Sommers 2000:48). The punishment for this infraction was 40 blows with a light bamboo, the 
lightest penalty in the Qing code (Sommers 2000:48).16  Should a husband catch his wife having 
sexual relations with another he was justified under law to kill both her and her partner if he 
acted out of righteous anger (Sommers 2000:42). Some have suggested that the increased 
obsession with chastity during this period was influenced by a severe shortage of brides and the 
large number of bachelors (guang gun) who were unable to find brides (Telford 1992:924, 
Sommers 2000:13). The purpose of these laws seems to be to protect the husband’s right to 
exclusive sexual access to his wife, rather than to protect the rights of women.    
 
2.1 REPUBLICAN PERIOD MARRIAGE LAW 
Following the fall of the Qing dynasty, legal reformers of the Republican period (1911-1949) 
drafted new legislation with regard to marriage and family matters. Local surveys were 
undertaken by government “investigators of customs” aimed at “reforming evil popular habits” 
resulting in a revamped civil code (Bourgon 2004:103).  While early republican lawmakers had 
                                                 
16 If another servant or outsider, on the other hand, had intercourse with a female servant the punishment was 100 
blows with a heavy bambo (Sommers 2000:48). 
  33 
drafted these codes they did not publish or enact them for twenty years in order to “allow for a 
period of transition and because they thought the old codes closer to Chinese realities” during 
that period (Huang 1998:9). Finally in 1931 when these codes were implemented, for the first 
time in China, civil rights were “guaranteed to any person, in full equality, without distinction of 
race, sex, or age” (Bourgon 2004:107).  In the last two parts of the code which dealt with familial 
relationships and inheritance, “marriage was defined as a union formed by the express will of 
both the groom and the bride” (Bourgon 2004:107). Therefore, forced marriages arranged by 
parents were forbidden (Bourgon 2004:107).17 The law also stated that both wife and husband 
owned and managed family wealth, and both had the right to initiate divorce (article 1049).18  
While the establishment of these new codes offered new rights and individual freedoms, 
they came at a price as they were tied to the establishment of a new moral order.  This new moral 
order combined with surveys that documented  local practices,  allowed the state to more 
accurately distinguish what practices were to be “disciplined” (Foucault 1995).  The 
acculturation of the local elite via these new legal standards and moral principles coupled with 
ongoing surveys, allowed state power to “permeate local society” (Bourgon 2004:103-104). The 
result was somewhat of a catch-22. While many of these reforms may sound quite reasonable, 
many of them conflicted with established practices therefore those who lived more “traditional” 
lives had suffered a loss of personal freedoms or were, in some cases completely overlooked in 
the drafting of these codes.           
                                                 
17 This is contrary to the Qing code which considered marriage an agreement between two families (rather than two 
individuals) which was presided over by the heads of the families (Huang 2001:163).  
18 A major change was the addition of equal property inheritance rights for all children, which until this time only 
included male heirs (article 1138). 
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As early republican lawmakers had feared, these new laws conflicted with some of the 
well established Qing codes which were deeply entrenched in Chinese society.  It is estimated 
that  30 to 40 percent of the Qing codes had been enforced since the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE) 
over nine hundred years before the Qing came to power (Jones 2004:49). Arguably, over such a 
long period of time these codes had become well established customs. As a result, the republican 
civil codes, like the Qing codes, would also be subject to compromise.  For example, while the 
Qing codes guaranteed rights to secondary wives or concubines, under the new code concubines 
and their children were considered “illegitimate” and had no rights of inheritance (Bourgon 
2004:108). In an interesting compromise the Supreme Court appended  article 985 which 
affirmed monogamy, while also granting concubines and their children the same rights offered 
by Qing law (Bourgon 2004:108).  
With regard to equal rights of inheritance, although the new code guaranteed equality of 
inheritance to sons and daughters, an article in the code allowed for “pre-mortem gifts” which 
provided a “legal way for fathers and brothers to cut daughters off completely” (Bourgon 
2004:109). Compromises and loopholes such as these, point to the fact that the old Qing laws 
continued to not only persist but in some cases overruled the new codes.  Bourgon (2004) 
explains that “in the countryside family wealth was still transmitted according to old rules” and 
“even urbanized young men who paid lip service to gender equality went on marrying secondary 
wives” (Bourgon 2004:109). As more compromises were made and more articles added to the 
code, it lost its teeth. But this would change with the founding of the PRC in 1949 and the 
subsequent creation of the hukou and danwei systems.  
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2.2 MARRIAGE LAW OF 1950 
As Alford and Shen have argued “it was not coincidental that the first major law promulgated by 
the PRC was the Marriage Law of 1950” as the reconception of family is closely connected to 
making broad political changes (2004:237). Given China’s long history of powerful families 
competing for political and military control this was a primary concern of the newly founded 
PRC.  The self-described goal of this legislation was to eliminate “the feudalistic marriage and 
family system in Mainland China” (Chen 2004:169) by “uprooting traditional hierarchies and 
freeing women from oppressive marriages” (Alford and Shen 2004:249). When this law was 
originally put into effect, granting women the right to marry the person of their choosing, 
millions of rural marriages were dissolved “often at the initiative of women” (Alford and Shen 
2004:238, Chen 2004:160).19 The law also explicitly “prohibited all forms of polygamy” 
including concubinage (Santos 2009:134). It was during this period that the PRC established the 
danwei (work unit) and hukou (household registration) systems which allowed government to 
permeate the day-to-day lives of its citizens through surveillance and enforcement at the local 
level.  
                                                 
19 The 1953 Marriage law campaign sought to limit the number of divorces that were granted and spurred a long 
running debate about whether divorce and for that matter, marriage should be understood in material or more 
personal terms (Alford and Shen 2004:249-250). This debate culminated with the 1980 Marriage Law. 
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2.3 THE DANWEI  SYSTEM 
The danwei 20 system in the cities and the commune system in the countryside emerged as the 
basic organizational form as it arranged housing, work, entertainment, pensions and gave 
“considerable definition to marriage and other dimensions of family life” (Alford and Shen 
2004:239). The danwei and hukou (household registration) systems proved to be a powerful 
means through which government could permeate society (Bray 2005:2). While the hukou 
system21 controlled population movement, the danwei system focused on the workplace, which 
“supplanted the family and clan as the central unit of social organization” (2005:196). One result 
of this is that this system “produced a different form of subjectivity…a collective subjectivity 
focused around production and political participation” (2005:197).  Marriage was more than a 
union of two people, or for that matter, two families. Rather marriage was a political statement. 
Marriage was a vehicle through which the government could increase production and control 
reproduction. One’s danwei circumscribed the “social space within one was likely to find a 
spouse” where the couple would reside, and provided a means through which “marital or other 
familial disputes might be addressed” (Bray 2005:239, see Marriage-scape 1 below).  
The Great Famine of the early 1960s followed by the social upheaval of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) marked the beginning of the end of the danwei system.22  Given the 
slow demise of the danwei  system, coupled with the market reforms that were put in place since 
                                                 
20 The term danwei often translated as “unit” or “work unit” encompasses much more than the name implies. Bray 
has argued that the term denotes, “a specific form of social organization that came to dominate socialist China’s 
cities” (2005:3).   
21 While the danwei system is in decline, the hukou system remains a primary vehicle for the CCP to monitor and 
control population movements and differentiate between rural and urban citizens. This important issue will be 
discussed in the following section. 
22 Bray argues that while the danwei is in a state of “terminal decline” its features “will affect urban China for many 
years to come” (2005:201).  
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1978 many have argued that the family unit has re-emerged as the “principal unit of economic 
organization”(Alford and Shen 2004:239). While this may on some level be the case the danwei 
system has not completely disappeared. Many families take advantage of the benefits of the 
danwei while also engaging in private business. This practice is cleverly referred to as the “one 
family two systems” (yijia liangzhi) model in which one spouse remains in a state-run enterprise, 
which provides a link to the security of the danwei, while the other becomes an entrepreneur 
(Bray 2005:169).23   
Others have claimed that the ongoing demise of the danwei marks a shift in subjectivity 
from danwei ren (person of the work unit) to (the social person) shehui ren (Bray 2005:158).24 
However, many aspects of the danwei system are still prevalent today albeit in different forms. 
For example, the government established the shequ jianshe (community building) system to fill 
the gaps left by the danwei (Bray 2005:187-188).25 The shequ provides a “comprehensive 
network for ensuring that all aspects of shequ life are kept under close scrutiny” (Bray 
2005:188). To sum up, while the gradual demise of the danwei coupled with the transition to a 
market economy has resulted in more economic and social mobility for some, government 
programs such as the shequ jianshe and the hukou system have a profound influence in shaping 
the choices available to its citizens through surveillance and regulation.   
 
                                                 
23 This is a play on “one country two systems” (yiguo liangzhi) with regard to the governance of  Mainland China 
and Hong Kong. 
24 Shehui ren refers to individualized forms of identity in which “identity is created through individual agency within 
the social realm—unmediated by the constraints of any collective groupings” (Bray 2005:157). 
25 The shequ covers a wide range of responsibilities including, welfare services, disseminating socialist education 
and solving disputes among residents. For a more detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the shequ see Bray 
2005.  
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2.4 THE HUKOU  SYSTEM 
While the danwei and commune systems shaped Chinese citizen’s work, housing and social 
environment, the hukou (household registration) system insured that these citizens “stay in their 
place” both geographically and socially (Sun 2009:8). Unlike the danwei system however, the 
hukou system, implemented in 1958, rather than withering away is still in full effect albeit with 
`several reforms26. In fact, the hukou book, which records household characteristics, has been 
referred to as “China’s No. 1 document” because it can “determine many important aspects of 
life, if not the fate of the majority of China’s people” (Chan 2009:198, Tian 2003). Coupled 
initially with the rural commune system and later to include the urban danwei, the hukou system 
requires every citizen to register through their local hukou office (Chan 2009, Yang and Cai 
2003). Based in part, on the Russian propiska (internal passport) this system works to monitor 
and control urban growth in part, by regulating rural to urban migration (109th Congress 
2005:29). In doing so however, this system also created a “legal and practical distinction 
between peasants (who have rural hukou) and non-peasants (who have urban hukou)” (Chan 
2009, Dutton 1992, Sun 2009:7). While those with urban hukou enjoy a host of entitlements such 
as subsidized housing, public education and medical care those with rural hukou do not. The 
disparity of Benefits and entitlements between those holding a rural hukou and those holding an 
urban hukou is so pronounced that those with rural hukou have been referred to as second-class 
                                                 
26 The reforms of 1978 and 1979 worked to more tightly control the migration of workers from the countryside to 
urban areas (Chan 2009:204). In 1984 a new hukou category was introduced; “hukou with self-supplied food grain” 
which referred to migrants that are not offered welfare benefits from the state (Chan and Zhang 1999, Chan 
2009:204). In 1985 a new national policy was implemented which allowed citizens to apply for temporary residence 
status, but without a local hukou the state offered them no benefits (Solinger 1999). In 1997 and 2001measures were 
introduced to ease hukou conversions to small towns (Chan 2009:205).  A reform measure in 1998 allowed for 
hukou conversions of children or elderly parents and those who had the money or skills stipulated by the 
government at the local level (Chan 2009:205).   
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citizens (Sun 2009:7, Wang 2005, Solinger 1999.) Smart and Lin have referred to this 
phenomenon as “local citizenship” wherein “processes of entitlement and exclusion are 
accomplished locally rather than through national frameworks” (2007:280). The hukou system is 
so pervasive in the lives of Chinese citizens that one’s hukou type has become a form of social 
capital, elevating the status of those with urban hukou often well above those with rural hukou. 
Recently the PRC press has criticized the hukou system and its effects on society (Chen 
2010:1). One week before the yearly meeting of Chinese legislators over a dozen newspapers 
published editorials calling for an end to the residence permits (Chen 2010:1).  These effects 
have been so highly publicized that in Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao’s opening address to 
China’s parliamentary session in 2010 he declared that China needed to reform the hukou system 
which categorizes citizens as either rural or urban dwellers in order to “reverse the income gap” 
(Bristow 2010:1).   
2.5 THE 1980 MARRIAGE LAW 
As the Cultural Revolution had destroyed China’s marriage and family laws the 1980 Marriage 
Law restored the rule of law into the realm of marriage and family (Chen 2004:169).27 It was in 
this context that the Marriage Law of 1980 was drafted. In many ways this law reaffirmed the 
rights guaranteed in the laws of 1950 including the affirmation of the equality of men and 
women and confirmed the principle of freedom of divorce (Chen 2004:169).28 In addition rights 
                                                 
27 During the Cultural Revolution many marriages were terminated on political grounds (Alford and Shen 
2004:250).  
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of inheritance were reaffirmed. However, as in the past, the implementation of these laws 
resulted in a fierce debate.  
One of the primary issues that were heavily debated concerned article 25 of 1980 
Marriage Law which states that the courts should “grant a divorce upon finding that a marriage 
had broken down emotionally [ganqing que yi polie]” (Alford and Shen 2004:250, Chen 
2004:170). Initially, many argued that the court needed to define what constitutes a breakdown 
of emotion. In response in 1989 the court identified fourteen situations which constituted a 
breakdown of emotions. These however, also proved to be problematic as these fourteen points 
included “physical inability to consummate the marriage” and a “prolonged unexplained absence 
of one’s spouse” which some argued could have little to do with a breakdown of emotions 
(Alford and Shen 2005:251). Others argued that using the term “emotion” was inappropriate 
given the “relative unimportance of emotional considerations in the decisions of many Chinese 
to marry” (Alford and Shen 2005:251). Xia Zhen of the People’s Congress Standing Committee, 
however while admitting that only three out of ten Chinese marriages were “love unions”, argued 
that this was the very reason article 25 was adopted, citing the “breakdown of emotion standard” 
as a way for women who had been coerced into marriage a legal avenue for divorce (Alford and 
Shen 2004:252).    
Another “feudal” practice that had become more commonplace during this period was the 
practice of being involved in extramarital affairs or husbands taking unofficial “second wives” 
[bao er nai](Alford and Shen 2004:246). In some cases husbands used this practice as a loophole 
in response to the one-child policy usually when their first child was a daughter (Chinese 
Woman’s News 1999:2). While bigamy was forbidden under criminal law,29 the 1980 Marriage 
                                                 
29 In Chinese criminal law bigamy could only be prosecuted if both marriages were registered with the state. 
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Law, unlike the 1950 Law did not bar concubinage or bigamy (Alford and Shen 2004:246). In 
addition the 1980 Marriage Law did not directly address the issue of domestic violence, which 
was a principle concern of the All China Women’s Federation (Alford and Shen 2004:253).The 
debates over these issues culminated with the creation of the 2001 Marriage Law. 
2.6 THE 2001 MARRIAGE LAW 
The 2001 Marriage Law was the first to address the issue of domestic violence or “bad habits” 
and allowed the victims of abuse the ability to seek compensation (Alford and Shen 2005:255). 
However, the law does not define “domestic violence” or “bad habits” (Alford and Shen 
2005:254). With language such as, “husband and wife shall be faithful to and respect each other” 
much was left to interpretation (Alford and Shen 2005:254). With regard to compensation upon 
divorce, the law is no less vague. One section states for example that the “greater duties that [a 
spouse] has fulfilled in the past in bringing up children, waiting on elders may result in 
compensation” (Alford and Shen 2005:255). The law also cites other possible payments such as 
“appropriate assistance if one party meets difficulties in life” (Alford and Shen 2005:25). Some 
claim that the vague language and lack of concrete definitions  within these laws are  somewhat 
of a compromise, to allow those interpreting the law more room for local customs and practices 
(Alford and Shen 2005:371). Chen Mingxia makes a strong point in arguing that the law needs 
further revisions as in its current state it “relies wholly on the good will of judges” making it 
difficult to enforce (2004:168).  
This short history of Marriage law in China highlights the difficulties in reconciling local 
customs and practices with marriage law. Deeply entrenched customs such as arranged marriages 
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have been illegal since the Republican period (1911-1949) but continue to persist today. A 
survey carried out by the All-China Women’s Federation in 2000 found that over 16 percent of 
rural women were involved in arranged marriages (Chen 2004:162).30 Given that under the law 
arranged marriages are “invalid”, one would assume that divorce would be a viable option for 
those involved in a marriage against their will.  However, given  that  few lawyers outside of 
major cities are involved in cases related to marriage litigation, and that local judges who hear 
such cases are predominantly men who have had little training regarding issues of marriage, 
divorce is often not  a viable option (Alford and Shen 204:259).  
 The practice of what has been referred to as “buying a bride” has been illegal in China 
since the adoption of the 1950 Marriage Law (Davin 2008:71). Since economic reform and 
China’s increasing prosperity, however, it has made a comeback resulting in what some refer to 
as the comodification or “commercialisation of marriage” (Davin 2008:71, Lu 2008:125). In 
some cases, unscrupulous marriage brokers and matchmakers deceive potential brides with 
bogus information about their prospective husbands or are reputed to sell them to prostitution 
rings after promising them a husband in a wealthy area (Ping 1993). Prospective husbands and 
their families have also been taken advantage of as many pay at least part of their fee up front, 
but the bride-to-be may never arrive (Han and Eades 1995: 861-65).  
It is important to note that while these practices do exist, those who use the services of a 
broker or matchmaker should not necessarily be considered being involved in the “trafficking of 
women,” nor should these women be thought of as powerless victims in this process (Constable 
2006).  Despite some problems, commercially introduced or arranged marriages have become 
increasingly more common in China. While matchmaking services have recently been put under 
                                                 
30 This figure had dropped considerably since 1994 when 28.98 percent of rural women stated that their marriages 
had been arranged by their parents (Chen 2004:162). There is no data regarding men and arranged marriages. 
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stricter control by the Chinese government, the industry in general is encouraged by the 
government. For example, the General Secretary of the China Social Work Association claimed 
that “the growing industry has made great contributions toward building a more harmonious 
society” (Xie 2007:10).  
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The tradition of reconciling local practices with China’s Marriage Laws and civil codes has 
resulted in the law being interpreted in relation to local understandings of marriage and gender 
roles, often reinforcing rather than reconfiguring these ideas at the local level. Local 
interpretations of China’s marriage law coupled with patrilocal post-marital residence patterns 
have played a large part in upholding traditional views regarding the social location of women in 
China. Further, the long tradition of women marrying out has resulted in women being thought 
of as appropriate marriage migrants, while Mainland men who migrate, marry and settle in their 
wives natal home are considered social outcasts.   
While under the law, Chinese women have gained equality with men, in practice this is 
clearly not the case. Harrell has argued that “there is a general agreement that there is a recovery 
in the villages of patriarchal domination, expressed in patrilocal arranged marriage, in expected 
household roles, and in the subordination of women” (2001:8 see also Andors 1983, Stacey 
1983, Wolf 1985). While the reasons for this are complex, this discussion points to some of the 
problems in reconciling marriage law with, customary ideas and practices. Vague laws lacking 
strict definitions leave much to the interpretation of, primarily male, local judges with little or no 
training in issues related to marriage. Rulings therefore are often gendered and work to shore up 
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local practices, even those that might be considered “feudal”.  Issues such as these have 
undoubtedly contributed to the fact that China is the “only country in the world that reports 
higher rates of suicide in women than in men” (Lee and Kleinman 2003:224, italics in the 
original).  
  45 
3.0  MARRIAGE MIGRATION AND GENDER IN CHINA 
This chapter is comprised of two parts, “Crossing Borders” and “Migrant Husbands”. Since the 
overwhelming majority of marriage migrants in China are women, the primary aim of the first 
section, “Crossing Borders” is to discuss the gendered experiences of these women and  how 
post-marital residence patterns in China effect social location. In particular, this section focuses 
on the recent pattern of long distance marriage migration highlighting administrative and cultural 
factors that are a part of this process. These factors include the household registration system 
(hukou) and local understandings of migrant brides.   
The second part of this chapter,“ Migrant Husbands” I  discuss diao cha men (marrying 
in son-in laws) and the social stigma attached to this practice. Next, I discuss “western” men who 
marry Mainland women and settle in China. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate some 
of the experiences of couples involved in various forms of marriage in order to show how ideas 
and expectations about marriage are in part, a product of Chinese marriage history, law and 
customs.  I will discuss stereotypical views about those involved in these marriages and the 
different ways that some couples react to these views. Finally, this discussion points to patterns 
of marriage on the Mainland that are beginning to emerge as a result of larger, global shifts. I am 
referring here to China’s emerging position as a global economic power which offers migrants, 
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particularly those that PRC regards as a person of “quality,” (suzhi) the prospect of economic and 
social upward social mobility.31   
Throughout this chapter I have included several vignettes or “marriage scapes” to 
illustrate my points. Constable (2005) uses the term marriage-scapes drawing on Appadurai’s 
(1996) notion of global ethnoscapes. The suffix scape points to both the “fluid irregular shapes 
of these landscapes” and the importance of historical, cultural and economic differences which 
influence the ways in which these scapes are viewed (Appadurai 1996:33).These vignettes offer 
a personal glimpse into the lives of those involved in various forms of marriage in Mainland 
China and are based on interviews and observations carried out in Xiamen, Beijing and 
Shanghai.  
3.1 CROSSING BORDERS 
In this section I use the term “crossing-borders” to highlight particular aspects of contemporary 
marriage migration patterns.  Building on the work of Constable (2005) I use this term to 
highlight the fact that within the process of marriage there are borders (in addition to 
administrative or political factors) that play a significant role in the lives and opportunities of 
those who marry. These borders are related to issues of gender, social and economic class, 
hukou, and ethnicity to name a few. Whether one migrates to another province, village or even 
household for the purpose of marriage these all involve some form of border crossing. Having 
discussed the historical influence that marriage laws, policies and moral codes have had on 
                                                 
31 The term “population quality” (renkou suzhi), is discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
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marriage practices in the previous section, in this section the focus turns to trends in marriage 
migration in contemporary China. Of particular interest are patrilocal post-marital residence 
patterns and how they influence the social location of women in China.   
 Given China’s long tradition of patrilocal post-marital resident patterns, it comes as no 
surprise that the majority of marriage migrants in China are women. The terms used to describe 
the marriage of a daughter or son, reflect this fact. When a daughter marries it is commonly 
referred to as marrying a daughter out or losing a daughter (jia chu qu). While when a son 
marries it is referred to as bringing in a daughter (chu jin lai). Village exogamy, the practice of 
brides moving from their natal village for marriage, has remained the most common form of 
marriage in China (Davin 2008:65).  According to the 1990 census, marriage is the primary 
reason women migrate in China (Fan 2008:141). The practice of men moving from their natal 
village or hometown for purposes of marriage however, remains quite rare.  
As discussed earlier, scholars have long argued that patrilocal post-marital residence 
patterns are one of the primary reasons for women’s disempowerment in China (Johnson 1983, 
Watson 1991). Kay Ann Johnson has argued that traditional Confucian marriage and kinship 
practices “have defined and shaped women’s place in Chinese society more than any other set of 
factors”(1983:3).  In, part this is because natal families tend to invest less in the education of a 
daughter as they anticipate that she will be “lost” to marriage (Lu 1997). In addition, as women 
leave their natal homes they have less easy access to their natal family for support to help them 
negotiate marital problems with their husbands or in-laws (Davin 2008:72).  
While out-marriage has a long history in China and is overwhelmingly the most common 
form of marriage we should not conclude that women have little or no agency in this process. 
Many brides prefer to marry-out, particularly when moving from a poor area to one that is more 
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economically prosperous (Fan 2008:17, Lavely 1991, Potter and Potter 1990,). Brides from more 
prosperous areas often either refuse to marry-out, or marry-out to areas that are even better off 
economically (Lavely 1991).  Fan (2008) has argued that given women’s “marginalization in the 
labor market, women may find marriage, and specifically hypergamy…an attractive vehicle 
toward economic betterment”(137). Constable (2005) on a wider scale, labels this movement 
primarily of brides from less developed poor areas to more modern richer areas “global 
hypergamy” (2005:10).32 
One of the most striking changes in marriage migration in China in recent years is “a new 
long-distance inter-provincial marriage market” in which “richer coastal areas tend to draw 
brides in, while the poorer inland areas suffer a net loss in women (Davin 2008:67). In December 
2007, the Xinhua news reported that “the country is facing a social time bomb as the number of 
young singles –mostly men—continues to rise” (Xinhua 2007, December, 12:3). In 2005, singles 
aged 15 to 35 accounted for percent of the population, which the article claimed could cause 
more “violent acts against women”(Xinhua 2007, December, 12:3). The concern over the 
growing number of rural bachelors who are unable to find brides can be traced back to the Qing 
dynasty as discussed in chapter two. During this period, these men were considered rogues 
and/or outlaws and were marginalized as they were considered a threat to the chastity of wives 
and daughters of humble families (Sommer 2000:14).33 In contemporary times, as during the 
Qing they are also regularly referred to as guang gun (bare branches) and are looked down upon 
(Hua 2009:51). This highly publicized “bride shortage” in rural areas is the result of a 
combination of factors including, the influence of the hukou system, state mandatory birth-
                                                 
32 See also Oxfeld 2005. 
33 Recall that some have suggested that the Qing Imperial Chastity Cult was in part a reaction to the ongoing bride 
shortage (Telford 1992:924).  
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control policies, “traditional values” which emphasize the importance of sons, sex selective 
abortions and female infanticides as well as  migration (Banister 2004, Cai and Lavely 2003,  
Hua 2009, Zeng et al. 1993).34  
 One issue that Hua suggests is often overlooked and contributes to this trend, is that 
while both men and women migrate to the cities, men generally work in gender-segregated jobs 
while women often work in service industries in which they are more likely to interact with the 
opposite sex, increasing their chances of finding a suitable marriage partner (2009:60). But the 
fact that many women migrants take jobs as maids and both men and women work in factories 
cut hair or drive taxis for living, reveals that gender segregated jobs while they do play a part, 
may not be a primary factor in this phenomenon.   
   The 2000 census revealed that 1.6 million women had migrated to another province for 
the purpose of marriage (Fan 2008:141).The highest percentage of females who migrate for the 
purpose of marriage migrated to the provinces of Hebei (63%), Anhui (59.1%), Jiangsu (54.5%) 
and Fujian (50.6%) (Fan and Huang 1998:241). Davin has argued that this trend reflects the fact 
that women are using marriage migration to move up the “spatial hierarchy” and is a form of 
upward mobility for women (2008:68). But as more brides now migrate over longer distances the 
term “marrying up” becomes more complicated.  
Brides-to-be that migrate from economically poor areas to those that are more prosperous 
(spatial hypergamy), may experience lower social status both in public and private spheres. 
Migrants are often treated as second-class citizens and looked down upon when relocating from a 
rural area to an affluent city. Post-marital residence patterns, as discussed earlier, are already 
considered a major factor for women’s disempowerment, therefore one would expect the greater 
                                                 
34 The resurgence in traditional values in rural areas I argue is, in part, related to the ambiguity of civil law codes 
coupled with localized interpretation and enforcement of these codes. See Chapter 2. 
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distance they are from their natal home coupled with the economic disparity they realize when 
migrating to their new home would exacerbate the problem. Women who migrate further from 
their natal homes, argues Davin, are more isolated and therefore more dependent on her 
husbands’ family and as such is considered easier to control (2008:72).  In addition, migrants 
from the countryside are often looked down upon in major cities. For example, in Shanghai 
migrants from the rural area are referred to as xiang xia ren (country bumpkins) a derogatory 
term that clearly places them in the category of “other.” In Tan and Short’s study of female 
marriage migrants who  had moved from poor regions to more prosperous areas, these women 
refer to themselves as “double outsiders” (2004:152). This term refers to the fact that they are 
looked upon as outsiders both in the community as well as in the household (Tan and Short 
2004:153). Local stereotypes abound regarding these women, casting them as “lazy,” or 
“swindlers” and they have been blamed for “destroy[ing] local peoples marriages and family 
relations” (Tan and Short 2004:167). In addition there can also be linguistic barriers, which mark 
them as outsiders and limit their ability to express themselves in the local dialect. One bride in 
Tan and Short’s study who had migrated from Sichuan province to Zhangjiagang explained that 
because of her accent “the locals looked down on me…I was cheated many times because I 
couldn’t speak like a local woman…my husband and mother-in-law thought I was stupid ”(Tan 
and Short 2004:166-67). Clearly, while many of these women may be relatively better off 
economically marrying into a more urban setting, that is only a small part of a larger picture. In 
order to improve their situation many of these women have successfully expanded their social 
networks by recruiting other women from their natal villages to join them in their new location 
(Tan and Short 2004:171). Interestingly, while many still spoke of isolation, and their relatively 
lower status in both the village and the household, all of those interviewed in Tan and Short’s 
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study agreed that their lives were better than if they had remained in their natal village 
(2004:172).35 
Another recent marriage form to emerge is the neolocal practice of newly married 
couples setting up their household a great distance from both the husband’s and the wife’s 
hometowns (Zhang 2009).  Zhang’s (2009) study of migrants in Dongguan found that in many 
cases this form of post-marital residence resulted in a shift in gender roles in part because brides 
were able to continue with factory work after marriage and childbirth (Zhang 2009:639). Also 
within this form of marriage many brides experienced more egalitarian marital relations (Zhang 
2009:652). The author however, laments that these types of marriages may not be sustainable 
due to in large part the exclusionary policies of the hukou system (Zhang 2009).  
Given the entitlements available to those with urban hukou, upgrading one’s hukou is a 
clear way to improve one’s economic and social status.  Hukou conversion while much desired is 
only possible for a select segment of the population. The most common means to change one’s 
hukou is through state employment (Wang 2004:122). Those who are cadres or officials at the 
level of section chief (kezhang) or above or military officers of at least the level of platoon leader 
are automatically granted urban hukou (Wang 2004:122). Those below these ranks do not qualify 
for urban hukou, but rather rural non-agriculture hukou which offers them state benefits 
regardless of their place of residence (Chan 2009:201,205). Within this system, rank and 
mobility have a complimentary relationship (Wang 2004).  
 Hukou conversion is also available to those who have the economic means to qualify for 
a “blue seal” hukou which can be obtained by purchasing expensive real estate or investing in job 
creation (Chan 2009, Sun 2009, Wang 2004:122). Those who are highly educated or are 
                                                 
35 Tan and Short conducted 120 interviews with married women and men in Zhangjiagang, Gangqu, Zhongxing and 
Nansha. 
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considered talented are also granted more mobility depending on their level of education or talent 
(Chan and Buckingham 2008, Chan 2002:202, Wang 2004).36 Of specific interest to this 
dissertation is a reform implemented in 1998 which allows rural-urban or cross-regional couples 
to choose whether their child inherits the mother’s or father’s hukou (Wang 2004:123).37  Not 
only did this entitle the next generation, it also opened the door for the rural hukou holding 
spouse to apply for urban hukou upon reaching old age (Chan 2009, Wang 2004).  
Since 1992, the shift to more local level control regarding hukou and hukou conversions 
have resulted in a wide variety of localized hukou reform measures and requirements (Wang 
2004, Solinger 1999).  In some cases spouses of existing residents with local hukou are eligible 
for hukou conversion depending on their level of “talent” or economic status (Chan 2009:205). 
Given these reforms, hukou type has become an increasingly important consideration in matters 
related to marriage and marriage migration (Lu 2004).     
In recent years the inequalities that the hukou system propagates have come under attack 
both in the United States and domestically, in the PRC (Congress, BBC news).  In March 2010 
the BBC news reported that “more than a dozen Chinese newspapers in the PRC have published 
a joint editorial calling for the abolition of the household registration system” and the Chinese 
government appears to be paying heed (Chen:1).  A recent article in the China Daily reported 
that  “Premier Wen Jiabao announced that Beijing would gradually relax its restrictions on the 
hukou household registration system for migrant workers moving to small- and medium-sized 
cities, enabling them to eventually receive the same benefits and social services as city residents” 
(Chinoy 2010). In the meantime however, this system of differential citizenship continues to 
                                                 
36 A graduate of any accredited college is guaranteed a urban hukou either where his or her job is or to city nearest 
her home town. Those who hold a PhD can relocate their hukou to the city of their choice. Skilled workers can 
change their hukou if their employer sponsors them (Wang 2004:122). 
37 Previously a newborn’s hukou classification was inherited from the mother (Chan 2009:200). 
  53 
draw more people to the urban areas. Many come for work but the possibility of converting ones 
hukou is also a powerful lure. Aside from working for the government or striking it rich, 
migrating for marriage is the most viable way to upgrade ones hukou.  
The following Marriage-scape illustrates the experiences of two friends both from 
Nanjing who have migrated, married and found themselves in enviable yet unsatisfied positions.   
3.2 MARRIAGESCAPE 1: A MILITARY MARRIAGE AND A KEPT WOMAN 
At a local gymnasium in Xiamen I became acquainted with a yoga teacher (Xui Li) from Nanjing 
who is currently living in Xiamen with her husband who was also born and raised in Nanjing. 
Her husband is a military officer who trains fighter pilots. He comes home about once a month 
for a few days but is required to live on the military base (to which Xui Li is not allowed entry) 
because of security concerns. She explained that the military bases in Fujian province are on high 
alert because of the “Taiwan issue” and keep close tabs on all of their soldiers. Most soldiers can 
only watch television a few minutes a day and are allowed off the base only for a limited time to 
buy groceries and necessities. She has heard that the suicide rate for soldiers in Fujian is quite 
high.  
As the wife of an officer, her movements are also strictly controlled. She has a “sponsor” 
(the wife of a high-ranking officer) who must accompany her when she goes out. This includes 
when she teaches yoga class at the local gym. All of her trips must be approved in advance. Each 
morning as she to hikes up to the temple nearby, she is accompanied by several soldiers. She 
explained that she loves her husband but is unhappy with her situation and sees no way out. In 
fact she has a friend who wanted to divorce her military husband and Xui Li was asked to speak 
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to her to talk her out of the divorce. No less than five different women tried to convince the 
woman to stay married. I was told that Xui Li’s husband was also called upon to speak to the 
woman’s husband about the importance of staying married.38 In order to get divorced, the 
woman’s sponsor must first approve it. Then her husband’s commanding officer must sign off on 
it. If the divorce quotas are too high that year the divorce is not approved and they are told to 
reapply the following year. Suffice it to say divorce is hard to come by in the military. Xui Li 
explained that when she was younger, marrying an officer in the military was a dream many girls 
shared. But now when single friends ask her to introduce them to potential military husbands she 
refuses and talks them out of it. 
When Xui Li was younger (she was 30 when we spoke) she studied at one of China’s 
most prestigious dance schools and did quite well until she sustained an injury. She explained 
that many dancers become yoga teachers when they get older. Others get rich by dancing at 
expensive gentleman’s clubs making upwards of 10,000 RMB (approximately $1500 US) a 
night. Some become mistresses, wives, or second wives to wealthy businessmen. 
On a recent trip to Beijing she looked up an old classmate who she had heard was doing 
well for herself having married a wealthy Taiwanese businessman. Her classmate, Miahua, who 
had worked as a dancer, was living in a very luxurious apartment in an expensive part of Beijing. 
Xui Li said she had found Miahua to be dramatically changed. She had become obsessed with 
the cost of all of her possessions, often pointing out various pieces of furniture or art works 
asking Xui Li to guess how much they were worth. Miahua talked about how lonely she was 
most of the time living alone in such a big place. If she wanted to go anywhere, her driver, her 
husband’s employee accompanied her. Her husband was seldom at home and spent most of his 
                                                 
38 This demonstrates that while the damwei system may be dying out, in some settings marriage, and divorce are 
considered community matters rather than individual decisions. 
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time away on business. Miahua asked Xui Li to spend the night with her because her husband 
would be in Taiwan for the next month or so. However as Xui Li’s whereabouts and movements 
were so closely monitored, she had to turn down the invitation. Miahua was furious, and started 
to criticize Xui Li for choosing the life she had. “You are stupid. You have nothing.” Xui Li 
returned to the car awaiting her outside.  
While Xui Li and Miahua had chosen very different paths to marriage both found 
themselves fairly isolated and a long distance from their natal homes. While Miahua does not 
seem to have any support system (outside of financial support) Xui Li’s support system has been 
chosen for her and is more concerned with control and surveillance, in part, to insure she remain 
a faithful and dutiful wife. Both Miahua and Xui Li’s lives are strictly controlled with regard to 
where they go and with whom they interact. In some sense however, in the public view both of 
these women were in enviable positions. While marrying a common soldier is usually not 
considered an ideal choice, marrying an officer is for the most part is looked upon as a positive 
thing. While some frown on women taking up with foreign businessmen, those who live a life of 
luxury and need not work to support this lifestyle are admired for their attractiveness and 
cunning. Miahua’s situation is captured by the common phrase jinwu cangjiao (a beauty hidden 
in a golden house) which refers in part, to the way in which these women are isolated. However 
it would be a stretch to say that either of these women felt satisfied with their situation. 
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3.3 MIGRANT HUSBANDS IN CHINA 
As stated earlier, today and in the past, men are rarely the ones who migrate for marriage. Some 
have convincingly argued that such marriage patterns at some level reflect and intensify gender 
inequality (Massy 1994, Watson 1991, Wolf 1968).  Caren Freeman’s (2005) study of Chosonjok 
brides who migrated from China to South Korea, however, revealed that women are often 
“poised to use cross-border marriage to their own advantage” while in some cases men, due to 
their economic or social positions may be the least mobile (Freeman 2005:99). This sentiment is 
also reflected in Constable’s (2005) study of so called “mail order brides” in which men from 
China, the Philippines and the United States expressed their frustrations regarding gender 
inequality with regard to mobility (Constable 2005:185). In some cases rather than being 
unwilling to migrate for marriage, cultural understandings about marriage and gender, 
government policies and economic circumstances make marriage migration unthinkable, 
impossible or at best extremely difficult. Such is the case on Mainland China.  
 In the PRC, the practice of men “marrying out” usually occurs when a family has no 
sons and searches for a “marrying-in son-in-law” (diao cha men), to carry on the family name 
(Davin 2008:64). In so doing the man often forsakes the continuation of his own family line. The 
practice of uxorilocal marriage usually results in lower social status for the husband as many 
consider this a humiliating arrangement (Davin 2008:64).39 This practice is rarely reported in the 
Chinese media, but when it is, the message is clear. An article in the China Daily in March 2007 
entitled “Doom and Groom” describes the story of one of these men, Mr. Song, who claims 
                                                 
39 However, Judd argues that women involved in uxorilocal marital residence patterns are disadvantaged “because 
the practice leaves women unfavorably situated within their own network of kin, in sharp contrast to the situation 
their male cousins enjoy” (2009:30).  
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marrying out was “the worst decision of my life” (Fang 2007:19). Song is dying of lung cancer 
and plans to be buried in his hometown with a blank gravestone because “Song feels he has 
failed in his filial duty” to his own kinship line (Fang 2007:19). A similar article entitled, “A 
Wedding for What it’s Worth” depicts an angry groom dressed in a wedding gown being laughed 
at by his bride who is wearing a tuxedo (Fang 2007:19). In a recent article Han describes how 
she attended one of these weddings wherein the groom was escorted to his “sedan chair” and was 
“symbolically ‘veiled’ under a red umbrella…as he wept quietly just as a bride in a virilocal 
marriage would normally do” (2009:56). Given such negative descriptions of Mainland men 
involved in uxorilocal marriages in both the media (China Daily March 6, 2007) and in academic 
studies (Han 2009) coupled with the long “tradition” on brides migrating for marriage, it is not 
surprising that men would feel emasculated in this situation. However, I found that 
characterizations such as these do not seem to apply to men who migrate from abroad, marry and 
settle in Mainland China. In fact, for men from abroad, such as Taiwan, there can be a distinct 
sense-from their own perspective and that of others—of upward mobility.    
3.4 FOREIGN MALE MARRIAGE MIGRANTS IN CHINA 
Here I will discuss PRC-foreigner marriages that occur on the Mainland in which a western man 
and a Mainland woman marry and set up a household on the Mainland. This subject has received 
remarkably little attention in anthropological studies but is particularly interesting given that 
matrilocal post-marital residence patterns are a rarity in China and include much negative 
commentary when they involve a Mainland man. As discussed above, this practice is considered 
a humiliating experience for a Mainland husband often resulting in disempowerment and public 
  58 
ridicule. Men who migrate from abroad however, are not held to the same standards as PRC 
men, and are treated--at least on the surface—quite differently. Through a series of “marriage-
scapes” I will highlight the experiences of two of these couples, and the various ways they 
contest or enforce stereo-typical views about these relationships. These examples serve as a point 
of contrast with Taiwan-PRC marriages discussed later in this dissertation. In addition these 
examples point to emerging marriage patters related to China’s improved economic status. 
Transnational marriages are becoming more commonplace in China. From 2004 through 
2007, an average of over 22,000 transnational couples registered for marriage on the Mainland 
(see Table 1).  While it is difficult to quantify the origin of these foreign spouses as the 
Department of Population and Employment National Bureau of Statistics groups all of those who 
are not from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan as simply wai gou ren (foreigners), we do know that 
most of these marriages occur in Guangdong, Guilin, Fujian, and Shanghai where economic 
zones draw foreigners to the area (China 2004:101, China 2005:119, China 2006:110, China 
2007: x).40 The first set of interviews took place in one of these economic zones in Fujian 
province. I have included them to demonstrate the ways in which some cross-border couples 
appropriate common stereotypical views with regard to their relationships into the stories they 
tell about their courtship and marriage. Interestingly this can work to shore up their social 
locations and legitimize, rather than belittle these unions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Special economic zones draw foreign businesses to the Mainland through preferential policies. These policies and 
the role of Special Economic Zones play in building social relationships will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3.  
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Table 1. Transnational marriage registrations within the PRC* 
Year Transnational 
Marriage 
registrations 
2004 26,406 
2005 24,133 
2006 20,424 
2007 21,227 
*This does not include marriages that took place in Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan. 
Based on the China Population Statistical Yearbook, 2004-2007.  
3.5 MARRIAGESCAPE 2: THE WILEY BUSINESSMAN AND THE SEDUCTRESS 
The following marriage-scape serves as one example of what might be considered a stereotypical 
marriage between a rich western businessman (Bouka) and his crafty Mainland wife (Lin).  
 I first met Bouka at an outdoor pub frequented by foreigners in Xiamen’s Haiwan Park. 
He is a Dutch shipbuilder who has lived in Xiamen for over 20 years. He married a local woman 
shortly after arriving. He is 63 and his wife is 40. He is a Saturday night regular at the pub and 
knows all of the staff and many of the customers. He often refers to his wife as “the boss” and 
jokes about how little money she gives him, but makes a point of regularly flashing his wallet 
and the oversized stack of bills within it. Usually this is accompanied by a sly glance and a wry 
smile. He is considered quite wealthy, owns two apartments in Xiamen, a house in Denmark, and 
a yacht in which he and his wife have traveled the world extensively. When I asked him how he 
met his wife he told the following story.  
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One of my captains was harassed by the local shipping authorities and ended up signing 
an agreement that he didn’t understand. It was all in Chinese and he couldn’t read any of it. A 
local translator told him that it required all of my boats to pay a small extra fee to enter the port. 
The fee was no big deal to me as I was making a good profit. The next time he returned, 
however, the fee increased ten-fold. It turned out that the contract included a clause that for every 
time my boats returned the fee would increase by ten. I decided to find my own translator and 
after asking some friends they referred me to Lin. She was the daughter of a high ranking local 
official and eventually agreed to help me. She went with me to the office and told them in no 
uncertain terms that the contract was voided. She then made them tear up the contract and throw 
it away. After we walked out the door she suddenly turned around and ran back into the office 
and caught the men digging the pieces of the contract out of the garbage can. Upon seeing this 
she ordered them to burn the contract which they did in the ashtray. I knew then I should hold 
onto her. 
     
Bouka went on to explain that his wife’s connections in the government had made him a 
small fortune and he seldom had to pay import fees for his cargo. During “the SARS scare”, as 
he referred to it, he smuggled tons of products into and out of China. If a patrol boat wanted to 
search his cargo he simply called his wife and put them on the phone with her. After that they 
always left him alone.  
   Later that evening Lin arrived and Bouka introduced me as an “American doctor in 
training.”  I greeted her in Chinese, which prompted her to criticize Bouka for never wanting to 
learn the language. As she continued to press the point, Bouka leaned towards me and said with a 
smile on his face, “I guess I still have time for another drink” and signaled the bartender.  
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Soon after, Lin began to tell me about the houses they owned, their yacht and their 
current project, building a traditional Chinese fishing boat. Soon the topic turned to how they 
met and their courtship. Lin explained that the first time they met; Bouka couldn’t keep his eyes 
off her. She decided to help him because she felt sorry for him, he couldn’t speak Chinese and he 
kept slamming his big fist on the table, which was frightening everyone in the room. She helped 
him out to calm the situation, never expecting to see him again. Several months later, he returned 
unexpectedly and contacted her. He said he had not been unable to get her off of his mind and 
had ordered his ship to change course from Hong Kong so he could see her again. This decision 
cost him thousands of dollars. During the next year he frequently returned each time trying to 
convince her to marry him. He met with her family and always brought them expensive gifts. 
Finally, she accepted, but she clearly made it sound like her decision was based on pity—she felt 
sorry for him because she was affecting his ability to do his job. Then she turned to Bouka and 
told him she wanted to go have dinner with friends and needed some money. He handed her a 
stack of bills and she kissed him on the cheek and said she would be back in a few hours.  
Several weeks later, my wife and I were invited to Bouka’s home for dinner. Upon arrival 
he offered us drinks and led us to a covered outdoor patio where we would be eating. He said he 
loves to cook and had made a “traditional” Dutch dish. He joked that his wife didn’t know how 
to cook well and makes a mess of the kitchen, therefore they had arranged for a cook to come 
and prepare the Chinese part of the meal. Lin made his drinks for him throughout the evening 
and set a limit of ½ a bottle of rum for him that evening.  
Bouka told us a story about one of their trips, shortly after they started dating. They took 
a trip to Hong Kong and while waiting for the plane it was announced that there would be a short 
delay. So he gave her some money to go shopping. She returned a short time later and asked for 
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more money as she had already spent what he gave her. She barely made it back before the plane 
was boarding. Once on the plane she handed him a large gold nugget and said it was his birthday 
gift. He had previously explained to her that in the past sailors often had a golden earring so that 
if they died far from home the earring could pay for their funeral. So Lin thought he should have 
something gold to wear and that he could take the nugget to a jeweler. Several months later Lin 
came home with a new gold necklace and earrings for herself. When Bouka asked how she could 
afford it she explained that she had borrowed his gold nugget. “I thought it was my birthday gift” 
he said. “It’s still yours, I’m just borrowing it” she retorted.  
Soon Lin and Qian (my wife) began a conversation about their marriages. Lin harshly 
criticized my wife for making such a poor decision primarily because I was not wealthy and did 
not have a stable job. At one point I heard her say “you could have done much better than this. 
You made a bad deal.”  
Similarly, as Bouka finished his rum and switched to scotch, he commented that Lin was 
much better than Qian because she had helped him increase his wealth and looked out for him. 
The fact that Qian and I were supporting each other through graduate school held little weight for 
either of them. As the scotch continued to flow, Bouka made it clear that he married Lin, in part, 
to get around paying extra fees and have access to her family’s connections and social capital. 
He also talked about how capable she is in protecting him from local schemes that target 
foreigners. Lin had started to get up to serve tea and glanced at Bouka having overheard him. He 
slapped her on the behind and she giggled. For the rest of the evening he scarcely kept his hands 
off her as she averted her eyes and feigned embarrassment.  
Bouka and Lin both describe their marriage as a success, but in different ways. Lin, 
painted a picture of her husband becoming infatuated with her beauty, often making unnecessary 
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trips to Xiamen in his boat just to see her, and showering her and her family with gifts in order to 
win her hand. She implies that she married him in part because she felt badly for unknowingly 
seducing him with her beauty. Her references to the “expensive gifts” that eventually led to her 
family’s approval of the marriage are clearly related to the concept of bride price and work to 
both increase her status and legitimize their marriage. Bouka describes their marriage as a good 
business decision. When they are together in public, Bouka often plays the part of a rich 
businessman whose wife freely spends his money while unsuccessfully attempting to restrict his 
expenditures. Lin plays her role as well—the role of a desirable woman who unknowingly 
mesmerized a rich foreigner with her beauty, and now lives a life of luxury. In this sense, both of 
them got a “good deal.” 
3.6 MARRIAGESCAPE 3: ERIC AND YUE 
Eric and Yue, a cross-border couple, have been married for four years. Eric is 28 years old and 
moved from the United States to China shortly after earning his B.A degree at a U.S. university. 
He works as an English teacher for one of most prestigious English schools in Beijing. He makes 
the bulk of his income however, tutoring the children of well-to-do parents during the evenings 
and occasionally on weekends. Yue is 24 and works in the Beijing office of an U.S. oil company 
where she spends most of her day talking to Chinese clients on the phone and answering her U.S.  
manager’s questions about Chinese culture and language. They live in a neighborhood in which 
Eric is the only foreigner and they speak Chinese at home.  
When I asked them how they first met, Yue explained, “We were on a group camping trip 
and I saw Eric passed out under some trees. No one was helping him so I went over to see if he 
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was okay.” “She gave me water” Eric said smiling. Yue continued “since then we have been 
together.” “Yeah” Eric said as he put him arm around Yue, “that was a great trip.”  
I once asked Eric if they planned to stay in China or eventually move to the United 
States. “We’ll probably stay here. We have it pretty good here although sometimes I miss 
speaking English. I couldn’t afford to live like this in the States. One of my student’s parents pay 
my rent, and I make more than most PhDs in China. We travel a lot, sometimes to see Yue’s 
Mom…she’s cool, we drink together during the holidays.”  
Eric is a functioning alcoholic. In fact, when I first arrived at their apartment a large beer 
truck was parked out front, as the deliveryman carried cases of beer to their third floor flat. Most 
nights he drinks beer until he passes out on his couch. If he works early the next day he adjusts 
his drinking schedule in order to pass out earlier. He is proud to say he has never missed a day of 
work. He explained that this is why he gets paid so well. “Most foreign teachers only last a few 
months. They party every night and show up to work with a hangover. One day they just stop 
coming to work. I’m dependable.”  
Yue told me that on the Fourth of July Eric called her at two in the morning. “He was so 
drunk he didn’t know where he was. Then he started singing and I could hear him from my 
window. He was lying outside in the parking lot.” She laughed. “He does that kind of thing a lot. 
Americans love to drink.” 
Once I accompanied Eric to a darts tournament at a local bar. We were the only 
foreigners in attendance and everyone was overjoyed to see Eric walk in the door. Throughout 
the night people would came over to our table and challenged Eric to a baijiu drinking contest. 
He never lost, while those who challenged him usually had to be helped out of the bar.  At 
midnight Yue arrived to coax Eric back home. He left shortly after. The next day over breakfast 
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he told me, “I couldn’t live like this in the States. I party every day and no one bothers me about 
it. They think all westerners drink every day. And the beer is really cheap.”    
Yue, who never finished high school, used a forged college diploma to secure a job with 
a U.S. company. “No one questioned me about it. Americans think all Chinese girls do is study 
all the time.” Yue told me that she takes the bus home from work because she doesn’t want her 
co-workers to see Eric. “If they knew I was married to a foreigner I would not have gotten the 
job. Western companies like to hire young single Chinese girls, not married women.” she 
explained. “Once Eric came by unexpectedly and was waiting outside the building to give me a 
ride home.  I don’t think anyone saw us though.”  
  I asked Eric about his relationship with Yue and he explained “we fight occasionally 
and if she really gets upset, she gets back at me by spending all my money. She will sit at the 
computer and order things she doesn’t need until the money is gone. It doesn’t’ make sense to 
me, but I adjusted. Now I keep some cash stashed away just in case.” “Once she was convinced 
that I was having an affair and got violent with me. I don’t know how she got the idea that I was 
cheating on her. I never have. She spent the next few weeks telling her family and friends how 
horrible I was. I was talking with her mother a few months later and she told me that Yue knew I 
didn’t have an affair but she was upset because we don’t have a baby yet. Chinese girls can be 
very weird sometimes.” 
I found it interesting that both Eric and Yue used stereotypes to benefit themselves. Eric 
is free from anyone questioning his drinking habit because most of the people he interacts with 
believe that all or most Americans do the same. Yue, on the other hand, made use of western  
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stereotypes about young Chinese women to secure a job in a foreign company. She continues to 
conceal her marriage from her employers for fear that this could negatively impact her status on 
the job.   
3.7 CONCLUSION 
A combination of factors including a resurgence of traditional practices in rural areas, recent 
changes to the hukou system, cultural understandings about women, marriage and migration, and 
the substantial economic disparity between rural and urban areas have resulted in more women 
migrating over longer distances from their natal home for work and/or marriage. This practice 
however, distances them even further from the support systems of their natal home. Once in their 
new home many are looked down upon both in the household and in public as they are “double 
outsiders” (Tan and Short 2004:152). Some migrant brides however, contend that while they are 
ridiculed in their husband’s hometown, they are better off than they were before migrating (Tan 
and Short 2004:172). 
On the other hand, the practice of husbands “marrying out” to the wife’s family is 
frowned upon and considered a humiliating situation for Mainland Chinese men, their families 
and their ancestors. As a result few men participate in this form of marriage. Meanwhile, the 
number of male bachelors who are unable to find wives in rural areas continues to grow. While 
some do migrate for marriage it is clearly an embarrassing, emasculating experience based on 
Hua’s (2009) study.  
While I hesitate to generalize or oversimplify contemporary marriage migration in 
Mainland China, it does seem clear that in many cases whether it is the groom or bride who 
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migrate, the migrating spouse is often at a disadvantage.  These issues however, do not seem to 
apply to foreigners who migrate to the PRC and marry Mainland women. As described in 
marriage-scapes 2 and 3 some couples use local understandings about them to their advantage. 
For example, Eric’s drinking was considered more a Western trait than an alcohol problem. This 
offered him more leeway than would normally be given a Mainland man. Perhaps because 
foreigners are not expected to conform to traditional Chinese practices they are also given more 
latitude regarding gender and marriage migration. This raises the question; are Taiwanese men 
also granted this margin of flexibility. Ethnically they are considered Chinese and many have 
ancestral families on the Mainland. If they were truly considered “just like us” as many 
Mainlanders claimed, then one would assume that they would be held to the same standard as 
Mainland men with regard to marriage practices. I will also consider why some Taiwanese men 
marry and settle on the Mainland rather than returning home to Taiwan. In order to take up these 
issues we must first consider the influence of larger structures such as government policies 
related to cross-Strait economic and social relations and the ways in which individuals have 
reacted to and influenced these policies.  
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4.0  CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS: POLICIES, 
PRACTICE AND CHANGE 
Although geopolitical-economic issues are an important factor to examine when considering 
marriage migration, it is important not to overstate the influence of such factors and portray them 
as overly deterministic in the decision making process of individuals and families. This is 
particularly important when it comes to issues related to family formation. Michael Warner 
(1999) asserts that “marriage regulation and sexual normalization converge to link personal 
desires with state goals” (Friedman 2005:312). Building on Warner’s (1999) work, Sara 
Friedman’s (2005) study of distinctive marriage customs41 in southeastern China found that 
government policies and initiatives aimed at “reforming” these customs particularly with regard 
to post-marital residence practices, were for the most part, unsuccessful until economic and 
social changes at the local level made these initiatives more viable. Friedman’s study highlights 
the fact that “different configurations of state and economy have had different capacities to 
define desires and subjectivities at once intimate and political” (2005:313).  
In the case of Cross-Strait economic and social interactions however, there are two 
governments, often with very different agendas that have established policies (in many cases 
                                                 
41 In Huidong county extended postmarital natal residence (chang zhu niangjia) practices were commonly practiced 
wherein after marriage the bride would continue to reside in her natal home until they bore a child. This resulted in 
many brides “shunning conjugal visits to avoid sexual relations and the pregnancy that might result” (Friedman 
2005:314).   
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conflicting policies) aimed at supporting their own goals. In essence these governments are 
competing to influence the desires of citizens on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. My use of the 
term “desire” in the broad sense as Rofel has defined it “to gloss a wide range of aspirations, 
needs and longings” (2007:3). While the PRC’s policies work to support its stance of integration 
with Taiwan, the ROC’s policies reflect their agenda of cautious interaction. In recent years 
Taiwan, has found itself in a precarious position in that it has had to change several key policies 
meant to control the level of socio-economic interaction with the Mainland in part to appease 
those desiring to travel to the Mainland economic, social and ritualistic reasons (Sangren 2000, 
Steinfeld 2005, Wang and Belanger 2008). As a result, some have argued that Taiwan’s 
democratization is its Achilles heel as “social interests’ play a more important role since 
democratization began” (Leng 1996:137).  This pressure by the citizenry to allow more 
economic and social interaction points to the ability of individuals and groups to influence larger 
geo-political and social structures. In this vein, the ways in which cross-Strait economic and 
social interactions have been handled by both governments coupled with the ways in which 
individuals have circumvented and influenced these policies have had a profound influence on 
the level and frequency of both economic and social interactions.        
Whether the increase in economic interaction across the Taiwan Straits fostered more 
social connections or vice-versa is not important to this study. What is important is that both of 
these sorts of relationships have clearly deepened and increased. What I find interesting is how 
both the PRC and ROC responded to these deepening social and economic relationships with 
new policies and media representations to support their political agendas, and the ways that 
individuals have circumvented some of these policies to affect change.   
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It is noteworthy that the ways in which the issue of economic interaction was handled by 
both governments is similar to the ways both responded to deepening social interactions, 
particularly with regard to cross-Strait marriage. Openly promoting or restricting economic trade 
across borders is often understood as a tolerable if not acceptable function of government. But 
when these restrictions and incentives are geared towards influencing whom one chooses to 
marry, the results can be quite unsettling to those who are involved in these relationships 
particularly when these unions are in conflict with the government agenda in their place of 
residence. On the other hand, when their relationships run parallel with government policies and 
agendas, as in the case of cross-Strait couples living in the PRC, both partners may benefit 
economically and socially. Further, the ways that individuals affected change in these policies 
also strikes a familiar chord. To substantiate this point, in the first section of this chapter I briefly 
discuss cross-Strait trade, primarily Taiwanese investment in the Mainland, and its development 
in recent years. I then review the key policies that were implemented by both governments to 
support their economic agendas. Next I examine the ways in which cross-Strait economic 
interaction has been portrayed in newspapers in the PRC and ROC. In the subsequent section I 
review these same issues as they relate to cross-Strait marriage. Finally, I make some key 
comparisons with regard to government policy, media portrayals, individual practice, and policy 
changes that were implemented as a response to these practices.                 
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4.1 CONTEMPORARY CROSS-STRAITS ECONOMIC INTERACTION 
When economists discuss the development of contemporary cross-Strait economic trade they 
often refer to two distinct periods, the early period, (1980s to the early 1990s) and the “second 
wave” which began in 1992 (Leng 1996:89-91).  
During the early period “the ROC explicitly banned Taiwanese investment on the 
Mainland” (Steinfeld 2005:232). As a result until the early 1990s, most Taiwanese economic 
transactions with China “were conducted through smuggling or investments by small 
enterprises” (Leng 1996:89). One common practice to circumvent these restrictions was to direct 
funds to the Mainland via shell companies based in third-party countries or territories, Hong 
Kong being the most common of these (Steinfeld 2005:232). As many of these operations flew 
under the radar of the ROC and/or PRC there are no reliable economic statistics for this period 
(Park 1997:187).  
The “second wave” began as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s call for economic reform in 
1992, which opened the PRC’s domestic markets to foreign firms, coupled with Taiwan’s 
legalization of economic interaction across the Taiwan Strait (Chiu 2000:133, Leng 1996:91). 
The goal of Taiwan’s new policy, “The roots remain in Taiwan, the leaves stretch over China” 
(Chiu 2000:133) and the use of the word “interaction” rather than the PRC’s commonly used 
term “integration” clearly highlight the ROC’s concerns.  
These ROC government concerns became more pronounced as many groups, such as the 
President Group with sales of over US$3 billion, were comprised of several small Taiwanese 
firms which were linked together through interlocking shareholders and bloodlines on both sides 
of the Taiwan straits (Leng 1996:90). In 1991 Evergreen Group, a Taiwanese shipping company 
won a controversial bid to build large container depots and regional offices in Shanghai and 
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Xiamen (Leng 1996:91-92). The controversy revolved around the company president’s political 
networks on both sides of the Taiwan Straits which many claimed, resulted in preferential 
treatment (Leng 1996:92). Significant cross-Strait investments such as these prompted the 
Taiwanese government in 1993 to establish the Mainland Affairs Committee to oversee and 
evaluate economic policy with Mainland China (Leng 1996:93). While it was legal for ROC 
owned businesses to invest in the Mainland, the ROC suggested firms exercise caution and “go 
slow” (Chiu 2000:133). John Deng, vice chairman of the Taiwan government’s Mainland Affairs 
Committee explains “we don’t want to stop them but we urge them to be more careful, to be 
more restrained…China is China and Taiwan is Taiwan”(Cheng 2001:4). More profits may 
translate into more economic prosperity for the state, whereas more social integration with the 
Mainland might pose a challenge to Taiwan’s claims of exclusivity.  
For some ROC business owners, Taiwan’s concerns regarding too much investment on 
the Mainland coupled with the PRC’s desire to encourage these investments through preferential 
economic policies and the establishment of “economic zones” (discussed below) were a boon for 
business. Such was the case for Y.C. Yang, the president of Formosa Group who played both 
governments against each other to secure a lucrative 9.5$US billion dollar project complete with 
a five year tax break, to build his factory in Taiwan rather than on the Mainland (Leng 
1996:96).42  
The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on the Mainland was a major 
factor in attracting foreign investment. Ong explains that the SEZ’s were established “to meet the 
crisis of centralized socialist production and to launch market reforms that produced spaces and 
conditions radically at odds with those of the rest of the country”(2006:19). Deng Xiaoping saw 
                                                 
42 Several years later Yang did open another factory on the Mainland in a “special economic zone” near Shanghai.  
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these zones as both an “economic bridge” and a “political window” to the outside world (Ong 
2006:104). Through the 1980’s and 1990’s these zones were strategically established in coastal 
cities, for example, “Shenzhen adjacent to Hong Kong, Zhuhai across from Macau, Xiamen 
across the Strait from Taiwan, and Shantou and Hainan, which have strong communities in 
Southeast Asia” (Ong 2006:104). 
The appeal of the PRC’s SEZs is clear in that it allowed the use of foreign capital, gave 
priority to corporations entering these zones in the form of permits and other business related 
processing, and it "gave autonomy to the management council of each economic zone” (Park 
1997:195). According to Ong this resulted in “freewheeling entrepreneurial activities and labor 
exploitation to a degree not allowed in the rest of China” (2006:106). One important 
consequence of these policies is that migrant workers in these zones are discriminated against 
and treated like foreigners as they are required to obtain a “border pass, a work permit, and a 
temporary residence pass to work in the SEZ’s”(Ong 2006:106). 
In return, the Central Government expected these zones to “foster closer relations with 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan” (Park 1997:198). Jung-Dong Park (1997), an economist who 
studies the impact of these zones, concludes that the economic integration these zones achieved 
with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao are “the most important result of the special economic 
zones” (187,198).  
Economists argue that while the opportunity for economic gain continues to draw 
Taiwanese investment to the Mainland, there are also political risks to be considered, “The most 
serious risks are political and have to do with the unsettled and potentially explosive relations 
between Mainland China and Taiwan” (Berger 2005:17). Berger explains that, “sometimes 
anxieties about these risks take the form of urban legends…for example a current one about the 
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impending collapse of China after the 2008 Olympics” (2005:18). In addition, Berger continues, 
“there are greater and lesser degrees of Taiwanese pride and nationalism and admiration for, or 
antagonism to, the PRC” which have a very “significant influence on decisions about locating in 
China” (2005:18).  Other concerns include, intellectual property violations, and “the need for 
bribes as a regular part of doing business” (Berger 2005:20). In fact, some managers Berger 
interviewed suggested that “when the costs of bribes are added in, the apparent benefits of low-
wage labor are significantly reduced” (2005:20). While in many instances this may be the case, I 
would argue that the Xiamen area in particular is different in several respects. First, the Xiamen 
SEZ’s were established with the express intent of drawing Taiwanese people and investments to 
the Mainland. The political stakes are much higher than those SEZ’s adjacent to Hong Kong or 
Macau. Second, both Xiamen and Taiwan are considered part of the Minnan cultural area43and 
there are kinship and cultural ties here that facilitate the practice of establishing and operating a 
Taiwanese business in the Xiamen area. As Ong describes it, “the formation of the Xiamen 
centered coastal belt” resulted in a “frenzy of cross-strait economic activity” as “Taiwanese 
investors, capitalizing on ethnic and linguistic ties forged interpersonal relations (guanxi) with 
local officials who further eased bureaucratic rules on tariffs”(2006:107).44      
 The level of Taiwanese investment on the Mainland in general continues to be difficult 
to quantify. Smuggling and investment via shell companies did not cease when the ROC 
legalized trade with the PRC (Steinfeld 2005:232). The level of Taiwanese investment reported 
by the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs is significantly lower than that reported by the PRC 
(Chiu 2000:134, Steinfeld 2005:233). For example, between 1991 and 1998 the PRC reported 
levels that were 52.64% higher than those reported by the ROC (Chiu 2000:134). Since 1998 
                                                 
43 This will be discussed in detail in the chapter 5.  
44 Also see Hsing 1998. 
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finding reliable data has become even more difficult, as the IMF (International Monetary Fund) 
and the United Nations no longer consider Taiwanese investment as foreign investment and rely 
solely on domestic data provided by the PRC.45 
On the Mainland, as one would expect, newspapers often lauded the increase in cross-
Strait trade and Taiwanese investment in the PRC. Taiwan was the fourth leading investor in 
Mainland China with Taiwanese capital crossing the $100 billion mark in 2001 (Cheng 
2001:1).46 This has prompted some to refer to this phenomenon as the “Taiwan invasion” (Cheng 
2001:1). This “invasion”, however is encouraged by the PRC media. In June of 2004, Li Weiyi, a 
spokesman for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office explained that, “ the central government will 
continue to encourage Taiwan compatriots to invest in the Chinese Mainland, provide support 
and service for them, and protect their legitimate rights”(China Daily 2004:1). In March 2007, 
the China Daily reported that the West Straits Economic Area (est. 2004) in Fujian Province, 
reported dramatic growth in 2006 in part because of “close relations with Taiwan in geography, 
blood, culture, and business” (China Daily 2007:2). Huang Xiaojing, the governor of Fujian 
Province stated that “closer ties with Taiwan” are among the principle goals of this economic 
area (China Daily 2008:2).   
Another factor that plays an important part in encouraging deeper integration between 
Taiwan and Fujian province in particular are the number of temples on both sides of the Straits 
dedicated to Mazu, a sea goddess who was reportedly born in Fujian province (Strathern and 
Stewart 2007).  Mazu is said to protect fishermen and their families in addition to those who 
                                                 
45 In addition to business investment many Taiwanese tourists visit Mazu (sea goddess) temples in Fujian province 
and make substantial contributions to the temples which are impossible to quantify (Strathern and Stewart 2004, 
2007, Yang 2004).   
46 This number is questionable because the PC Ministry of Commerce announced that it would no longer report the 
value of contracted foreign investment deals because their figures were unreliable given that local officials had been 
inflating these numbers (The US-China business council 2007). 
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travel on or over (by plane) the sea (Strathern and Stewart 2007:4). Pilgrimages from Taiwan to 
Mazu temples in Fujian have increased in recent years and are encouraged by the PRC 
government (Sangren 2000).  In fact, a new temple, the Mazu Cultural Park has been established 
on Meizhou Island to further support these pilgrimages to the PRC (Strathern and Stewart 
2007:7).  These pilgrimages however, are not simply unidirectional but also flow from the 
Mainland to Taiwan. For example in April 2010 more than 2000 people from approximately 40 
Mazu temples primarily in Fujian province converged on Dajia, Taiwan to witness the beginning 
of the Mazu tour (Sui 2010:1). As Strathern and Stewart (2007) have noted “ideas about Mazu 
provide a sensitive barometer of Taiwanese-Mainlander relationships” (8).47   
Given the economic benefits available particularly to Taiwanese business people who 
invest in Xiamen it is no mystery why Taiwanese investment has increased so dramatically.      
Local government officials as discussed above receive bribes and are praised publically by their 
superiors for facilitating this process. In the course of my fieldwork however, I was struck by 
how often my Taiwanese informants were approached by Mainland entrepreneurs who wanted to 
do business with them. The following is one experience I had one evening in Xiamen that 
illustrates the point. 
 I accompanied one of my informants to dinner one night for a “business meeting.” A 
young man of about 24 year-old joined us and ordered some beers (da baisha) a local beer made 
in Xiamen, and several dishes he claimed were the specialty.48 After speaking to me in Mandarin 
for a few minutes he quickly switched to Minnan hua for the remainder of the meal. After dinner 
he shook hands with the both of us and hurried off with a wide smile on his face. My informant 
                                                 
47 See Strathern and Stewart 2003, 2007, and Sangren 2000 for a more detailed analysis of Mazu ritual practices. 
48 I found it interesting that Da Baisha translates to great white shark. Powerful businesspeople are also referred to 
as sharks. 
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apologized and explained that some Mainlanders wanted so badly to do business with Taiwanese 
people that they tend to be rude and pushy. When I asked if the proposal was interesting he 
shook his head and said “I don’t trust him yet. This happens all the time.” 
The opportunity for economic gain is obviously one primary reason for the frequency of 
these occurrences. Another often overlooked factor is China’s form of neoliberal logic. 
Neoliberalism is often described as a principle that calls for limited government involvement in 
the area of economic markets (Ong 2006:3). Within this system individualism and creativity are 
often lauded as positive traits which can work to improve the economic and social position of the 
individual (Anagnost 2004, Gordon 1991, Ong 2006, Yan 2003). Gordon has described this as 
the “entrepreneurialization of the self” (1991:44).  
Since Deng Xiaopeng’s call for “market reforms” (shichang gaige) and China’s move 
towards “privatization” (siyouhua) profound social and economic changes have followed 
including the expectation that individuals be self-enterprising rather than rely on government 
support  (Anagnost 2004, Hoffman 2006, Ong 2006:6). The term “population quality” (renkou 
suzhi) which in the 1980’s referred to raising the quality of the masses has shifted to “encompass 
the minute social distinctions defining a ‘person of quality’”(suzhi) (Anagnost 2004:190).49 
Successful entrepreneurs then are lauded as being a person of quality, while migrant domestic 
workers are expected to improve their suzhi (quality) by learning from their new environment 
(Yan 2003:494). College graduates, who in the past could count on government positions, are 
now expected to attend job fairs, market themselves and plan their own careers (Hoffman 2006).  
However, China’s form of neoliberal governing is unique in that is strongly linked to “Maoist era 
                                                 
49 Yan (2003) has argued that throughout China’s reforms the term (suzhi di) low population quality has been 
regularly invoked in the press and official and public discourse to blame peasants for impeding China’s 
modernization efforts.  
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norms and values of serving the country” (Hoffman 2006:552, Ong 2006, 2008, Yan 2003). 
Hoffman coined the term “patriotic professionalism” to refer to the “a self-enterprising subject 
who is also decidedly concerned with and has an affinity for, the nation” (Hoffman 2006:552). 
Therefore while young entrepreneurs regularly approach Taiwanese businesspeople to form 
partnerships or corporations the reasons go deeper than simply profits. They are also being 
patriotic entrepreneurs as they contribute to supporting the PRC’s goal of further integrating 
Taiwan and the PRC.  
4.2 CROSS-STRAIT MARRIAGE POLICIES AND DISCOURSE 
Just as cross-Strait trade and Taiwanese investment in the PRC has increased in recent years so 
has the practice of cross-Strait marriage. In June of 2003 the China Daily reported that overseas 
marriages in Shanghai had increased almost seven fold since 1980, and that of these marriages, 
38% are to partners from Taiwan. It was also becoming more commonplace for Mainland 
women to marry Taiwanese men and immigrate to Taiwan (See Table 2). In November 2007, the 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council reported there were approximately 270,000 cross-
Strait marriages (Wu 2007:3).This issue quickly became a major cause for concern for the 
Taiwanese government.  
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Table 2. Statistics of foreign migrant partners in Taiwan according to household registrations 
Year Marriage 
Registrations 
(Couples) 
Non-
Chinese 
Foreign 
Spouses* 
(Persons) 
Chinese 
Spouses 
(Persons) 
1998 145,976 10,413 15,041 
1999 173,209 14,670 21,165 
2000 181,642 21,338 26,474 
2001 170,515 19,405 32,719 
2002 172,655 20,107 33,840 
2003 171,483 19,643 34,426 
2004 131,453 20,338 10,972 
2005 141,140 13,808 14,619 
2006 142,669 9,524 13,964 
2007 135,041 9,554 14,721 
2008 154,866 8,957 12,274 
Sources: Data 1998 to 2002 is from the Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics, 
Guoqing tongji tongbao Reports on National Development], 26 August 2003. Data 2003 to 2005 is from the 
Ministry of the Interior, Neizheng tongji tongbao [Reports of Internal Affairs], week 3 2006. Available 
from:http://www.moi.gov.tw/moi2004/upload/m_38736_6618287037.doc. 
*The majority of non-Chinese spouses in Taiwan are from Southeast Asia.  
 
In order to restrict or better control the number of Mainland brides entering Taiwan, in 
1996 the government established a limit of 1,080 Mainland brides a year who could legally enter 
the ROC (A. Huang 1996). But this policy did little to stem the tide of incoming brides, as PRC 
women entered Taiwan before being married, so two years after the limit was established, in 
1998, 15,041 cross-Strait couples were married in Taiwan (Wang 2008:94). By marrying in 
Taiwan they circumvented the 1,080 restriction which applied to the number of PRC wives who 
would be granted visas to enter the country.  
Another response by the ROC to limit this practice has been to better educate Taiwanese 
businessmen who travel and work in the PRC, warning them to avoid entering into serious 
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relationships with Mainland women. In Shih Shu-mei’s study she explains that in order to limit 
the influence of Mainland Chinese women on Taiwanese men the Taiwan media “calls for a 
controlled exercise of financial power to better manipulate the women” (Shih 1999:289). This 
discourse is further demonstrated by the popularity of Chen Pin’s book, Emigrating to Shanghai 
in which he warns Taiwanese businessmen about these dangerous women, and advises them to 
be careful in their dealings with them as he describes how these women and their families prey 
on Taiwanese businessmen primarily for financial gain (Pin 2000).  
As the number of Mainland and foreign brides increased, in 2002, the Taiwan 
government officially changed its policy regarding foreign spouses from one of exclusion, to one 
of inclusion (Toyota 2008:6, Wang 2008:97). While this did grant marriage migrants access to 
public health coverage and easier access to the job market, subsequent government studies 
continued to reinforce the idea that “these immigrants will bring social problems”  (Wang 
2008:97-98). 50 For example, in 2003 the Ministry of the Interior conducted a survey and 
concluded the following, 
 
Many problems arise when the nationals marry foreigners and Mainlanders. For 
instance, it could produce many problems because of fragile love marriage, 
disadvantaged economic situation, weak support networks and low social status. These 
problems result in poor adaptation and family problems. Fertility and health problems 
affect population quality. Low education problems make it hard to cultivate children. 
When there is domestic violence, there are no social support networks. Other problems 
include falsified marriages and illegal migration (MOI 2004:40).  
                                                 
50 Chinese spouses can only apply for residency after being married for two years or having children. They cannot 
work without residency status (Toyota 2008:6). 
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According to Wang and Belanger however, most of these conclusions lack the evidence 
to back them up as the survey did not ask about domestic violence, falsified marriages, illegal 
migration or social networks (2008:98). It did however, manage to portray foreign and Mainland 
brides as deficiently educated women of low social status who are a threat to Taiwan’s 
“population quality” (renkou suzhi). 
The term “population quality” has a somewhat different meaning than in the PRC, and is 
a key component of Taiwan’s immigration policy (Wang 2008:96). In 1992 the Population 
Policy Committee passed a document entitled “population Policy Guiding 
Principles”(Zhonghuaminguo Renkou Zhengce Gangling) which in Chapter 3 defines those that 
threaten Taiwan’s population quality (Executive Yuan 1992). Those of “low quality” were 
described as “genetically deficient, infected and mentally ill people and elderly disabled and low 
income people” (Article 15). Although in 2006 the “population quality” chapter was deleted, the 
term “population quality” was retained in the preface and is still an important factor with regard 
to immigration (Wang 2008:96).  
It is important here to clarify that in Taiwan both Mainland brides and foreign brides are 
considered a threat to Taiwan but often in different ways.  The term “foreign bride” in Taiwan is 
ideologically charged as it refers to brides from less developed countries and “reflects the 
discrimination against Third World women (Hsia 2009:27).51  Foreign brides and their children 
are considered a threat to Taiwan’s “population quality” (Hsia 2009:31). Such discrimination is 
often reflected through government policy and rhetoric. For example, in July 2004 the Taiwanese 
                                                 
51 Foreign brides refer primarily to brides from Southeast Asia, In 2008 the Ministry of the Interior reported the 
following percentages: Vietnam (64.1%), Indonesia (20.7%), Thailand (6.7%), the Philippines (5%) and Cambodia 
(3.5%), (Ministry of the Interior, 2008).  
  82 
Deputy Minister of Education made an appeal to foreign brides to “not give birth to so many 
babies”, because of their “low quality” while referring to their Taiwanese spouses in extremely 
negative terms stating that “everyone knows well who marries foreign brides”(China Times 
Daily 2004). These views are even mirrored by Professor Lin Wan-I a member of National 
Taiwan University’s Social Work Department who explained; 
 
A third of all foreign brides under the age of 20 tend to be physically, emotionally    
and socially immature. They are on average three to five years behind their Taiwan 
counterparts educationally. Not only is their own competitive advantage low, it adversely 
affects the rearing of their children and creates the problem of continued weak 
competitiveness for the next generation (Chang 2003:7). 
 
In 2006 a Taiwanese legislator claimed that the United States’ use of Agent  
Orange in Vietnam had infected many Vietnamese women (United Daily 2006). As a result, 
“they give birth to a lot of handicapped babies” (United Daily 2006). Therefore Vietnamese 
brides in Taiwan “could negatively affect Taiwan’s next generation” (United Daily 2006).   
 In 2003 there was “a clear rising trend in the number of domestic violence cases reported 
by foreign brides” (Chang 2003:2). Further, “even foreign brides who have legal residence must 
return home if they get divorced, without the possibility of taking their children with them” 
(Chang 2003:4). Within this system, foreign women who attempted to escape spousal abuse 
often ended up losing their children. Chang explains that “although many foreign brides found 
themselves in unhappy marriages, they would grin and bear it for the sake of the children and 
become one of the hidden number of battered women” (2003:4).  
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4.3 WIFE.ORG 
While Chang referred specifically to foreign brides with regard to domestic abuse, Mainland 
brides are also subject to similar treatment. A valuable resource for those in this situation is the 
“New Mainland Bride Spouse Forum” (www.wife.org.tw) an online support site based in Taiwan 
for Mainland brides. To access the site new users must agree to three primary rules.  
1) Talk about your impressions after arriving in Taiwan 
 
2) This site is in no way to question or damage the unity of the Nation.  
 
3) This site is not to be used to share state secrets, or damage the security of the Nation. 
 
Many of the postings on the site are from Mainland brides in Taiwan who are looking for 
Lao Xiang (people from their hometown or province) with whom they can connect. Many 
exchange QQ52 addresses or phone numbers. For example, one user from Fuzhou asked if there 
was anyone from her hometown in Taiwan. She received several contact numbers/e-mail 
addresses, QQ addresses.  
Others are from Mainland women who plan to marry and move to Taiwan and are 
concerned about the treatment of Mainland brides primarily by their in-laws. One posting by 
Mrs. Wang asks “Why do Taiwanese mother-in laws usually treat Mainland brides poorly and 
have dirty homes. They remind me of my former mother-in law. How come when I visit my 
                                                 
52 QQ is a popular networking site in China and Taiwan that is similar to Facebook. 
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mother she cooks for me and takes care of me but my old Taiwanese mother-in law didn’t do 
anything?” 
  The responses to this post are below. 
  Ming:   It has to do with economic status. 
  Cheng:  My mother-in-law is very nice to me and treats me well. Before we married my    
              husband told her to treat me well or he would fight with her. 
   Xie:  My mother-in-law treats me well. When my husband and I fight she always takes  
my side. My first husband refused to get air conditioning in the summer when I  
was pregnant. He said “my mother doesn’t even have air conditioning in her 
room”. I divorced him.  
     Ting:  You are lucky to have a good Mother in law there aren’t that many in Taiwan 
     Xie:    If you are weak people will take advantage of you. You should be strong.  
     Ting:  She will see how strong I can be.  
      Xiu:   My mother-in-law treats me well. She buys me clothes and snacks. I talked  
    with her before moving to Taiwan.   
 
This site works as a conduit in which Mainland brides can create a virtual support 
network upon which many women rely for companionship and advice. Many exchange 
addresses, phone numbers and e-mails which allow these connections to develop further as some 
later meet in person. A bride from Guanxi province who had been living in Taiwan for six years 
commented on how happy she was to have recently located the site. Most commented on how 
helpful the site was and were very excited to make such connections. Many shared information 
about resources that were available in Taiwan. One posting explained the Foreign Spouse Center 
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in Xingzhu was very helpful as it offers free classes in parenting and many Mainland brides 
volunteer their time to help out at the center. Clearly this site is a valuable resource for Mainland 
brides, particularly those that find themselves in isolated violent situations.   
A clear example is an internet posting, from May 2010 entitled, “My Four Years of Pain” 
which appeared on the site. The poster, Mrs. Ma explained that her husband spends a great deal 
of time gambling and recently grabbed her by the hair and threw her out of the house telling her 
to leave Taiwan. She is worried that if she calls the police they might send her back to the 
Mainland without her children. She also explains that her in-laws won’t allow her to make 
friends or for that matter speak to anyone outside of the family, including her neighbors. She 
feels trapped and explains that she can’t go home because her parents on the Mainland do not 
have the means to support her two children. She is considering suicide. 
 The first few responses from those on the site were as follows.  
1) Call the police immediately 
 
2) Don’t do stupid things. My first year in Taiwan was hard and I considered suicide but 
found that if I communicated with my husband things improved. I used to cry at night 
while my husband was asleep. Finally I woke him up and told him how I felt and things 
have improved.  
 
3)  Don’t commit suicide because that would make your husband happy. 
 
4) You should leave your gambling, violent husband. 
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5) Call 113 the women and children protection hotline.  
 
6) Call the police. Don’t die. 
 
7) Buy a plane ticket and bring your children to the Mainland with you. Once you arrive       
    Apply for a visa it is very easy to get. Think of your children. Don’t leave them with a   
    gambling father. At the very worst we can help you smuggle your children back to the  
    Mainland. 
 
8) Leave if you don’t love him. Take the children with you. 
 
9) Be strong for the sake of the children. 
  
10) If your husband hurts you go to the police. 
  
Many of the responders also offered their contact information. Sites like these are 
invaluable to Mainland brides whether they are in such dire straits as Mrs. Ma or those who just 
want to connect with a Liao Xiang.  
While most responders implored Mrs. Ma to take her children with her if she leaves, in 
many cases this is simply not possible, resulting in some Mainland women leaving their children 
behind. These women are commonly referred to as “runaway brides” in Taiwan, a moniker that 
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is still commonly used today.53 The following quote from a conversation I had with a Taiwanese 
professor of sociology demonstrates that such discourse involving PRC women becoming 
runaway brides is also prevalent in academic circles. 
 
“They (Mainland brides) just run away and disappear. They leave their children 
behind and go back to the Mainland. They just don’t care.”  
 
Many scholars however have addressed the issue more critically and in recent years the 
Mainland or foreign bride phenomenon in Taiwan has been the subject of many scholarly works. 
Hsiao-Chuan Hsia has been a strong advocate for the rights of foreign brides in Taiwan. Her 
academic publications challenge the overwhelmingly negative portrayal of brides from Southeast 
Asia in the Taiwan media by demonstrating how “narrative strategies...fabricated statistics…and 
collaboration with governmental agencies” work to construct “the foreign bride phenomenon as a 
social problem”(Hsia 2007:55).54 In this vein, the work of Wang and Belanger points out the 
ways in which the Taiwanese state in pursuing the integration of foreign brides simultaneously 
works to “further stigmatize these women, discriminate against them, and therefore create an 
‘Other’”(2008:91). They argue that “differential legal and social citizenship” places foreign 
brides at the “bottom of the social hierarchy in Taiwanese society” (Wang and Belanger 
2008:91).55  
                                                 
53 Lieba Faier (2008) has examined the common usage of this term to describe Filipina brides who had married 
Japanese men and eventually “run away.” 
54 In addition Hsia has worked at the community level establishing language and cultural programs for foreign brides 
and worked to establish a national TransAsiaSisters Association (TASAT) which works to reform immigration 
policies and change the public perception of foreign brides. (See Hsia 2005, 2006) 
55 For a detailed discussion of this type of cultural racism which works to erase social differences while 
simultaneously highlighting and maintaining these differences to justify the current social hierarchy. see Larson 
2003.  
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Toyota has described how cross-border marriages by their very “existence challenge the 
state and the boundaries of its sovereignty” (2008:3). In the case of Taiwan, wherein its 
sovereignty is not recognized by much of the international community the issue of cross-Strait 
marriage is often regarded as a threat to the legitimacy of Taiwan’s independence. In a recent 
study of the interview process that Mainland brides and their husbands must undergo at the 
airport after arriving in Taiwan, Sara Friedman demonstrates how these interviews “perform 
Taiwan’s desired status as a modern sovereign state” (2010:180). This interview process which is 
meant to determine which marriages are authentic argues Friedman, “disciplines cross-Strait 
intimacy through imposing specific truth demands on cross-Strait couples” and also 
“(re)produces Taiwanese sovereignty” (2010:176).   
4.4 MAINLAND BRIDES AND DESPERATE HUSBANDS 
While both foreign (non PRC) and Mainland brides are considered a threat to Taiwan’s 
population quality, state building processes and issues of sovereignty have resulted in Mainland 
brides being portrayed as posing a somewhat of a different kind of threat to Taiwan than foreign 
brides.  Such differences are reflected in ROC government policies and discourse. In November 
of 2004 the Taiwan Ministry of the Interior began enforcing a new law that made advertisements 
involving cross-strait matchmaking illegal (Yiu 2004:2). The law states that anyone engaged in 
“the ad broadcast or publication or any other promotion activity that is contrary to the public 
order or good morals will face a fine of on less than NT$100,000” (Yiu 2004:1-2). While 
matchmaking agencies in general are legal, the promotion of these activities specifically in 
regards to the Mainland is a crime. The article reiterates that “matchmaking ads for people from 
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countries other than the PRC however are not illegal” (Yiu 2004:2). The use of the phrases 
“public order” and “good morals” clearly devalues any relationships that might result from this 
practice and questions the patriotism of Taiwan citizens who take part in it.  
One year later, however, in 2005, one in five newlywed couples in Taiwan involved a 
foreign spouse; the overwhelming majority of women were Mainland brides (Wang 2008:94).  
During that year 14,619 cross-Strait couples were married in Taiwan (Ministry of the Interior 
2006). In fact the only year that showed a marked decline in these marriages was in 2004 when a 
more strict interview process was implemented at the airport, and the majority of brides and 
brides to be were prevented from entering Taiwan (Wang 2008:104). This airport deterrent too 
was only temporarily successful as the following year the number of cross-Strait marriages in 
Taiwan increased by almost 4000. As of 2008 there were 411,315 registered foreign spouses in 
Taiwan, 63.32% (260,445), were Mainland brides (Ministry of the Interior, 2008). More 
recently, in October 2009 the ROC’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) reported that there were 
over 170,000 Mainland brides living on Taiwan. During the same period the Taipei Times 
claimed the unofficial total was closer to 270,000, alluding to the fact that many of these 
marriages are not recognized by the ROC government.  
 Given the amount of negative press that Mainland brides receive in the Taiwanese media 
throughout this period, the growing number of these marriages seems even more striking. For 
example, an article entitled “A Match Made in Hell” which appeared in the Taipei Times warns 
that “there may be spies among these Chinese women” who “may engage in sabotage and 
instigation” (Taipei Times 2003:8). Further, the article claims that Mainland women who have 
moved to Taiwan bring with them “numerous social and law enforcement problems such as drug 
trafficking, drug abuse, contagious diseases and kidnappings” (Taipei Times 2003:8). Another 
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article, “Marriage for Love or Money?” claims that “Chinese women, who come to Taiwan 
legally via marrying a Taiwanese man, are found to be making money through prostitution” (Lin 
2002:1).  
In 2003 Taiwan’s Council of Labor Affairs eased its regulations regarding the 
employment of “foreign” spouses, but these new regulations did not include Mainland brides 
(Wang 2008:98). In recent years Mainland brides have begun staging rallies in Taipei to demand 
better treatment (BBC Oct. 29, 2009:2). Their primary demands included reducing the wait time 
for a Taiwanese identification card from six to four years (the same as for foreign brides), and 
recognition of PRC degrees and licenses (BBC Oct, 29 2009:2). Although the Mainland Affairs 
Council (MAC) is considering amending the law with regard to degrees and licenses, it 
maintains that the six year waiting period is not discriminatory (BBC Oct, 29, 2009:2). At the 
time of this writing the policy remains unchanged.  
Although foreign brides and Mainland brides are often considered threats to Taiwan 
albeit for different reasons, the Taiwanese men who marry them tend to be portrayed in a more 
generalized way. Although Hsia states that Taiwanese men who marry foreign brides are “not 
viewed or imagined as a threat to population quality,” they are most often referred to in quite 
negative terms (2009:31). For example, while Hsia’s article focuses on discrimination against 
foreign brides who are often portrayed as undereducated and desperate, she refers to their 
Taiwanese husbands as “lower class Taiwanese men”, “peasants” “low-skilled” and “extremely 
disadvantaged in Taiwan’s domestic marriage market”(Hsia 2009:27, 28, 31). Further, while 
Hsia’s article reports that “forty percent of the Taiwanese husbands are working class”, the 
sentence that follows begins, “since the Taiwanese husbands are mostly working class” (Hsia 
2009:28). I point this out not to criticize Hsia, as her work in improving public awareness about 
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discriminatory policies and rhetoric with regard to foreign brides is has done much to improve 
their lives in Taiwan. Rather, I want to emphasize the fact that the rhetoric regarding Taiwanese 
men who marry foreign and for that matter Mainland brides is so pervasive that even those who 
are sensitive to such broad characterizations can find themselves perpetuating certain 
stereotypes. Wang and Belanger (2008) on the other hand, rightly state that discussions about the 
quality of Taiwan’s population often refer to migrant brides and their Taiwanese husbands as 
low class (Wang 2008:92).   
 Jones and Shen’s (2008) study of the factors that have contributed to the increase in 
transnational marriage in East Asian offers further evidence as to why such characterizations 
persist. They divide such marriages into two primary types. The first involves men from more 
prosperous regions who are “less marketable” as potential husbands in the local area because 
they are “poorer less educated, and/or reside in rural areas” and therefore seek out brides from 
less prosperous regions (Jones and Shen 2008:15). The second type is related to increased 
mobility of people across borders but is less targeted (Jones and Shen 2008).  This includes those 
who cross borders for business, tourism, international study or to find work and do so without the 
express purpose of finding a marriage partner (Jones and Shen 2008:15).  
As the first type is responsible for much of the increase in cross-border marriage in East 
Asia much of the academic literature regarding transnational, international or cross-border 
marriage focuses on the commodification, or commercialization of marriage in which men who 
have been unsuccessful in domestic marriage markets seek out brides from poorer regions, who 
cannot afford to be as “choosy” as local women (Jones and Shen 2008:15). Many of these men 
use some type of mediating agency such as marriage brokers, introduction agencies. 
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Local and national media outlets in Taiwan however, as discussed earlier, tend to lump 
these two marriage patterns into one generalized model which broadly defines cross-Strait 
couples in Taiwan as comprised of desperate unmarriageable men and poor, economically 
motivated women. I argue that although marriages that come about as a result of tourism, 
business or international study are not the dominant form of marriage they are grossly 
underrepresented in both the media and in academic studies. This tendency to equate cross-Strait 
marriage and for that matter cross-border marriage as a result of an active targeted search for a 
suitable marriage partner, overemphasizes economic factors while ignoring or glossing over 
emotional attachments.  While such characterizations exist in many parts of the globe, Taiwan’s 
uncertain status as a sovereign state exacerbates the issue as such couples are perceived as a 
threat to Taiwan itself.   
 On the Mainland side however, cross-Strait couples are treated quite differently. For 
those women who stay on the Mainland and marry Taiwanese men the representation and 
experience appears to be markedly different. Having a husband from Taiwan can be a source of 
social capital that can improve women’s status rather than diminish it. Taiwan businessmen who 
move to the Mainland and marry Mainland women are supported by the PRC’s government 
policy and are seldom mentioned in negative terms in the media. Taiwanese managers and 
business owners are in a stronger economic position on the Mainland in part, because of the 
influence of the Special Economic Zones and because Taiwan currency is worth considerably 
more in the PRC (Shen 2008:61). Many enjoy “a lifestyle and prestige that they would often be 
unable to afford in Taiwan” (Shen 2008:61). Also in part because of the influence of Taiwan 
popular culture in China many are considered by many to be more forward minded than 
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Mainland Chinese men. This is reflected in a comment from Mei regarding local married couples 
in Xiamen, her hometown. 
 
Women in Xiamen are too easily controlled. The men are in charge here. Women 
don’t argue with their husbands. They do whatever the man wants to do. The men here 
yell at their wives and beat them if they don’t listen. At home the woman has to cook, but 
usually doesn’t eat with her husband. She eats in the kitchen. Ang and I are not like that. 
 
 
 Clearly marrying a Taiwanese businessman can lead to upward social mobility, but it 
also has its share of problems, a topic that will be examined more deeply in the following 
chapter.  For those who are not openly “separatists” the PRC grants them access to a profitable 
market, while those who openly support Taiwan’s independence from the PRC are denied this 
opportunity (China Daily 2004 June 18:1). PRC policies facilitate economic and social 
relationships with Taiwan and highlight sameness rather than difference to draw businessmen 
and women to the Mainland promoting greater social and economic interaction and resulting in 
more cross-Strait marriages.  
 As discussed above, political relations between the Mainland and Taiwan have a 
profound effect on the lives of those involved in cross-Strait intimate relationships. Marriage, as 
Warner (1999) claims is clearly not benign but works to connect intimate desires with state 
agendas. The governments of both the PRC and ROC employ policy and media discourses to 
cajole citizens to support their oft conflicting government agendas, in part, by influencing the 
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desires of those on both sides of the Taiwan straits. Such policies and discourses however, can in 
some cases result in unintended practices which can, in turn, influence government policies.      
4.5 CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that Taiwan’s shifts in economic and social policies were, in part, a reaction to the 
creative ways in which companies and individuals circumvented these restrictions. In the case of 
cross-Strait trade, smuggling and the use of third-party countries or territories to direct funds to 
the Mainland made these restrictions so porous that they became almost obsolete. The PRC’s 
special economic zones granted Taiwanese businesses access to a cheap labor force, less 
government oversight, and access to the huge Mainland market effectively drawing Taiwanese 
investment and people to the Mainland, despite pervasive media discourse in Taiwan warning of 
the dangers of this practice. After the ROC legalized trade with the Mainland, entrepreneurs had 
gained the leverage they needed to play each government against each other to secure more 
lucrative deals and government subsidies. Eventually, as was the case with Y.C. Yang, some 
opened factories and businesses in both sites.   
Similarly, the ROC’s policies meant to limit the number of cross-Strait marriages through 
strict immigration policies and negative portrayals of Mainland women and their Taiwanese 
husbands, were in some cases circumvented through smuggling (Mainland women into Taiwan), 
forged travel documents, and other means. As a result of such practices, just as the level of 
Taiwanese investment in the Mainland is impossible to quantify so are the number of cross-Strait 
couples both in Taiwan and on the Mainland. In trying to limit the amount of interaction across 
the Taiwan Straits through the establishment of new policies Taiwanese businesspeople found a 
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way to circumvent these regulations. So too have cross-Strait couples. Arguably, one of the 
unforeseen outcomes of these policies is the practice of Taiwanese men migrating to the PRC 
and setting up households with their Mainland wives.  
 In November 2007 the China Daily reported that there are currently “about 270,000 
cross-Strait marriages” and that “nearly 400,000 Taiwanese people currently live on the 
Mainland” (China Daily 2007:2). The issue of why some cross-Strait couples choose to reside on 
the Mainland came up in my interviews with a cross-Strait couple currently living in the PRC.  I 
asked if they would ever consider living in Taiwan. The PRC wife answered:  
 
Why would I want to do that (laughing)? We have a good life here. Women from 
the Mainland are treated so poorly there. Even women from Hong Kong aren’t treated 
well. We visit each year, to see my husband’s parents. The environment is nice. But we 
would never live there.      
 
If her comments are any indication, Taiwan’s policies with regard to cross-Strait 
economic and social interaction may have created an environment that encourages more 
Taiwanese men to migrate to the PRC and set up businesses and form families (both officially 
and unofficially) on the Mainland.  
 In 2003, 34,426 cross-Strait couples registered for marriage in Taiwan (see table 2). The 
following year that number dropped significantly to 10,972 as a result of establishment of the 
interview system discussed above (Friedman 2010:171). During this same period, the number of 
registered cross-Strait marriages on the Mainland was 32,300 in 2003, and rose to 37,178 in 
2004. The same year, 90.9% of those who underwent the interview process at Taoyuan airport 
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were granted visas (Friedman 2010:178).56  If the overwhelming majority of those interviewed 
were granted visas how then can we account for the significant drop in the number of cross-Strait 
marriage registrations in Taiwan in 2004? Perhaps anxieties regarding the interview process 
prompted more couples to reconsider registering for marriage in Taiwan. The increase in such 
marriage registrations during the same period on the Mainland could be the result of some of 
these couples choosing to settle on the Mainland rather than in Taiwan. Perhaps more cross-
Strait couples had decided that given the ROC’s immigration policies coupled with the negative 
discourses about them in Taiwan, they were better served staying on the Mainland. If so, 
Taiwan’s protective policies may have had unintended consequences.  
 
 
Table 3. Cross-Strait Marriage Registrations in Taiwan and the PRC 
Year Cross-Strait 
Marriage 
Registrations, 
Taiwan* 
Cross-Strait Marriage 
Registrations, PRC** 
2003 34,426 32,300 
2004 10,972 37,178 
2005 14,619 22,31557 
2006 13,968 19,629 
2007 14,721 15,801 
2008 12,27458 13,902 
*Data from the Ministry of the Interior (Neizheng tonji tongbao) [reports on        
international affairs], (2009). 
 **Data from China Statistical Yearbook 2003-2009. 
                                                 
56 Taoyuan airport is Taiwan’s primary international airport.  
57 Part of the reason for this drop in marriages on the Mainland could be attributed to the fact that 2005, the year of 
the rooster” is also considered a “widow year” and is known as a very unlucky year to get married. See “Chinese 
avoid weddings in Year of Rooster” in China Daily, January 5th 2005. 
 
58 Friedman argues that the decrease in cross-Strait marriages in Taiwan in 2008 points to the “marital consequences 
of Taiwan’s economic decline” (Friedman 2010:171). This may also account for the decline in cross-Strait 
marriages in the PRC during the same period. 
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Given the PRC’s policies with regard to Taiwanese businesspeople investing and residing 
on the Mainland it comes as no surprise that many experience upward economic status.  Further, 
those that marry and settle on the Mainland do not fit into the category of diao cha men. Rather 
than leaving their natal families and homes they are thought of as returning to the motherland, 
the home of their ancestors—a practice that arguably does not conflict with the tenants of filial 
piety. Given this, we would expect their social location to improve in the PRC just as their 
economic situation does in many cases. But the situation is much more complex as it relates to a 
variety of factors including local histories and perceptions, individual personality and initiative, 
and the scale of analysis.  
  98 
5.0  TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS CLASS: TAIWANESE MIGRANTS AND 
SOCIAL LOCATIONS 
“Class is not a thing or set of characteristics to be defined but a matter of practice and 
process. Class is not prior to or outside of discourse and performance but an emergent cultural 
project wherein people attempt to speak and act themselves—and their new socioeconomic 
existence—into cultural reality or coherence” 
     Mark Liechty (2005:3) 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the various social locations (Mahler and Pessar 2001) that Taiwanese 
men occupy in the PRC. I draw on interviews carried out in Xiamen, Shanghai and Zhenjiang, 
with local residents and Taiwanese businessmen living on the Mainland. The Taiwanese 
businessmen I interviewed were economically privileged. Given this, I found considerable 
variation with regard to their social locations. I also monitored a chat room based in the PRC 
(onlylady.com) in which there was a discussion about their impressions of Taiwanese men living 
on the Mainland. This chapter points to non-economic factors that influence migrants’ social 
locations. These include public perceptions and discourse and individual initiative, imagination 
and personality.   
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The first half of this chapter focuses on Mainland Chinese public discourses about 
Taiwanese migrants. I begin with some PRC women’s comments about Taiwanese men on an 
internet chat room. Then I focus on the various ways that local residents of Shanghai, Zhenjiang, 
and Xiamen talk about Taiwanese migrants. While there are some common themes, there are 
also marked differences which are related to historical and contemporary lived experiences in 
each locality. As the bulk of this dissertation is based on research carried out in Xiamen, I 
emphasize Xiamen residents’ unique discourses with regard to Taiwanese people and culture 
which simultaneously speaks to local cultural cohesiveness and individual difference.  
Next I discuss local and national media characterizations of Huang Jinshan, the founder 
of the Taiwan Folk Culture Park in Xiamen, as a model Taiwanese businessman. Such 
characterizations work to recast the image of Taiwanese businessmen as loyal, hardworking, 
honest employers who hold their employees in high regard. This also works to re-enforce the 
party line I so often heard in the course of my fieldwork, that is, “They [Taiwanese] are just like 
us”.  
The second part of this chapter examines these issues from the perspective of Taiwanese 
migrants I interviewed in Xiamen. The focus is on how they view themselves in relation to the 
local population, and their lived experiences in Xiamen. Preferential policies enacted by the 
PRC, coupled with the fact that many Taiwanese people (like foreigners) are paid at a “special 
expatriate rate” clearly give many Taiwanese businesspeople a distinct economic advantage in 
the PRC (Shen 2008:61). However, economic advantage does not always result in upward 
mobility with regard to their social location.59 I argue that despite their economic advantages my 
                                                 
59 Ong’s 1999 study of wealthy Chinese migrants in California found that their economic advantage did not 
necessarily translate to high social status. This was primarily because of discourse involving citizenship and ethnic 
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primary informants occupied varying social locations in the PRC, which were partly related to 
their personality traits. Those who had the ability to develop social relationships at the local level 
adapted to life on the Mainland more easily than those who isolated themselves or tended to only 
interact with other Taiwanese migrants. Those Taiwanese and other foreign men who marry a 
Mainland woman and set up a household in her hometown can (depending upon their 
personalities) build social relationships more easily. These social relationships at the local level 
are of primary importance in that they allow the migrant better access to the host society, which 
can have a profound effect on the migrants’ experiences abroad. In some cases, these 
relationships offer migrants the social space in which to reconfigure or shift their identities, 
which in turn influence their social location. My approach is multi-scaled, meaning that I 
examine how these social locations shift in relation to place and social space. Of primary 
importance are the migrants’ responses to these shifts, which highlight their willingness and 
ability to reconfigure their sense of self in relation to place. Further, the differing ways that they 
reinforce or contest local stereotypes about themselves highlight the importance of individual 
personality and practice and how these factors intersect with their social locations. 
5.1 ONLYLADY.COM 
This section is based on an internet chat room site (http://bbs.onlylady.com/thread-345534-1-
1.html) in which respondents from various areas on the Mainland responded to the question 
                                                                                                                                                             
stratification in the United States. Ethnicity however, is not a distinguishing factor for Taiwanese migrants in the 
PRC, specifically within the Minnan cultural area. See also Bourdieu 1984.  
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“What do you ladies think about marrying a Taiwanese man?” which was posted in 2008. The 
comments are listed below.  
Comment 1: I have been dating a Taiwanese man for half a year. To be honest with you, 
I feel that sometimes a Taiwanese has very weird ideas. I don’t know if you share the same 
feelings with me. 
Comment 2: I have two mistresses [er nai] living next to me. Their boyfriends are from 
Taiwan. There are many cases like that in Xiamen. 
Comment 3: As seen from the only one I interacted with, Taiwanese men are male 
chauvinists. It is hard to get along with the mother-in-law. I recommend that you should consider 
the relationship from all perspectives. 
Comment 4: I watched a TV program, which says: if a Taiwanese woman marries a 
Taiwanese man, both of their families are happy. The man’s family will treat the woman as a 
daughter. If the woman is not from Taiwan, she and mother-in-law are adversaries. 
Comment 5: Different regions will have cultural differences. 
Comment 6: Fewer women married Taiwanese men, more women were kept as 
mistresses. 
Comment 7: I know one Taiwanese man. He is weird. 
Comment 8: I have a good friend who is Taiwanese. His girlfriend is from my 
hometown. He is conscientious, responsible, and male chauvinistic. They are about to get 
married in two months. The man’s parents will pay for their new house. He is very gentleman-
like, well-educated. We often have discussions about Confucianism, Li Bai and Du Fu, and we 
became good friends. 
Comment 9: They are bumpkins, they all have bias against the China Mainland. 
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Comment 10: I have known several Taiwanese men. They are biased against the China 
Mainland. 
Comment 11: It varies with people. 
Comment 12: I know quite a few friends from Taiwan and Macau. I once interacted with 
a Taiwanese guy. We are now still friends and contact each other sometimes. Talking about my 
impression of Taiwanese men around me, they talk gently, relatively modest, and also pay 
attention to their image. They are strong individuals and they are independent. They are heavily 
influenced by Western culture, which was different from people from the Mainland. Their 
pressure of lives in their hometown are much bigger than ours, therefore, students from Hong 
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan take money seriously. They have much stronger consciousness to 
make money than people from the Mainland. 
Comment 13: They are scheming too much. They will not do anything out of line. They 
will not talk much profanity. But they are not profound either. I just do not think they are what 
they appear to be. 
 
The variability of these comments reflects some of the differing opinions about 
Taiwanese men on the Mainland. The bulk of comments however, seem to agree that Taiwanese 
men are for various reasons considered “different”, whether it because they are perceived as 
“biased against the China Mainland,” “weird,” “scheming,” “bumpkins,” or “male chauvinists.” 
While most of these comments seem to be based on personal experiences these perceptions of 
Taiwanese men may also be influenced by group identity at the local level, a subject discussed 
below.   
  103 
5.2 LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 
Harold Isaacs has argued that basic group identity is usually “dressed in national colors” 
(1975:171).  Appadurai, on the other hand, predicts the demise of the nation-state, in part 
because “communities of sentiment” are formed through the “collective experiences of the mass 
media” which are not grounded in a particular geographic place (1996:8). Scholars have also 
lamented that in the case of modern globalization, or “hypermodernity” (Foster 1999)60 “the 
local and the global are often indefinable and indistinct” (Grewal and Kaplan 1994:11) and that 
“the spatial dimensions of social life are…no longer dominated by presence” (Giddens 1990:18). 
They are arguing, in other words, that geographic places and social life at the local level may not 
be as important as in the past, given the influence of modern globalization and the relative ease 
in which images, information, people and goods move around the world. In the course of my 
research, however, I found that group identity at the local level is grounded in unique local 
histories, lived experiences and discourse. While local identity is influenced by global and 
national factors it should not be viewed as necessarily subsumed or dominated by national or 
global influences. Further, local identities in some settings may become more cohesive in 
response to global influences. One way that these local identities are manifested in everyday 
practice is in the ways that individuals interact and talk about “others.” Of chief concern in this 
section are the differing ways various local populations, in Shanghai and Zhenjiang, talk about 
Taiwanese migrants and how these discourses influence these migrants’ social locations.  
I begin with an introduction to Shanghai and Zhenjiang followed by examples of how 
residents talk about Taiwanese migrants who reside in these cities. In the next section I focus 
                                                 
60 Foster argues that hypermodernity brings about significantly accelerates time and space and works to dissolve 
traditional boundaries.   
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specifically on Xiamen, highlighting its unique historical and contemporary interactions with 
Taiwan, and how these factors frame the ways that local residents talk about Taiwanese men who 
have migrated to the area.  
5.2.1 SHANGHAI BAZI: WEALTHY BUMPKINS 
Shanghai is known as China’s most cosmopolitan city. It has long been considered China’s 
financial hub and one of China’s most fashionable cities. Some refer to Shanghai as the elder 
brother of Beijing, which is meant to imply that without Shanghai’s support Beijing could not 
prosper. Most Shanghainese speak Shanghai dialect, which is incomprehensible to most from 
other areas of China.61 Among other things this dialect is known for its colorful language, 
particularly when pointing out the faults of others. The locals I spoke to in Shanghai were 
fiercely proud of their city and local culture.  
Mrs. Shi is a retired textile worker. She is 65 and lives in Shanghai with her daughter 
(Ming), Ming’s husband, and their daughter. She once explained to me that her elder daughter 
(Chengcheng) was offered a substantial promotion in a major newspaper that hinged on her 
relocating to the main office in Beijing. Mrs. Shi advised her to turn down the offer in spite of 
the significant salary increase because “Shanghai is the best place to live in the world. Beijing 
can’t compete.” Her daughter concurred and still lives in Shanghai.  
 While in Shanghai I asked Ms. Lee, a well-dressed outspoken businesswoman who grew 
up in the city, if she had any experiences with Taiwanese businessmen. When Ms. Lee was 
attending graduate school she worked for a Taiwanese businessman in a small office typing up 
                                                 
61 One exception is the Suzhou area where the local dialect is somewhat similar to Shanghainese.   
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memos and answering phones. She said that her boss acted like he had just migrated from the 
country. “He had money but no manners and no taste,” she said.  He had a lot of girlfriends but 
they all just wanted his money. She explained that in Shanghai, Taiwanese men like this were 
most often referred to as bazi (a term in Shanghai dialect meaning country bumpkins). She had a 
very low opinion of her previous employer explaining that he would often lose his temper and 
throw things (phones and teacups) around the room when upset. She said a large part of her time 
was spent cleaning up after his tantrums. I asked her if she had any other experiences with 
Taiwanese men and she said that she had not. “They live in their own little communities.” She 
later commented on how ridiculous they all look, walking proudly through the malls buying 
whatever their mistresses want. “Usually the girls are taller than them and very well dressed” she 
said laughing, “and these guys wear clothes that are so ugly.”  In this case, Ms. Lee’s opinion 
didn’t seem to be tied to nationality but rather urban and rural differences associated with class. 
In fact, the term bazi is most often used to describe migrants who move from rural areas in China 
to Shanghai.  
5.2.2 ZHENJIANG: A SITE OF ABANDONMENT 
Zhenjiang a city situated just south of the Yangzi River in Jiangsu province is a relatively small 
city. Zhenjiang has long been famous for the quality of its vinegar, and Jin Shan Temple, where 
many Chinese come to pay their respects to the gods and ask for good fortune in the upcoming 
year. In recent years it has also become known by some, as a site of abandonment.  
The establishment of special economic zones in and near Zhenjiang resulted in business 
people from primarily Hong Kong and Taiwan establishing manufacturing plants in the area, 
which drew workers from the surrounding areas. One of these workers was Shao Li, who quickly 
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found a promising job in a Taiwanese owned plant. Li’s new job included the use of a two 
bedroom apartment, free transportation to work each day and the possibility of a promotion to a 
management position. Five years later because of his dedication and hard work he was promoted 
to a low-level management position. The first time I visited Li in 2006 things were no longer 
looking so rosy.  
As my taxi entered Li’s neighborhood the asphalt street turned onto an unpaved pothole 
covered road. Empty unfinished dust covered buildings lined the streets. The street was filled 
with people making their way to hawkers selling legs of pork, fried bread and other foodstuffs 
covered with flies. The noise was deafening as motorcycles sped down the street leaving a cloud 
of blue exhaust behind them adding to the constant layer of dust that hung over the 
neighborhood. My initial impression was that this resembled a rural village situated within a city. 
Li’s apartment was in a housing complex in which the employees of the plant lived with their 
families. While it was only a few years old it looked much older and was in need of repair. A 
small play area was situated in between two rectangular apartment buildings where mothers and 
grandmothers played with children. Across the road was a second complex, where there was a 
preschool had been built for the employee’s children. Li’s apartment, like many in this part of 
China was in a cement building with no heat. The apartment was large by Chinese standards, but 
most of the appliances did not work. He had running water, but no hot water. He had a kitchen, 
but no working stove.  
During my month long stay with Li, his wife, and their four-year-old daughter, they often 
spoke of their frustrations. Each morning, a company bus arrived to take Li to the factory outside 
of town. It was not uncommon for Li to be gone for days at a time. When his shift was over the 
bus would take him home. If his boss required him to stay at work for several days at a time, he 
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would not be allowed to board the bus. During these periods he slept at his desk and ate what he 
could. There was no overtime pay, only a vague promise of a possible promotion. Li was 
considering finding another job, but if he left, the company would take his apartment and his 
family would have nowhere to live. His irregular hours also made it difficult for him to search 
for another job. Li’s wife, Jin, worked at a department store in the downtown area to help them 
make ends meet. To help the couple out, Jin’s mother and father sold their apartment in Shanghai 
and bought one nearby so they could help care for their granddaughter. While Li was not happy 
with his situation, he was reluctant to talk about his employer. This changed the following year.  
On my follow up visit in 2007, Li and his family were living with Jin’s parents. Li had 
left his job and was preparing to go to Shanghai and stay with his brother while looking for 
work. Thus unencumbered he spoke more openly about his previous job. “They don’t treat us as 
human beings.” “My boss made all these promises and in the end the owner sold the company to 
another Taiwanese businessman and moved back to Taiwan. My pay went down and my hours 
went up because of the new owner’s greed. They come here, treat us like slaves, make huge 
profits then run back to Taiwan. I will not work for a Taiwanese company ever again. They don’t 
treat us like people.”  
Another factor that influenced Li’s decision was the fact that the previous year his wife 
had to have an abortion because they could not afford a birth permit for a second child. Li was 
unhappy, and his wife was angry. They have a daughter who is four, and Jin claims the aborted 
child was a son.  Li was taking quite a chance leaving his job, with a family that depended on his 
income to survive.  Jin still worked at the department store. Times were tough and they had come 
to depend heavily on Jin’s mother and father.  
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A year later, in 2008, I called Li, who still spent most of his time in Shanghai looking for 
work. He had several interviews but no offers. His family lived in Zhenjiang, and he was still 
staying with his brother in Shanghai. He was frustrated but still optimistic. He planned to move 
his family to Shanghai as soon as he found work. But with the post-Olympic economic 
slowdown his dream seemed at least temporarily out of reach.  
5.2.3 XIAMEN: THE MINNAN CULTURAL AREA 
In Xiamen, one of the easiest parts of my fieldwork was recruiting members of the local 
community to answer my questions regarding Taiwanese men on the Mainland. One of the most 
difficult aspects of conducting these interviews was getting people to tell me what they really 
thought—particularly when their thoughts strayed from the party line. To complicate matters, 
before I arrived in Xiamen, China’s President Hu appeared on CCTV to promote cross-Strait 
economic, educational and cultural exchange. In his speech he announced that “compatriots on 
both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one family” and that the Taiwan people are "our flesh-
and-blood brothers" (China Daily March 4, 2005).  As a result, in the early stages of my research 
when I asked the question, “what is your impression of Taiwanese migrants” the most common 
answer I received was “they are just like us.” When I attempted to encourage them to elaborate, 
most replied “we are all Chinese.” Any attempts on my part for further elaboration usually meant 
either the end of the interview or a swift change of subject.  
Later, anticipating their response, I rephrased the question to highlight the local area, and 
sameness, rather than that of the national level and difference. “In what ways are Taiwanese 
people and Xiamen people the same?” In addition to “we are all Chinese,” many spoke about 
Minnan culture. Minnan culture was in a sense the common cloth from which Taiwanese and 
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Xiamen people were supposedly cut. When I asked them to explain what they meant by Minnan 
culture, most would first refer to language (Minnan hua) followed by the ability to brew and 
appreciate tea in the Minnan way.   
5.2.3.1 TEA: A PUBLIC PRACTICE 
Tea is an important cultural symbol within Minnan culture. Tea is not served in the same fashion 
in Xiamen, as it usually is in Beijing or Shanghai. In Xiamen, tea is served in very small 
porcelain cups, to better judge its color and aroma. Tea is prepared, as one of my informants 
explained “in the Minnan way” in which the brewer follows set procedures. While tea is being 
prepared, those at the table seldom speak, but watch closely to insure the procedures are correct.  
First the cups, a small mesh screen, and a pair of tweezers, are immersed in hot water. 
Next scalding hot water is poured in and over the teapot and the lid. Once the pot is deemed 
warm enough the pot is emptied and a small vacuum-sealed packet of tea is opened and poured 
inside. The pot is filled with hot water and covered. Quickly, the teacups are taken out of the hot 
water and placed on the tea table. The tea, which has been steeping for less than one minute, is 
poured into the cups with the remainder of the first brew poured onto the tea table. Water is 
again added to the teapot and the lid replaced. After it has brewed long enough (usually about 
two minutes), the teacups are emptied of the first brew (which was to season the cups while 
keeping them warm), and refilled with the second brew. The cups are then placed in front of 
those at the table for tasting, while the lid of the teapot is passed around the table for everyone to 
smell. I’m told that usually the third brew is the best, and that a good tea maker can get at least 
six brews from one packet of tea. After the last of the tea is served, the leaves are inspected to 
determine their quality and if they were machine or handpicked. I’m told that good tea should 
only include whole leaves, not pieces of leaves.    
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In Xiamen, it is not unusual to see small tables placed on the sidewalks outside of 
storefronts and apartment buildings around which residents are crowded enjoying their tea. 
Having traveled extensively throughout China I have never witnessed so many people drinking 
and preparing tea outdoors, nor have I seen so many teashops crowded into such a small area. 
There were six within one block of my apartment, and this was by no means the tea district. The 
local residents openly spoke proudly about their tea, its preparation and consumption, often 
differentiating themselves from those from other areas. One elderly man explained that “In the 
northeast they drink tea…but here we taste tea.”  
A local bar owner kept a complete tea set behind his bar so he could make a favorable 
impression by showing off his tea brewing skills. It was not uncommon for his regular customers 
to bring tea samples into the bar which would prompt long discussions about who had the highest 
quality of tea at the time. If a young woman entered the bar, the tea set would be on the bar in 
short order to try to impress her. To sum up, tea appreciation and preparation is an important 
cultural marker of Minnan culture, which may explain why it is often a public rather than private 
practice.62   
5.2.4 CONVERSATIONS AT “THE WAY”: THE PARTY LINE AND LOCAL 
OPINIONS 
My search for a discourse of difference had been preempted by one of sameness. While I 
regularly was witness to conversations by Taiwanese men that revolved around, for example how 
Taiwanese women differ from Mainland women (discussed later in this chapter), I had yet to be 
                                                 
62 This is not to say that tea appreciation is practiced or for that matter important to every individual. Later in this 
chapter I introduce a Taiwanese manager who drinks Lipton tea which he identifies as a valued Taiwanese product.  
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privy to Xiamen locals differentiating themselves from Taiwanese men or women. Several 
weeks later however, marked a turning point in this endeavor, which occurred in the most 
unlikely of places.  
“The Way” is a very small bar in Xiamen that few people frequent. On the sidewalk there 
is one small sign the reads “The Way” with a small menu printed below, although I never 
witnessed anyone eating there. “The Way” is in a converted small old-style Chinese house that 
sits well below street level. It fact from the street one can only make out the red shingled roof. 
To locate the entrance you must take an unmarked stairway that leads into the darkness 
seemingly to nowhere.   
The bar is constructed of dark wood and mirrors. Directly in front of it sit five bar stools 
with barely enough room between the opposing walls for one to maneuver to the restroom, which 
is situated in a small back room. In the back room there is also a surprisingly high quality 
dartboard with the rules and regulations posted on the wall and a regulation foul line painted on 
the floor. On the walls are photos of the most famous dart players primarily from Europe, and a 
list of the most recent winners in the local tournament. Apparently darts are popular here. Behind 
the bar there are an assortment of various mixers and liquor, some authentic prestigious brands 
and some clearly fake.  
My primary contacts here were Zhi Peng, his cousin Ting, and her Uncle Liu. Zhi Peng, 
the owner is 25, an ex-soccer player (who retired after a leg injury), and considers himself an 
entrepreneur and quite the ladies man. His cousin Ting, the bartender, is 30, and is desperately on 
the lookout for a husband. Ting’s Uncle Liu, who is in his 60’s, spends his evenings doing 
repairs at the bar, primarily so he can keep a close eye on Ting.   
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During my weekly visits, more often than not I was the only person in the bar and spent 
my time playing darts and talking to Uncle Liu about everything from world history to the Iraq 
war. He grew up on a small island (Gulang Yu) just off the coast of Xiamen. Gulang Yu was a 
foreign concession, and during Uncle Liu’s childhood was dominated by westerners. In order to 
find a good job, as a boy he converted to Christianity, studied western history and some English 
(Ting considers herself Christian by extension). While he no longer remembers English he still 
has a great understanding of world history, specifically American history.  
On the few occasions there were others at the bar, I was usually the only non-local. Most 
locals stop in out of curiosity, order warm water, bring in their own snacks, and gossip with Zhi 
Peng or Uncle Liu. Occasionally Ting had a friend stop by (always female) and share a snack 
and some fresh gossip, usually about currently available bachelors. On some occasions Zhi Peng 
posted himself behind the bar with his girlfriend of five years—of whom Uncle Liu strongly 
disapproves--who usually by 8:00 begged to go home because she was bored. Zhi Peng gladly 
accommodated her and shortly after, as if by magic, another of his girlfriends usually appeared at 
the bar. Once every few months the bar hosted a dart tournament, which was standing room only. 
If not for these infrequent events, Zhi Peng would have been hard pressed to pay his bills.     
When I began stopping by I asked anyone who would listen what were, in their view, the 
differences between Xiamen (I tried the local approach) and Taiwanese people. On one occasion 
I was talking to a local doctor who had stopped in after his shift. He insisted on speaking English 
when he responded to my question, in part, so that no one nearby could understand his response. 
Before he finished his first sentence, however, a middle-aged woman angrily rushed downstairs 
claiming (in broken English) that she knew what we were talking about and that he shouldn’t talk 
about such things to foreigners. The doctor told her to be quiet and go back upstairs, which she 
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did. As a result, however, the doctor failed to continue the conversation and left in short order. 
Consequently, the answer to my question remained that same, often word for word. “Xiamen and 
Taiwanese people are the same” after which most would talk about Minnan culture as discussed 
earlier. It wasn’t until I brought my Taiwanese friend Ang into the bar that I finally received 
some different perspectives.  
One evening Ang picked me up at me apartment, and as usual had a woman sitting in the 
back seat of the car. I sat in front with Ang and he introduced her as Tammy. Tammy was close 
to 6 feet tall, thin, about 25, and had a constant smile on her face. Ang started the evening, as he 
usually did, by asking the woman who accompanied him who was better looking, he or I. The 
response was also the same. Tammy laughed and said that of course Ang was the best looking. 
Ang was always more than a little pleased with this response. We drove around for an hour or so 
with Ang and Tammy constantly flirting and laughing. I suggested to Ang that we go check out a 
small bar near my apartment. When I told him where it was, he was surprised he had never heard 
of it. 
As we approached the stairway leading into the darkness, Ang began to get a bit uneasy. 
He later told me he was concerned that Tammy might fall. After entering, Tammy seemed to like 
the place but Ang was clearly shocked. He pulled me aside and told me I should never take 
anyone to this bar because it’s too small and dirty and there is nothing going on. He was clearly 
embarrassed to bring Tammy to this place. He did his best however and--as I had become 
accustomed—began telling story after story to Uncle Liu, Tammy, Ting and myself for the better 
part of one hour. Everyone seemed to be enjoying themselves and it appeared that Uncle Liu and 
Ting liked Ang. Soon after, Ang said he and Tammy had to go, so I left with them and walked 
across the street to my apartment.  
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The following week when I showed up for my weekly dart game, Uncle Liu had some 
sharp words to say about Ang. He made it clear to me that most Xiamen people do not like 
Taiwanese people at all. “They always think that they are better than us and talk down to us” he 
said. I explained that I thought everyone had gotten along fine but he shook his head and said, 
“You don’t know,” as he walked towards the door. That comment drove me to redouble my 
efforts.  
A week later, Uncle Liu broached the subject again. Even though we were the only 
people there that night, he leaned over the bar and spoke quietly into my ear, “Taiwanese people 
are not like Xiamen people because the way they think is not the same. The Japanese controlled 
them for so long they are now like a mixture of Chinese and Japanese. Not good.” I was warned 
to be very careful with Taiwanese people lest they influence me.  
5.2.5 WIDOW VILLAGES AND STORIES OF ABANDONMENT 
The following week I spoke to Ting about my conversation with Uncle Liu regarding Ang and 
his visit. She explained that many people don’t trust Taiwanese men in the Xiamen area. “They 
are not good,” was the mantra she often revisited. When I asked her for an example she told me 
about Widow Village.  
According to Ting, there is an entire village outside of Xiamen (I could not get an exact 
location) composed of grandmothers and their grown children who had been abandoned by their 
Taiwanese husbands and fathers. Ting explained that most of the men had been members of the 
GMD (Nationalist) army that had fled to Taiwan as the Communist forces gained control of the 
area in the early 1950s. She said that since that time, the wives had dutifully waited for their 
husbands’ return, never remarrying and raising the children on their own. The husbands, 
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however, never did return. Most, according to Ting, had remarried and started new families in 
Taiwan. She said that even today the village is full of old grandmothers who are still waiting for 
their husbands to come home. “Once they arrived in Taiwan, they forgot about their families 
here as they remarried and started families in Taiwan. That’s what Taiwanese men are like,” she 
explained. Although Ting desperately wanted to find a husband, she said she would never 
consider a Taiwanese man suitable. 
In the next few months I followed up on this story. Every local person in Xiamen I asked 
about “widow village” said they had heard of it, but had little to add. When I expressed a desire 
to visit this village no one seemed to know where it was. One man in his fifties told me that in 
Fujian province there are many widow villages in the rural areas.  
Stories of abandonment, whether pertaining to business and/or family, seemed to be a 
common theme regarding Taiwanese migrants. According to my interviews in Shanghai and 
Zhenjiang, Taiwanese men are clearly considered outsiders. In Shanghai these differences were 
related to issues of class. The designation bazi relegates these men to the category of uncultured, 
country bumpkins. In Zhenjiang the focus was on stories of employer abuse and abandonment by 
outsiders from Taiwan. In Xiamen however, local discourses highlighted cultural cohesion on the 
surface while there was clearly an underlying sentiment of difference.     
5.3 THE LURE OF THE MAINLAND AND THE MODEL TAIWANESE 
BUSINESSMAN 
Such discourse describing Taiwanese men as greedy untrustworthy employers and disloyal 
husbands and fathers has been highly contested by the government controlled media on the 
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Mainland. One of the most striking examples related specifically to Xiamen, is the story of 
Huang Jinshan, a Taiwanese businessman who is portrayed as the model Taiwanese 
businessman. His story has been widely circulated in the Mainland press and he has been 
featured in television interviews on CCTV 1, Fujian Television and South East China television.  
The following synopsis of his story is based on a two part special that is regularly aired on 
CCTV. 
In the first part of the series entitled “Father’s Xiamen Golden Mountain Dream” 
(爸爸的厦门金山梦), Huang’s story is initially told from the perspective of his eldest son who 
explains that only ten days after his father left to visit the Mainland he called home and said he 
had invested in a business and would not be coming home for some time. From that time on, he 
said, his mother had to shoulder the burden of raising both himself and his brother in Taiwan. 
The son laments that his father later sold the family land in Taiwan that he had inherited from his 
grandfather and even hocked an expensive watch his wife had given him all to keep his “Golden 
Mountain dream alive.” Finally the son asks, “What magical power does the Mainland’s 
landscape have over my father?” (Wang 2008).   
In the second part of the series entitled “The Enterprising Spirit”, Huang Jinshan (the 
father) describes his first visit to the Mainland in 1989 as “love at first sight” (Wang 2008). His 
first impression was that he had been here before, perhaps in a dream. Upon seeing Golden 
Mountain Huang says that he made what he repeatedly refers to as his “ten second decision” 
(Wang 2008).63 At that moment he decided to make the Golden Mountain area his life’s work no 
matter what the cost. His goal was to “match the landscape to the environment” (Wang 2008). 
                                                 
63 Golden Mountain is located on the Xiamen coast I nautical mile from Taiwan’s Jinmen Island.  
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The result was the Xiamen-Taiwan Folk Culture Park, which is a combination, museum, nature 
reserve, and amusement park. 
The overall message of the park is clear as it was designed to highlight historical cultural 
continuity across the Taiwan Straits. This message, which echoes the PRC government line “we 
are the same,” is one of the reasons that Huang and the park are so highly promoted. The 
message is clear in the “Common Root Hall” where some of Taiwan’s minority groups are 
represented in historical photographs, and are described as sub-groups of the Gaoshan zu (high 
mountain tribe).64 The Gaoshan zu however, rather than being relegated to historical 
photographs perform on the main stage for the park’s guests. At the culture park, the Gaoshan zu 
are portrayed as a common “other” which both support the party line and call into question any 
claims of cultural difference across the Taiwan Straits.65 
 Huang admits that he chose a difficult path but he has no regrets. On one occasion in 
2001, for example, he was unable to pay his employees because he was six million RMB short.  
He promised to pay them in full with interest as soon as he could. He also made a deal with them 
that he would not return to Taiwan until the debt was paid in full. Finally, in July 2006 he made 
good on his promise and paid his employees the full amount plus thirty percent interest (Wang 
2008). He spends a great amount of time in this part of the series praising his employees for their 
dedication and hard work.  In the past twenty years he has invested the bulk of his time and his 
family’s assets in the park. Throughout most of this period, aside from visits over the holidays, 
Huang and his wife and children have lived on opposite sides of the Taiwan Straits.  
The effect of Huang’s story is three-fold. First, Huang’s well circulated story of self-
sacrifice adds a strong dose of authenticity to the Culture Park, and the party line. Second, it 
                                                 
64 Taiwan currently recognizes 14 individual ethnic minority groups.  
65 The PRC classifies nine Taiwanese ethnic groups as sub-groups of the Gaoshan Zhu. 
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emphasizes the powerful allure the Mainland has on Taiwanese visitors. In Huang’s case this 
attraction is not related simply to economic gain. On the contrary, Huang nearly lost everything 
in the process. Rather, this pull is characterized as an innate sense of belonging and identification 
with the place. Finally, his story contests discourses which portray Taiwanese businessmen as 
untrustworthy employers who abandon their Mainland employee’s without warning.   
5.4 MIGRANT VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES: ANG, FENG AND CHIN-LUNG 
To demonstrate the variability of social locations Taiwanese migrants occupy in Xiamen and the 
importance of personality in influencing these locations, I will focus on my experiences with 
three very different Taiwanese migrants, all of whom are economically well off. Following is a 
short introduction to Ang and Feng and a more in depth description of Chin-Lung. As Ang and 
Feng are involved in cross-Strait marriage, they will be revisited in Chapter 5, “Cross-Strait 
Couples and Social Spaces.” Other informants will be introduced in later sections; however it is 
important here to offer some background information on these three men as I will draw on my 
observations and experiences with them directly.  
5.4.1 ANG: SURROUNDED BY BEAUTY 
Ang is in his early 40s and has been living on the Mainland for twelve years, five in Guangzhou, 
five in Shanghai, and two in Xiamen. He is very clear as to why he migrated to the PRC---
“because labor was cheap” and he “could make a lot of money”---which he did. He owns a 
factory outside of Shanghai, a retail business with his wife (who is from Xiamen), and spends 
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much of his time entertaining friends. He and his wife Mei own apartments in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Xiamen. Ang spends most of his time in Xiamen, while Mei, is often out of town on 
business. During Mei’s frequent business trips Ang often has a meimei by his side to keep him 
company. 66 One evening while driving me home he explained it to me this way,  
  
Women as they get older always want more. They never have enough. They always want 
to accumulate more things, buy another house or another car. Men, on the other hand, 
want a very stable, comfortable life without complications. We are over 40, so when we 
can, we should go out and have fun with meimeis because when we are 70 we will have 
to stay at home. We don’t have much time left to enjoy life.  
 
Ang is very clear about his relationships with meimeis. First he never tells them where he 
lives so they cannot “make trouble” for him. Second, these relations are not sexual, as he claims 
he would never do that to Mei. He put it this way, “it’s okay to have fun with meimeis but not in 
the physical sense.” He said for his friends, that’s fine, but not him.  In fact I have never seen 
him so much as touch one of them. He likes to buy them coffee, meals and drinks (usually non-
alcoholic), and tell amusing stories to entertain and to be entertained by them. He later told me 
that life without meimeis has no flavor (meiyou weidao), it’s boring. He often commented that it 
was important to “surround himself with beauty.” 
On one occasion, he explained that I should not tell my wife about all of the places he 
takes me, because some of them are off limits to wives. For example, some coffee shops, 
                                                 
66 I use the term meimei (little sister) here to reflect the fact that Ang referred to them as such. In this setting this was 
not considered a derogatory term but was used to differentiate them from xiaojie (young women or literally little 
sister) which has come to carry meanings associated with prostitution.  
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restaurants and bars are meimei places. “You have to be careful in China because people like to 
make trouble” he explained. For example, if someone who knows his wife were to see him 
driving with another woman in the front seat they would call her immediately. Or they might just 
follow him and ask him “is this your wife” even if they know she isn’t. That’s why he explained, 
he always has his meimei’s ride in the back seat. He warned that this could happen if my wife 
were to see him somewhere with a meimei. So I had better be careful about what I tell her, he 
said.  
Meimeis are relegated to specific spaces that for the most part do not overlap with those 
that include family or work. The one exception to this rule is Lao Fangzi, a Taiwanese owned, 
massage parlor, where the specialty is foot massage, herbal soaks and pedicures.  
On my first trip to Lao Fangzi,, Ang picked me up at my apartment and drove me to the 
four-storied building with a sculpture of a foot in the entryway. Everyone seemed to know Ang 
and one of the managers asked if his wife would be joining him today. “No” he replied and said 
he was going to the fourth floor today.  He requested a particular room, which was private with 
identical chairs, a massage table and a bathroom complete with shower. He ordered some snacks 
and coffee for us and two young women came in each dragging a tub of hot water with herbs for 
us to soak our feet in. In this setting Ang seldom spoke and spent the next hour smoking 
cigarettes silently with his eyes closed.  
Several weeks later Ang and I were at a Taiwanese ice cream parlor, where as usual I was 
introduced as his American friend. Taiwanese ice cream is, “much better than Chinese ice 
cream” he explained. Suddenly, he checked his watch and made a phone call. “When are you 
going to work?” he asked, and quickly hung up. Then we rushed to his car and he drove to a bus 
stop where two young women were waiting. They jumped into the car and were immediately 
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asked, what had become the standard question, “Who is more handsome me or my American 
friend?” Then standard question number two, “Aren’t they beautiful?” “Sure.” I said.  These two 
however, didn’t seem like the kind of women I had seen him with before. They were young and 
thin but didn’t have the perfect posture, expensive clothes and the polite manner of the others.  
After fifteen minutes I asked where we were going. “To their house for a massage” Ang said 
smiling from ear to ear. He could see I was more than a little uncomfortable with this situation. 
To my relief, we stopped at Lao Fangzi and the young women got out and ran to the door. Ang 
drove around back and walked in the front door barking orders to the help, “private room, two 
coffees, we want numbers 265 and 278, foot massage. The help began rushing around as we 
were escorted to our private room. The two young women came in laughing and Ang was 
laughing so hard he was holding his stomach. The joke was on me. During this session Ang 
spoke casually to the young women, but didn’t exhibit the kind of “non-sexual play” he did in 
other settings with other meimeis.  
A week later we returned to Lao Fangzi for a foot massage. I noticed that this time he 
entered through the back door and took the elevator to the third floor rather than the fourth floor. 
When we arrived, he quietly (which was unusual) asked for a particular young woman to 
massage his feet. During this session in the private room he asked for a full body massage from 
her. She was more his type. Soft spoken, perfect posture and she had an easy smile.  She seemed 
to know him and teased him for gaining weight. They openly flirted with each other throughout 
the session. When we left, Ang promised to call her sometime in the future. I later found out that 
he went well out of his way to visit this particular Lao Fangzi (there are several in Xiamen). 
There was one right across the street from the restaurant where we had dinner earlier that 
evening, but instead we drove for about 20 minutes to this particular location.  
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 Lao Fangzi, was the only space where Ang seemed to make some sort of exception to his 
first rule, to separate family/work spaces from meimei spaces. But on closer examination perhaps 
he was holding fast to his principles. When we visited the fourth floor, where several employees 
asked if his wife would be joining him, he did not engage in flirting or teasing the young women, 
but was more reserved, seldom telling entertaining stories or jokes to entertain them. In fact, 
when on the fourth floor he seldom spoke, which was not the Ang I had come to know. On the 
fourth floor it was more about the foot massage than the meimeis. But when visiting the third 
floor, where I suspect he doesn’t take his wife, he treated the young women more like he treats 
meimeis, openly flirting and constantly joking with them.    
He said that Feng (his friend living in Beijing) prides himself on how many women he 
can sleep with but he is not like that. He has no problem with it, but that kind of lifestyle doesn’t 
suit him. He said in the company of some friends he might brag about how many girlfriends he 
has but in actuality he would never do that to his wife. “That is just empty talk between men” he 
explained.  He often complained about his wife’s frequent trips to Hong Kong and Europe 
explaining that he often feels like he is living alone. In the year I had come to know Ang, Mei 
(Ang’s wife) was more often than not, out of town on a business trip. Ang on the other hand, 
during the same period, never left town without Mei. Further, on those occasions when I saw 
them interact in social settings---be it a wedding, a dinner or entertaining at home---Mei was 
usually the most outspoken. On one occasion, when Ang had begun to tell a story, Mei told him 
in no uncertain terms to shut up—which he did.  
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5.4.2 FENG: BUSINESSMAN AND CONSUMER 
Feng is 30 and is from Jinmen Island, a Taiwanese island a half an hour boat ride from 
Xiamen.67 He has lived on the Mainland for three years. He works for a Taiwan based 
advertising firm and volunteered to work in their Beijing office. He spends much of his time 
traveling in eastern China and frequently visits his friend Ang in Xiamen, usually when going to, 
or coming from, Jinmen Island.  A little over a year ago he married a woman from a small town 
in rural Henan province where she continues to live with her mother. “She’s afraid to leave her 
mother.” he once explained. Unlike Ang, Feng prides himself on how often he “needs” to have 
sex, and how many different women he can have sex with.68 When he and Ang are together they 
often tease each other about how many meimeis each of them have. On one occasion Ang told 
me that Feng called him from Beijing and said he had nine women with him at the time. “He’s 
very lihai” Ang commented (in this case lihai refers to Feng’s strong sexuality). The following is 
an excerpt from my field notes describing one afternoon meal with Ang and Feng. 
After picking Feng up we drove along the sea to a fairly isolated area. Ang told Feng he 
knew of a good spot nearby. After traveling down several unmarked dirt roads we arrived 
at a large three-storied building situated on the beach. As we pulled up no less than eight 
motorcycles stopped at the building, each with a man in front and two young women on 
the back. They all smiled at us and rushed into the building. Ang had reserved a private 
room on the second floor with large windows that opened up onto the beach. It was a 
typical KTV room with several large couches, two coffee tables, a big screen television 
                                                 
67 Jinmen is only a few kilometers from Xiamen and was an important site of resistance against the Chinese 
Communist Party as it marked the first major victory for the KMT during the war (Szonyi 2007). See Szonyi 2007 
for a more detailed discussion on Jinmen’s unique local identity.    
68  Hsiu-Hua Shen’s (2008) study revealed that Taiwanese men often cite biological needs as a common justification 
for sexual intimacies with Mainland women.  
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and a bathroom. Ang ordered the food and in a few minutes roughly 20 young women 
walked into the room single file. Ang and Feng quickly picked one and then told me to 
make my choice. I said I was fine and didn’t need one today but Ang insisted, explaining 
that she would only pour my beer, sing for us, and feed me dinner. They quickly picked 
one for me.  
 
Throughout the meal Ang and Feng acted more and more like twenty-year-olds, jumping 
on the couch, running around the room, dancing, singing and constantly laughing and joking. 
They had only consumed a couple of beers but they acted quite drunk. The young women made 
jokes, laughed, poured our beer and sang. As the meal came to a close I realized that neither Ang 
nor Feng had acted like I had expected. Neither had grouped the women, they rather made fun of 
them only to have the young women retaliate which both seemed to enjoy (of course the women 
were working). Suddenly Feng announced that his train would be leaving within the hour, so he 
had to go to the second floor to shower and would be back soon. He and “his meimei” left the 
room only to return half an hour later looking freshly showered. Ang explained that Feng needed 
to have sex and a shower with a meimei before getting on the train so he could relax.  
5.4.3 CHIN-LUNG: THE VUNERABLE ELITE 
 
Chin-Lung has lived in Xiamen for a little over a year and is a manager for a Taiwanese shipping 
company. Unlike Ang and Feng who chose to move to the Mainland, Chin-Lung claims he had 
little choice in the matter. In fact, he had just purchased a house in Taiwan shortly before he was 
transferred. His wife is Taiwanese and he has a two-year-old daughter. While Ang and Feng 
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seem to enjoy life in Xiamen, Chin-Lung spends much of his time terrified. Each morning his 
driver waits for him in front of his apartment takes him to work, and delivers him back home 
safely each evening. Chin-Lung seldom leaves his apartment at night for fear of being robbed. 
He is also in constant fear of contamination from a variety of sources. The following is a short 
excerpt from my field notes describing my first experience with Chin-Lung.  
 
This afternoon I was looking for an apartment to rent and the taxi driver pulled over to 
ask a passing pedestrian where the office was. The pedestrian peered into the cab and 
upon confirming that I was a foreigner, suddenly panicked. He asked the driver how 
much the fare was, paid the fee, and told me to quickly get out of the cab. After stepping 
out of the cab he told me that since I was a foreigner I had better be more careful. In the 
next few days he would take it upon himself to help me (a fellow foreigner) find an 
apartment, and to educate me about the dangers of living in China. For example, he 
explained that if I was ever in a taxi that turned onto the bridge leading to the Mainland I 
should jump out, because the driver was going to rob and kill me once on the Mainland.69   
 
Chin-Lung’s apartment is on one of the upper floors in an expensive building that caters 
primarily to well-off Taiwanese migrants. The grounds include a swimming pool, basketball 
courts and a large landscaped garden. The first thing that caught my attention in this apartment 
was the stunning view of the Taiwan Straits and Jinnan Island from the living room, undoubtedly 
a strong selling point. The apartment is 140 square meters in area and, has marble floors 
                                                 
69 Much of my research was conducted on Xiamen Island, one section of Xiamen city of which the largest part is 
situated on the Mainland. 
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throughout, three bedrooms, an elevated Japanese style dining room encased in glass, two 
bathrooms, a very large living room, and a generous patio.  
He introduced me to his housekeeper, a middle-aged Mainland woman whom he praised 
for keeping his home spotless. He was proud to point out that his floors were so clean that you 
could eat off them. He explained that it is so dirty in China that it is crucial to have a good 
housekeeper. He said he often locks her in his apartment if he has to leave so she doesn’t steal 
anything. I asked him what would happen if there was a fire in the building. He said “there are 
no fires, this is an expensive building.” 
He offered me a cup of green tea “from Taiwan” because he explained “Mainland tea has 
too many chemicals.” He handed me a cup of hot water with a Lipton teabag floating in it. He 
also made a cup for the housekeeper who took a small sip and quickly went back to mopping the 
already spotless floor.  
Although he had lived there for over a year by the time I visited, it looked like he had just 
moved in, or perhaps was preparing to move out. On the table in the glassed-in dining room were 
shirts and dress pants all neatly stacked and freshly pressed. There was a large suitcase on the 
entryway counter at the ready. The large living room was sparsely furnished with a small couch 
to one side, a footstool, small coffee table and large screen TV. The general feel of the place was 
one of emptiness. It appears that in a matter of minutes Chin-Lung could pack a bag and 
disappear.  
Once I asked him if his company offered him any pre departure orientation or advice 
about living in the PRC. He said that they only do that for people who are moving farther 
away—to Europe, for example. The only advice he was given was to be careful about the 
restaurants. Incidentally, at the time we were eating in a Taiwanese owned restaurant.   
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In the next few days we visited countless rental agencies and looked at many apartments. 
There were several that I wanted to rent but the negotiations ended with Chin-Lung shouting at 
the agent and leading me out the door. “They are always trying to take advantage of us” he said. 
In this case “us” referred to foreigners.  
Once when I asked him about his co-workers he explained that while he works in a 
Taiwanese company those he supervises are from the Mainland. He seemed quite isolated and 
very lonely, which is why I found it so easy to make contact with him. While I continually asked, 
he did not introduce me to other Taiwanese people in Xiamen, usually claiming that everyone is 
too busy. Perhaps he was worried about what they might tell me about him, which might help to 
explain more fully why he is an outsider.  
5.5 HIERARCHIES OF DESIRE 
I was seated at a large table with a group of local business owners in a Beijing pub 
discussing what constitutes “the best life” for a man. We were on the subject of income when our 
waitress leaned over and said, recounting a version of a popular, well known joke, “That’s easy, 
a Chinese job, an American paycheck, and a Japanese wife.” Everyone nodded in agreement.  
The experience above reveals the ways that people inscribe certain traits on individuals 
from particular areas. In this case Japanese women were perceived, seemingly even by the 
Chinese waitress, as more suitable wives. This section addresses this type of mapping as it 
relates to Taiwanese men and Mainland women.   
This section is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the ways that 
Taiwanese migrants living in the PRC talk about Mainland women with regard to intimate 
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desire. Most spoke about the differences between women from different areas of China, and Asia 
as a whole. These perceived differences shape the opinions of men and women about those who 
are considered potential intimate and/or marriage partners and those who are not. The term 
“hierarchies of desire” refers to the geographical mapping of perceived traits as they relate to 
intimate desire. In addition, this term also incorporates other factors such as socio-economic 
status and citizenship. The second section focuses what position these men believe they occupy 
within these hierarchies of desire both on the Mainland and in Taiwan.  
 Given Chin-Lung’s view of the Mainland as a hostile lawless place, and his practice of 
locking his housekeeper in his apartment, his ideas regarding Mainland women came as no 
surprise. On one occasion as we were walking down the street he pointed out a well-dressed 
attractive young woman.  
“Look at her. She looks good but a lot of them look good. Then they do something 
unexpected, like spit on the street or blow snot out their nose. They look good, but they 
are dirty and uncivilized…disgusting.”  
 
He followed this by glaring at the passing woman, who took no notice. “And they will do 
anything for money” he added curtly. I responded by telling him that a Taiwanese friend of mine 
had married a woman from Xiamen. His response was a sneer followed by a long period of 
silence.   
I expected to get a very different view from Ang and Feng as both of their wives were 
from the Mainland, but their views were certainly not what I had anticipated.  
Once while on a drive, Ang carefully explained that Shanghai women in particular (aside 
from my wife he was careful to add) were the most difficult to get along with because they hold 
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men in low regard and always want to be in control of the money. He said the women in 
northeastern China (particularly Harbin and Shenyang) are much better as they are mild and 
“comfortable” to spend time with. But, he added, it’s much better to marry a Japanese or Korean 
girl because they are more traditional and soft spoken and they prefer that the man be in charge. 
When I asked him to elaborate he said that although women from Shenyang are good, even they 
are “a little bit crazy.” When pressed he said because of the way women have been treated 
throughout Chinese history, “all Mainland women are unhappy.”  
On another occasion, Ang asked me about my wife, who is from Shanghai, and decided 
to open up to me a bit. He said his first wife was from Sichuan province but had moved to 
Shanghai years before he met her. He said she often asked him for money for her family, which 
he always provided without question. In time these requests were made more frequently and he 
became concerned about her intentions. Finally, he told her she would have to stop asking him 
for money for her family. Instead, he would provide a set amount every year and no more. After 
that she began treating him poorly (he would not elaborate) until he finally requested a divorce. 
Her response was to announce that she was pregnant. In order to end the marriage he offered to 
pay her 10,000 RMB (US approximately $1500) a month for child support. He still regrets 
offering to do this because now he feels that this was her plan all along, that her family had 
encouraged her to do this. He believed that the only reason she married him was to provide her 
family with money. He said her parents bought two big houses and became one of the richest 
families in their town with his money. He also now doubts that the child is his, but he still pays 
the child support as agreed. I asked him if this kind of thing is common and he said he has lots of 
friends who have had similar experiences, usually with Shanghai women. He was quick to say he 
wasn’t insulting my wife but thought I should be careful. I told him I didn’t have any money to 
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supply her family with and that both of us were students. He reiterated that I should still be 
careful. We are over 40, he said, “at this stage we should have a relaxing life, free of stress, and 
no women problems.” 
Feng, who was married to a woman from a rural area in Henan province, often 
commented that it was easy to find women on the Mainland because there are so many of them. 
He usually qualified this statement with the comment, “as long as you have money.” Despite my 
attempts to encourage him to talk about his wife, he seldom did. He never referred to her by 
name, which is not uncommon in China. However, when he did speak about her he referred to 
her as “the country girl,” which emphasized the fact that she was from a rural area, and not well 
educated.  
Given the many criticisms I heard with regard to Mainland women, I was surprised that 
Ang and Feng had little to say about Taiwanese women. One afternoon while having lunch with 
Ang and Feng at a Taiwanese owned restaurant, I asked them what they thought about 
Taiwanese women. Feng responded with a wide smile and said “Taiwanese xiaojie are beautiful, 
they would love you.” “Why is that?” I asked. Ang responded “they love foreigners, especially 
Americans.” I responded “what about you guys, you’re rich and handsome?”  “The really 
beautiful ones aren’t interested in us. They are all looking for men that are more rare. It’s better 
for us here,” Ang said. I responded, “Really?” Ang suggested, “the next time I go back, I’ll take 
you with me. You will see.” He quickly changed the subject, “How about we go for a foot 
massage?” 
Given those studies of cross-border marriage in which men tend to criticize women in 
their homeland as “fat”, “lazy” and not feminine enough, I was surprised that I sensed little or no 
animosity towards Taiwanese women in our conversation (Constable 2003:100, Tolentino 1999).  
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Both Ang and Feng were openly smiling when they spoke about them. While they proudly 
boasted about how beautiful Taiwanese women were, they also seemed resigned to the idea that 
these women would not be interested in them. Perhaps, given the fact that I was a Western male, 
any animosity towards Taiwanese women was downplayed.   I suspect, however, that the 
possibility of attracting a beautiful Taiwanese woman was so remote that they hadn’t seriously 
considered it.      
Once on a drive with the two of them they explained their view of how Mainland women 
see them within the hierarchy of marital desire. Ang did most of the talking with Feng 
enthusiastically nodding in agreement.  
 
First they like Americans because they assume they are rich and want a visa. Their 
second choice is Japanese businessmen because they are also rich. Third are Taiwanese 
men. Fourth are Hong Kong men because they are also rich and the girls want to live in 
Hong Kong. Last come the Mainland men, who have a tough time finding meimeis unless 
they are very rich.  
 
I told them that I had heard that Mainland women like Taiwanese men better because 
they had more in common and could speak Chinese. They both shook their heads and explained 
that the possibility of getting a US visa was more important to Mainland girls than a common 
language. I questioned this explanation until it was mirrored by Ting, who worked at The Way.  
One evening I arranged to meet an English teacher from London at The Way. He had 
only been in Xiamen a short time and didn’t speak Chinese so he had a lot of questions. We 
talked for a while and later that evening we exchanged phone numbers. Apparently Ting 
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witnessed this exchange because several months later she contacted my wife, who had been 
trying to teach her English, and told her she had quit her job. She was tired of bartending, and 
was leaving Xiamen, never to return. When asked why, she said she was just tired of it. Before 
hanging up, however, she asked to speak to me. She asked me for the “foreigner’s” phone 
number she had seen me talking to several months before. I asked why she wanted it and she 
explained that she needed to date a foreigner because she was tired of her life and needed a 
change. “But aren’t you leaving Xiamen?” I asked. “First I thought I would try to call him,” she 
replied. Needless to say, I didn’t give her the number, and she quit her job and moved away. But 
this brought home an important point. In this case, dating a foreigner was perceived as an avenue 
of escape, a way to start anew. For Ting, her decision to move out of town hinged on the 
possibility of dating a foreigner she didn’t even know. The fact that they couldn’t communicate 
was not a consideration. This may also have had much to do with notions of the west as a more 
modern destination where one could live a more modern life (Constable 2003:143).70   
Ang and Feng’s ideas about Chinese women’s marital desires conflicts with Ong’s study 
of “flexible citizenship” in which she argues that Chinese men from Taiwan and Hong Kong and 
elsewhere are thought of as “good catches” in part because these marriages have the potential to 
widen their social networks (guanxi) and improve the living standards of these women and their 
families (Ong 1999:154)71.  However, Constable’s study of so called “mail order brides” 
revealed that while some Chinese women might prefer to marry overseas Chinese men these men 
tended to be much more choosy and desired young, beautiful and obedient wives (2003:133). In 
addition, the majority of Chinese women in Constable’s study describe western men as “more 
                                                 
70 In Constable’s study she found that in some cases while women from China and the Philippines may “look to the 
west for more modern lives” U.S. men may “look to China and the Philippines for “traditional wives” (2003:143).  
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open-minded [and], less controlling… and more romantic” than Chinese husbands (2003:134). 
Ang and Feng however, focused on the more pragmatic issues of money and a visa. This is 
interesting in that this view mirrors what Constable has referred to as “the western illusion of a 
divide between the personal and the political” which tends to ignore issues of love and emotion 
and reduces such decisions to “rational calculations” (2003:120).  
Chin-Lung, Ang and Feng had relegated Mainland women to the category of “other” but 
each of them expressed this in different ways. Chin-Lung viewed them as “uncivilized” and 
“disgusting.” The only local woman he had any contact with was his housekeeper, whom he 
appreciated but clearly didn’t trust. He didn’t differentiate between women from various areas of 
the PRC but spoke about them in general terms. Feng, not surprisingly, spoke about them more 
like various local commodities that were in great supply—as long as you could afford them. His 
habit of referring to his wife as “the country girl” was his way of distinguishing himself from 
those from rural areas who “don’t know how to think.” Ang on the other hand, while 
acknowledging regional differences in Mainland women, considered all of them “crazy” and 
“unhappy.” His generalizations about Shanghai women being calculating gold diggers were 
grounded in his experiences with his first wife, who he claimed married him in order to funnel 
his money to her family. The one common thread here in all of their responses was money.  
Chin-Lung believed that nearly all Mainlanders were untrustworthy, in part because he 
believed that they would do anything to get his money. Feng believed that his money gained him 
access to a never-ending supply of Mainland women. While Ang’s comment, “they never have 
enough” coupled with his experiences with his first wife, pointed to Mainland women as greedy. 
Ang and Feng’s views suggest that their money was the primary component that marked them as 
desirable men.  
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Based on Ang and Feng’s comments and Ting’s phone call, the fact that they spoke a 
common language with the women in Xiamen didn’t necessarily work in their favor. Their 
money aside, their Taiwaneseness arguably marked them as undesirable, given the discourse of 
abandonment that permeated the area. Finally, considering the well publicized negative treatment 
of Mainland brides in Taiwan, fewer women would be motivated by the possibility of marrying a 
Taiwanese man to gain Taiwanese citizenship. In Taiwan, according to Ang and Feng, the 
situation was no better. They considered themselves too common to be widely desired by 
Taiwanese women.  It is important to note here that Ang’s comment, “we have it better here” 
was in reference to desirability rather than purely economic issues.  
5.6 DANGER, SAFE PLACES AND SELF-CENSORSHIP 
Once when I met with Chin-Lung he told me that Taiwanese people in the PRC have to be very 
careful about what they say. For example, he explained that if he said that Taiwan was better 
than the PRC in any way, he could go to jail. By this point I had pegged Chin-Lung to be more 
than a little paranoid but I still wondered if Taiwanese people in the PRC really had to be so 
careful. While being sent to jail might sound extreme, I found that there is reason to be careful 
about what one says in public spaces. I later found that even Ang, who always came off as being 
self-assured and quite comfortable in Xiamen, demonstrated a level of fear in some settings.   
 One evening when I was with Ang and Feng at a very busy bar, we started a game of 
“Kai” a Chinese dice game. Feng suggested that I go first because I am a lao wai (foreigner), to 
which I replied that Ang and I live in Xiamen and Feng is a guest so he should go first. “But you 
are a foreigner.” he said. To which Ang replied “we are all foreigners here…Joe is from the 
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States and we are from Taiwan.” A middle-aged woman sitting nearby overheard our 
conversation and was very offended. She approached our table and began to yell at Ang saying 
he shouldn’t speak that way because “we are all Chinese.” Ang apologized and said he was just 
joking but she still seemed quite upset—as did Ang for that matter. We left shortly after. Ang 
never repeated that joke again in a public setting. He did, however, repeat it several times in a 
private room at “Seaside” where the only witnesses were Feng, several hostesses and I.72   
Seaside was one of the places where Ang was the most noticeably relaxed and openly spoke his 
mind. But this was not the case on one particular evening.   
Ang, Feng and I were at Seaside one evening when Ang received a phone call and 
announced that an important high-ranking PRC official would be joining us. He said that this 
official was instrumental in helping him open his factory near Shanghai. “Be careful,” he said 
seriously. Then uncharacteristically he asked the young woman sitting next to him to leave. A 
few minutes later, a middle-aged man entered the room wearing an expensive suit. Ang stood 
quickly, greeted him, introduced us and poured him a beer. He and Ang sat across the room and 
spoke quietly about business matters, while Feng and a hostess sang songs together. After several 
minutes the official looked around the room scowling and pointed at Feng. “You should stay 
away from those xiaojie. They are dirty. They often have sex with several men at once.” He then 
pulled out a gold-colored cell phone and stepped into the hallway only to return a short while 
later. Aside from his comment to Feng, he ignored us and continued his whispered conversation 
with Ang. Several minutes later there was a knock at the door, and a very well dressed young 
girl, who appeared to be no more than 15 years old, entered the room. She filled the official’s 
                                                 
72 Seaside refers to a large restaurant that Ang and Feng frequented. We never ate in the dining room but ordered a 
private Karaoke room overlooking the sea where our meal was served. Hostesses who poured beer and sang were 
included in the cost of the dinner and room.  The upper floors were referred to as “the hotel,” where for an extra 
charge the hostess would accompany clients for sex and a shower.    
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beer glass, and sat next to him. He did not introduce us or for that matter ever acknowledge her 
presence. Soon after, the food arrived. During the meal, the young girl fed him his meal with her 
fingers. His only comment to her was after she fed him some fish, which he spit out muttering 
“not fresh.” Throughout the meal he continued his private conversation with Ang, while Feng 
and I ate quietly. Throughout most of the conversation Ang was silent, occasionally nodding his 
head and saying “yes” or “okay.”  Suddenly the PRC official got up to leave, grabbed Miao’s 
hand and turned to scowl at the rest of us. Ang opened the door for them and walked them out. 
Not long after, Ang returned with a hostess and soon reverted back to his old self—telling stories 
and joking with all of us. Neither Ang nor Feng ever spoke about this episode, despite my 
attempts to steer the conversation in that direction.  
Only on one other occasion did I witness Ang interacting with a local government 
official. It was during a tea tasting at his apartment.  He had two guests over, a Taiwanese friend 
who had been living in Japan for six years and has a wife and child there, and a Chinese official 
who lived nearby. There was an intense conversation about where the best tea is from, the 
Mainland, Japan, or Taiwan. The official insisted the best tea was from Mainland China and left 
to retrieve some from his apartment to prove his point. As we tasted his tea the official concluded 
that his tea was the best. Ang’s friend nodded. Ang looked at me quickly and gave me a slight 
shake of his head and then began picking through the spent tea leaves commenting on their good 
quality. The official was pleased. Having proved his point, the official switched to the topic of 
Japanese people and how different they are. Ang’s friend, who has a Japanese wife, attempted to 
shift the conversation to Japanese men, but had little success asthe official insisted that “not only 
do they think differently, but they are not shaped like Chinese people.” This conversation went 
on for half an hour, focusing mostly on the shape of their legs. Seemingly out of the blue, Ang 
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asked if anyone knew what wai po meant. Everyone agreed it meant grandmother on the wife’s 
side. Not on Taiwan, Ang argued. It refers to foreign second wives (er nai) living outside of 
Taiwan. Everyone laughed. As I attempted to pursue the topic further Ang shifted the 
conversation back to tea.  
Ang’s practice of self-censorship in certain social contexts revealed an underlying fear 
that given his confident easygoing nature was rather unexpected. In his interactions with 
government officials he was understandably respectful, but kept his opinions to himself always 
deferring to the officials’ viewpoints. In the case of the tea tasting party, Ang’s joke about 
second wives enforced common stereotypes about Taiwanese men on the Mainland. This 
technique worked to lighten the mood and shift the topic of conversation, making his visiting 
friend more comfortable.  
Aside from Seaside, Taiwanese owned businesses such as Lao fangzi, and upscale coffee 
shops restaurants and teashops were the places where Ang was clearly more relaxed and spoke 
more freely. It’s no coincidence that many of these were included in what he referred to as 
meimei places—that is, places where he could surround himself with beauty. 
In Chin-Lung’s case, while he didn’t seem to consider any place on the Mainland 
completely safe, he felt more at ease in Taiwanese-owned businesses like restaurants where we 
often talked. Even in these places however, he often whispered so quietly that I had to ask him to 
repeat himself, which he would, usually after a quick glance around the room. Chin-Lung was 
most at ease in an unlikely place.  
 Once while we were looking at apartments he suddenly announced that he had to get his 
hair cut and wanted to introduce me to a good barber. We passed over eight hair salons on the 
way to the bus stop. After a 20 minute bus ride we arrived at the hair salon. He insisted it was 
  138 
cleaner and more professional but reasonably priced. I could see little difference in either the 
cleanliness or quality between the average hair salon and this one, aside from the fact that this 
one charged almost twice as much (40RMB) as others I had visited in Xiamen. But Chin-Lung 
insisted that the employees were better trained here because this was a Taiwanese owned 
company. I spoke to the employees who were cutting our hair and they told me they had just 
moved here from a rural area in Hubei province.  Afterwards we went upstairs to a room with a 
low ceiling and rested on two massage tables. Shortly after the massage began Chin-Lung fell 
soundly asleep.73  
5.7 UNSPOKEN WORDS 
In some cases, much can be learned by what is left unsaid. For example, considering the amount 
of publicity the “Taiwan issue” is afforded in the PRC media, and the amount of time I have 
spent with Ang, it is quite significant that Ang has never talked to me about the elephant in the 
room, that is, the political tensions between Taiwan and the PRC. While he did mention that 
Mainland brides are not treated well in Taiwan, and that the PRC government facilitated his 
factory opening, political issues have never come up. Although I have broached the subject on 
several occasions, a conversation about this topic never developed.  
Chin-Lung on the other hand, who didn’t possess Ang’s ability to finesse the 
conversation, found his own way to avoid answering my questions. The following highlights a 
standard Chin-Lung technique.  
                                                 
73 In China an upper body massage is often included in the price of a haircut. 
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One afternoon Chin-Lung, who’s English was rudimentary at best, suggested we open an 
English school and make a lot of money. I told him I was not in a position to start a business in 
China but he said that he and his friends do this all the time and make a lot of money doing it. I 
asked him where he had opened his schools. He reached into his back pocket, pulled out a 
dictionary and replied “spear gun.” “What?” I said. “How do you say spear gun in Chinese?” he 
asked “Use it in a sentence.” I asked, “Why are we talking about a spear gun?” “Tide” he said. 
“What?” I replied. “How do you say tide in Chinese?” he asked. I guess he didn’t want to talk 
about where his (probably imaginary) schools were. At this point I figured I had nothing to lose 
so I asked, “Do you think Taiwan should be independent?” Out came the dictionary.   
A short while later we passed a travel station where he made it a point to ask the 
attendant if I (an American), could take the boat to Taiwan. The attendant explained that I would 
have to go through Hong Kong first. As we walked back outside Ang said “See?”  He refused to 
elaborate any further.  
These silences probably had much to do with my position as an outsider. My key 
informants were usually very careful about what they said, where they said it, and who was 
listening. While I had explained that I would keep their identities anonymous they 
understandably had no intention of putting themselves, their jobs and their families in jeopardy 
for the sake of my research project. They had too much to lose.     
5.8 CONCLUSION 
While there were some variations in the ways that local people in the PRC spoke about 
Taiwanese migrants, there were also some common themes. In Shanghai, a cosmopolitan city, 
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they were referred to as bazi, unrefined somewhat ignorant migrants with money that are often 
easily duped by young women. In Zhenjiang, a more rural area, they were considered greedy, 
controlling business owners who made empty promises to their dedicated employees, ultimately 
abandoning them in the name of profit. In Xiamen, local discourses were more complex. 
Discourses of inclusion on the surface, highlighting Minnan culture were juxtaposed with an 
underlying sentiment of difference. These discourses of difference characterized Taiwanese 
migrants as unreliable, pompous, and culturally corrupt. In all of these discourses they were 
clearly considered outsiders. My informants were fully aware of this fact but responded to these 
characterizations in different ways.  
Chin-Lung saw himself as a target, living in an uncivilized place and responded by 
isolating himself from Mainlanders in general. The state of his apartment indicated that he had 
never really settled in, or for that matter had any intention of settling in. Safe spaces such as 
Taiwanese owned businesses offered him a respite from his dangerous life on the Mainland.  
Feng was content to play the role of the stereotypical Taiwanese womanizing 
businessman. Like Chin-Lung, he viewed many on the Mainland as uncivilized, but relegated 
this discourse to women. As he traveled throughout Eastern China he used his economic status to 
reinforce his perceived superiority by purchasing sexual intimacy from local women, whom he 
viewed as a commodity that was cheap and plentiful. While he had married a Mainland woman, 
he referred to her as “the country girl” again, to highlight his superior status. Feng’s view can be 
summed up by a common cheng yu (saying),74 “Zuo ma kan hua,” literally, riding a horse while 
                                                 
74 Cheng yu are common sayings usually with four syllables whose meanings often depend on the context in which 
they are said.  
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looking at flowers. In this context it refers to a man gazing upon beautiful women from his 
privileged position high on his horse. 75    
Ang also viewed Mainland women as “others” but in a very different way. Rather than 
referring to Mainland women as cheap commodities, Ang made it a point to get to know them, 
often asking about their hometowns, parents and aspirations. He wanted to know who they were, 
and then did his best to impress them. On the surface, it appears that Ang’s non-sexual 
relationships with various meimeis offered him the opportunity to be more relaxed and entertain 
a captive audience while projecting a particular sort of male subjectivity. Within these “meimei 
places” he could be outgoing without worrying about overshadowing his wife, who prefers to be 
the center of attention. Mei, who is adamant about differentiating herself from local Xiamen 
women—whom she regularly describes as subservient and weak—sees herself, or wants others 
to see her, as a strong, successful, outgoing transnational businesswoman.  In order not to 
threaten that image, Ang has to tone down his personality or risk being humiliated in public, 
which was clearly the case when Mei once told him to shut up.  
When “surrounded by beauty,” Ang can speak freely and be as outgoing as he likes. 
Perhaps “beauty” to Ang means more than simply aesthetic beauty. Perhaps it also refers to the 
freedom he experiences in these spaces to relax and express himself without the fear of losing 
face. It is important however to note that while Ang often made it a point to interact with 
meimeis on a more personal rather than physical level his ability to do this was based on his 
economic status and points to issues of power.  Ironically, in the same setting, often 
simultaneously, his visiting guests use this space to shore up these boundaries and articulate the 
                                                 
75 This cheng yu can also refer to one who hides his faults by remaining high on the horse and/or is unable to see the 
faults of the flowers from such a vantage point. 
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differences between themselves and the local population or more specifically—Mainland 
women.   
 Hsui-Hua Shen has rightly argued that Special Economic Zones are sexualized 
masculine playgrounds wherein women are in a sense consumed by Taiwanese businessmen 
(2008). Shen also makes a valid point in that “women are often seen as the symbol of a nation” 
and that “sexual consumption of the ‘other’ national women by transnational privileged men is 
often interpreted….[as] domination” and is also often tied to nationalism (2008:70). Feng seems 
to fit this description well.  
 In contrast to Allison’s analysis of Japanese hostess clubs wherein conversations at the 
tables were often focused on sexual matters, this was more the exception than the rule at Seaside. 
Rather the differing subjectivities of each of those in our group were manifested in the varying 
ways each interacted with and spoke about the young women who were serving them. In 
Allison’s study she describes how Japanese men “assume an identity far more unifying and 
uniform” and that “ranks of difference and possible discord are dissolved” when visiting a 
hostess club (1994:181).Simultaneously however, the Japanese men described by Allison craft 
subjectivities that distinguish them from the others in the group (Allison 1994, Kondo 1990). My 
findings at Seaside were similar. While Taiwanese men do identify with each other in that they 
are able to pay these young women to serve them, they are also concerned with expressing their 
individuality in part through their interactions with these young women. This practice is a clear 
example of what Shen (2008) describes as a “transnational status ritual” in which Taiwanese 
businessmen “experience, display and intensify their upward move in position and identity as 
privileged transnational businessmen in China” (70). But contrary to AIlisons (1994) study, 
differences between men were not “dissolved”, but rather reinforced (181). My findings with 
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regard to interactions in these settings were closer to Shen’s (2008) in which she draws on 
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) oft cited concept of “deep play” wherein Balinese cockfights served as a 
forum for “asserting and displaying social status and hierarchy”(Shen 2008:70). In my 
experiences at Seaside, this deep play had much to do about seemingly good natured competition 
in which men expressed their masculinity in various ways.     
Feng for example seemed to equate his masculinity with his “need” to have sex with 
meimeis.76  He tended to choose a young woman based upon how hao si (sexy) she appeared. 
Feng was concerned with the shape and size of their breasts and preferred young women who 
were thin and had long legs. As he was choosing a meimei he did not touch them but he would 
openly talk about these traits. For example, “This one’s breasts are too big and she is fat.” or 
“This one is too short.” Such comments served to enforce Feng’s masculine identity as a 
womanizer while clearly (re)establishing his dominant position in relation to the young women.  
The PRC official who arrived at Seaside on one occasion to speak to Ang called a young 
woman from outside the restaurant to serve him because the meimeis available at Seaside were 
dirty. This worked to emphasize the unequal power relations between him and the others in the 
room. His loud criticisms coupled with his finger pointing worked to demonstrate his dominant 
position. From Ang’s interaction with him and his warning to us to “be careful” it was clear that 
Ang was involved in some sort of business relationship with him.77 Given that Guanxi (social 
relationships) is crucial to the success of business owners in China, Ang’s submissive attitude 
towards him was understandable (Yang 1994, Zheng 2009). The PRC official’s criticisms about 
the meimeis at Seaside are related to Bourdieu’s (1984) analysis regarding the connections 
                                                 
76 Zheng has described the common practice of Chinese men citing the need for men to have sex as a biological and 
natural fact which “frees them to act with impunity regardless of the consequences” (Zheng 2009:125). 
77 Wank has argued that businessmen in the private sector rely on connections in the state sector for resources 
(1996).  
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between the ability to consume properly and ones social status. He was pointing out that because 
we were seated with these women we did not know the correct way to consume. Further, when 
the young woman who he had called arrived, he all but ignored her aside from tersely ordering 
her what to feed him next. This demonstrated his ability to “control the hostess” which according 
to Zheng “proves oneself to be powerful” (2009:139).  
Ang, on the other hand, while he did purchase their time, more often than not he acted 
concerned about their comfort and treated them with respect. In fact, he seldom physically 
touched them. On one occasion, as he was leaving, one girl kissed him on the cheek 
unexpectedly and he actually blushed. There is no doubt he was consuming but he was 
purchasing a form of social space in which to express himself. While the visiting businessmen he 
often hosted were appreciative of his hospitality, he was never pressured to participate in sexual 
encounters when I was present. Neither he nor I were expected to. Perhaps he was purchasing 
intimacy--but while this intimacy was not explicitly sexual it was still a form of “social 
intercourse” (Allison 1994:165).  
My informants’ comments revealed that their money was the primary component that 
they believed marked them as desirable men. Feng clearly had no problem with this. But it seems 
that Ang sought more than money. Perhaps he was purchasing a social space, in which he could 
put his personality on display. Zheng’s study of sex workers in China revealed that “the simple 
ability to buy a woman with money is not a strong demonstration of masculine potency” 
(2009:140). Zheng argues that a man who is viewed as possessing “the power and charm to 
control a commercial sex worker…is the man that is most admired” (2009:140). From this 
perspective, Ang’s seeming egalitarian banter, jokes and singing with the meimeis may have 
reflected his attempts to dominate these young women by showcasing those personality traits 
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that, when he was with Mei, he had to keep hidden. While there was money involved, it was 
important for Ang to give the appearance that he was charming these young women in part by 
acting as if he really cared about them.  These qualities differentiate him from understandings 
and stereotypes that many locals associate with Taiwanese men, such as the bazi in Shanghai 
who are desired strictly for their money.  
It also seems clear that Ang used his interactions with meimeis as a way to dominate not 
just the young women in the room, but as a way to elevate his status above the other men in the 
room as well. Ang always chose a young woman who possessed certain qualities, such as perfect 
posture, a soft well mannered voice, and a pleasant personality. Mirroring what Yoda (1981) and 
Allison (1996) have argued, one of Zheng’s informants commented that “If a man has a cultured 
hostess beside him, she will definitely add to his reputation before other men” (2009:141). It was 
clearly no accident that Ang never failed to choose a young woman with those traits. On one 
occasion he commented that he could identify a quality meimei at first glance.” Like the 
government official, he knew the proper way to consume in order to bolster his status. I would 
speculate that Ang asked the young woman sitting with him to leave before he arrived so as to 
not pose a threat to his position in the social hierarchy in the room. The official’s performance of 
speaking gruffly to the young woman who was serving him while all but ignoring her, was 
clearly a show of power and domination. But Ang’s ability to seemingly charm these young 
women, however, requires finesse and social skills that are more highly regarded than the use of 
political or economic power  (Zheng 2009:139-41). Rather than risk overshadowing a 
government official Ang simply asked her to leave until his meeting was over.   
 In chapter 1 I briefly discussed Mahler and Pessar’s “Gendered Geographies of Power” 
framework and how it offers us a more holistic way in which to analyze gender across and 
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between transnational spaces.78 In the opening section of this chapter I discussed the differing 
ways that Taiwanese migrants are talked about and perceived by those I interviewed in Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, and Xiamen. These interviews point to the sometimes subtle ways in which social 
locations shift with relation to local histories, experiences, and understandings within the nation-
state. For example, in Shanghai some referred to these men as bazi or uncultured country 
bumpkins. In Zhejiang, a much less cosmopolitan city, Mr. Li never referred to them as country 
bumpkins. He focused on how poorly these Taiwanese businessmen treated their workers and 
how they seemed to be driven by greed. In Xiamen, while many on the surface claimed “they are 
just like us” based on understandings of Minnan culture and state discourse related to ROC-PRC 
political issues. Uncle Liu felt that Taiwanese men looked down upon the local people in part 
because they were influenced by the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. Ting claimed she would 
never be interested in a Taiwanese man based on stories she had heard about “widow villages.”  
The term “social location” refers to “persons’ positions within power hierarchies created through 
historical, political, economic, geographic, kinship-based and other stratifying factors” (Mahler 
and Pessar 2001b:6). The above examples reflect all of these factors.  
While social locations affect migrants’ access to resources and mobility, their level of 
agency and hence their ability to effect or transform their socio-economic status is related to 
individual characteristics such as initiative and imagination (Massey 1994, Mahler and Pessar 
2001a, 2001b). The polarized experiences of Chin-Lung and Ang are perfect examples of the 
importance of individual personality traits with regard to levels of agency and creativity. 
Gender is both an ongoing process (Lorber 1994, Ortner 1996) and an institutional 
structure (Glenn 1999, Ferree, Lorber and Hess 1999:xix). Feng and Ang’s comments about their 
                                                 
78 In using the term “transnational” I am not making a political statement regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty, rather I 
am adopting this theoretical framework because I found it instrumental in my analysis.     
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improved status after migrating to the PRC with regard to what I have referred to as the 
hierarchy of desire points to the fluidity of gender and reveals how institutional structures can 
influence the masculine identities of migrants. Feng seems content to identify himself as a 
desirable Taiwanese businessman primarily because of economic factors. Ang, however, goes 
well beyond this as he negotiates his way through social relationships in ways that differentiate 
him from local understandings about Taiwanese men. This reveals the differences in how both 
Feng and Ang through practices and discourses construct their gendered identities within the 
context of Mainland China and in contrast to Taiwan.      
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6.0  A CROSS-STRAIT COUPLE IN XIAMEN: ANG AND MEI 
The bulk of my interviews with and observations of Ang and Mei revolve around their 
interactions with locals, business associates, and friends. One of these friends was Feng, as 
described in chapter 5, who was involved in a cross-Strait marriage that ended in a divorce 
during the course of my research. In this chapter I highlight the ways in which Ang and Mei’s 
experiences are related to local understandings and personal knowledge about cross-Strait 
couples, which are in turn influenced by socio-economic, historical, and political factors 
(discussed in earlier chapters) which are linked to and help create and maintain stereotypical 
ideas about these couples. The ways that couples reinforce or sidestep these stereotypes is both 
situational and closely related to individual personality, and can work, in some cases, to improve 
the social location of those involved in cross-Strait marriages.  
I began this dissertation with a short excerpt from my field notes in which Mei explains 
to her customers that both she and Ang are from Hong Kong. My initial reaction to this lie was 
that it was simply a business strategy. Mei clearly didn’t know these people or their views 
regarding Taiwan, Taiwanese businessmen, or cross-Strait couples in Mainland China, and 
divulging accurate information could endanger a possible sale. But after spending a considerable 
amount of time with this couple, it became clear that this was more than simply a business 
calculation.  Rather, it was a coping strategy employed to avoid local stereotypes regarding 
cross-Strait couples in Xiamen. The ability to side-step such views, allowed Ang and Mei to 
  149 
shore up or improve their social location in Xiamen. Mei, for example, rather than being viewed 
as a gold-digging, subservient (traditional) Xiamen bride was known to her customers and many 
of Ang’s associates as a successful businesswoman from Hong Kong. While Ang, rather than 
being perceived as a desperate Taiwanese man who was unable find a bride in Taiwan was 
viewed as a successful Hong Kong businessman who had moved here with his wife. Although 
Ang also probably benefited from Mei’s family and social connections just as Bouka did (chapter 
3) he never mentioned it. Nonetheless the couple prefers to give the impression that they married 
someone from a common homeland, Hong Kong.       
6.1 THE FIRST MEETING 
I first met Ang and Mei through my Hong Kong Chinese friend, Leslie, who had come to 
Xiamen to study Mandarin. Leslie knew I was interested in interviewing cross-Strait couples in 
the PRC and suggested I speak to her sister-in-law (Mei) and her Taiwanese husband. Leslie is 
married to Mei’s brother and I later learned that she had been the one to introduce Mei to Ang 
several years earlier. Leslie described Mei as a very busy successful businesswoman who owns a 
number of clothing stores in Hong Kong and Xiamen. Our first meeting was arranged by Leslie 
with the understanding that I would teach Mei English in exchange for interviews with her and 
her husband. Leslie had warned me earlier that Mei often made plans to do things but seldom had 
the time to follow up on them. I was to meet Mei in the lobby of an exclusive hotel to discuss our 
arrangement.  
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Mei rushed through the door 15 minutes late, wearing an expensive looking summer 
dress she was obviously nervous and a bit uncomfortable.79 She quickly ushered me outside to a 
silver SUV explaining that her “boyfriend” (nan pengyou) who was waiting in the car would be 
joining us. Ang was less than enthusiastic about meeting me and made it a point to introduce 
himself as Mei’s husband. My initial impression was that Ang was uncomfortable with a foreign 
man spending time with his wife and had insisted on coming along. As far as Mei referring to 
Ang as her boyfriend, I have never fully understood, but perhaps she thought I would be more 
apt to help her if she were unmarried.80  
As we drove to a restaurant for our first meeting, I asked Mei if she was from Xiamen 
and she said that she lived in Xiamen until she was 18 then moved to Hong Kong, so she 
considers herself a “Hong Kong woman.” She spoke to me in a mixture of Mandarin and 
English, often pausing to speak to Ang, who I later learned was indeed, her husband, in a mixture 
of Minnan Hua and Cantonese. I made it a point to speak Mandarin so Ang could understand 
everything I was saying.  
 Mei was in her mid-thirties and Ang around forty. She explained that she planned to 
meet with me twice a week when her business settled down.  She is often abroad in Italy or 
France during certain times of the year buying clothing for her stores.  
When asked, Ang said he was from Taiwan and has lived on the Mainland for twelve 
years (three in Guangzhou, five in Shanghai, and four in Xiamen). Throughout our conversation 
both of them commented on how much they loved living in Xiamen. Ang explained that they had 
moved there because of the clean environment, the pace of island life, and because they both 
                                                 
79 I later found out that the dress was purchased in Paris on one of her business trips.    
80 Recall Yue hid her marriage from her American employers as she thought they would be more interested in a 
single woman.  
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wanted to be close to the ocean.  At one point I made the mistake of asking about “their store” 
and Mei was quick to point out that the clothing store was her business. Although Ang often 
“helps out” (he usually works there each day from 8:00 AM to noon). I later learned that Ang 
owns his own ball bearing factory outside of Shanghai, which he visits about once a month. They 
said that “they” owned two apartments, one in Hong Kong and one in Xiamen, as well as a house 
in Taiwan.  
We arrived at a local seafood restaurant where they seemed to know everyone. The walk 
back to our private dining room was punctuated by frequent stops to acknowledge the many 
diners who knew Ang and Mei and were curious about me. I was introduced as their “new 
American friend.”  I later learned that the manager of the restaurant, a woman of about 25, was 
married to Mei’s younger brother. During dinner Mei spoke primarily about her business and 
how much she enjoyed traveling to Europe. Ang remained mostly silent. Afterwards they drove 
me to Mei’s clothing store.  
Mei’s store was situated in a very expensive section of Xiamen directly across the street 
from a row of exclusive cafés and an expensive hotel where many wealthy foreigners visiting 
Xiamen choose to stay. There were four women employees working in the store that evening. All 
were around 25 years old, tall and thin, and each of them wore identical makeup and hairstyles. I 
was quickly ushered into the back room where there was a comfortable couch, several 
expensive-looking leather chairs, a coffee table and various wall hangings. Ang made us tea 
while Mei spoke with her employees and several customers at the front of the store. During the 
half-hour I spent in the back room with Ang I made it a point of mentioning that I was happily 
married and my wife would be joining me in several weeks.81 Once that was out of the way, Ang 
                                                 
81 In hindsight I was working to subvert a common stereotype about middle-aged western men who visit China.  
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seemed to relax a bit. We had a good conversation about life in Xiamen and arranged to meet 
again the following day.  
6.2 THE APARTMENT 
The following day Ang picked me up at my apartment and explained that we had to stop by his 
apartment so he could change out of his work clothes. His work clothes consisted of black pants, 
a white shirt with a button-down collar and black leather shoes. The apartment was about a half 
hour drive from mine, situated on the other side of the island. Ang and Mei’s neighborhood was 
much quieter and cleaner than either my neighborhood or the downtown area. Ang explained that 
most people living in this neighborhood were not from Xiamen and wanted more space.82 I later 
learned that Mei and Ang’s neighbors included PRC government officials, Japanese expats, and 
many Mainland Chinese people who used these apartments as vacation homes. In the time I 
spent in this community I did not see anyone else who appeared to be a “westerner”.83 There 
were several Taiwanese owned businesses (primarily tea shops and restaurants) which led me to 
believe that there must be Taiwanese people in the community to support these businesses. 
However, the only Taiwanese people Ang introduced me to in this neighborhood were those who 
owned and operated their tea shops.  
As we drove into the gated community, we passed a security check point where a guard 
waved us through. Within this community there were quite a few seafood restaurants, a 
McDonalds, a KFC, and a Wal-Mart. I also spotted a host of tea shops, grocery stores and 
                                                 
82 In many parts of Xiamen, the houses, apartments and streets tended to be quite crowded and noisy even by 
Chinese standards.  
83 Many “westerners” lived outside of the city in exclusive communities. 
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several KTVs. As we drove into the parking lot an attendant showed us to an open space. The 
area surrounding the apartment building was landscaped with tropical trees, a well maintained 
lawn, and a trellis-covered walkway covered in grape vines.  An attendant stationed inside the 
building greeted Ang and motioned us towards the elevator.  When we reached the door Ang 
rang the bell and his housekeeper let us in. He introduced me as his American friend and 
introduced her as his Indonesian housekeeper. He later explained that Indonesian housekeepers 
are better than Chinese housekeepers because they are more particular and less trouble. He told 
her to prepare some snacks for us as he motioned me towards the couch and went into his room 
to change.  
The apartment was approx 150 square meters in area, with two bedrooms (one for their 
housekeeper), an office, two bathrooms, a large dining room with seating for eight, a glassed-in 
open kitchen, and a walkout balcony off the living room. The floors were polished marble. In the 
living room there was a big screen TV, a large aquarium, an impressive sound system, a leather 
couch flanked by two overstuffed chairs, and a coffee table, upon which sat a tea service. The 
photos on the wall were all of Ang and Mei attending various high-end social functions. On a 
later visit several weeks later Ang made it a point to show me their closets. His was in the spare 
bedroom and contained several white shirts, a couple of black polo shirts, six pairs of black 
pants, and two Italian suits. “Men don’t need much” he said. Mei’s closet was twice the size of 
Ang’s and was packed with dresses (I never saw Mei wear anything but dresses) and shoes. 
“Women never have enough,” Ang said as he shook his head.   
It was not until I was reviewing my field notes that I was struck by the absence of 
wedding portraits which commonly adorn the walls of many Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese 
couples (Adrian 2003, Constable 2006). Ang had once mentioned to me that they had been 
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married in Xiamen but didn’t elaborate. It figures that when friends and business associates visit 
their apartment, questions might be raised as to why they were married in Xiamen rather than 
Hong Kong—Mei’s “home”.84 Another explanation could be the fact that this was Ang’s second 
marriage (as discussed in Chapter 5). I often wondered if, given Mei’s strong aversion to Xiamen 
men that she too may have been previously married, perhaps to a local man. Although on several 
occasions I tried to steer the conversation in this direction, by asking about how common divorce 
was in the PRC, or how divorce law had changed, I was often met with silence. Regardless, Mei 
and Ang were clearly not a typical Xiamen couple. They didn’t plan to have children (although 
Ang has a daughter from a previous marriage), and given the photos on the wall, tended to 
portray themselves more as cosmopolitan socialites than a couple focused on raising children.   
Mei and Ang’s apartment’s location, in an exclusive gated community did more than 
distinguish them from the local community. As Pei-Chia Lan  has argued, “people fortify spatial 
segregation in the built environment to make concrete the existence of social boundaries, thereby 
avoiding trespass and consolidating the exclusion of minority groups” (2006:19). However, in 
this case, the physical location of Ang and Mei’s apartment also works to distinguish them from 
a group (Taiwanese) of which Ang is a part.  It differentiated them from other cross-Strait 
couples and Taiwanese businesspeople that often choose to live in their own enclaves on the 
outskirts of Xiamen.85 In Taiwan the media has referred to some of these Taiwanese enclaves as 
“second wife villages,” where Taiwanese men are said to establish a second household on the 
Mainland (Chang 1999:80). This may be in part the reason Ang and Mei chose not to live in a 
                                                 
84 While bridal portraits seldom include the actual ceremony, Xiamen’s local scenery would surely be included in 
portraits taken locally. I regularly witnessed many couples having their wedding portraits taken in Xiamen at various 
beaches and parks. 
85 There are also several apartment complexes, like Vincent’s (Chapter 5) in the city proper which cater primarily to 
Taiwanese businesspeople and tend to be surrounded by Taiwanese owned and/or managed businesses such as 
restaurants, tea shops and salons. 
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Taiwanese community. More importantly perhaps, is the fact that had Ang and Mei lived in one 
of these communities they would be hard pressed to deny that they were a cross-Strait couple, 
and would be subject to the stereotypes surrounding this designation.  
It was only on my first visit to their apartment that Ang made it a point to knock on his 
door, so the maid would let us in. On later visits he made a point of always finding something for 
the maid to do, be it to take off his shoes, prepare a snack, or find a particular shirt he had 
misplaced. On one occasion, Ang and Mei drove their maid to Mei’s store to work, on another 
they dropped her off at Mei’s sister’s flower shop to help out.  Ang had been quick to point out 
to me that his maid was from Indonesia rather than the Mainland. Indonesian maids are the most 
sought after in Taiwan because of they are regarded as more docile and obedient than maids from 
other areas of Southeastern Asia (Lan 2006). Ang seems to have brought with him the idea that a 
live-in Indonesian maid is a marker of wealth and social status. But there is also a practical side.  
An Indonesian maid would make a good impression on Taiwanese friends and business 
associates who visit or live in the area. While I cannot speak to local ideas and perceptions about 
Indonesian maids, most of those with whom Mei and Ang socialized would probably have been 
impressed. I would assume that most who knew Ang and Mei were well aware that they 
employed an Indonesian maid.   
Mei and Ang’s apartment, situated in an exclusive community on the other side of the 
island, simultaneously worked to distinguish the couple from both the local population and other 
cross-Strait couples in the area. The addition of an Indonesian maid (which Ang explained was 
rare in the PRC) living in their household marked them as quite unique in their community and 
more like Hong Kong people who prefer Indonesian maids (Constable 2007). Although it is not 
uncommon for families to employ a live-in maid to help out with the cooking, cleaning and child 
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or elderly care, Ang and Mei had no children and seldom ate at home. As was the case in de 
Regt’s study of domestic workers in Yemen “employing migrant domestic workers has become a 
strong sign of social status” (2008:593). Employing Indonesian maids in particular, who are 
considered more obedient and easier to control, is in no small part due to the promotion of these 
women as ideal workers by the Indonesian government, and is clearly a marker of status 
(Constable 2007, de Regt 2008, Lan 2006). These markers of distinction reflect the fact that class 
is “a matter of practice and process” that is ongoing and involves the construction and ongoing 
maintenance of boundaries (Lan 2006, Liechty 2005:3).   
I often thought it strange that Ang would ask me what shoes I thought he should wear 
with certain outfits when he was always much better dressed than I was. Often when we went to 
coffee shops or cafes he would grab a stack of car magazines and ask me which car I thought 
was better. More often than not he was torn between BMW and Mercedes. On one occasion, 
after an hour of this I told him I didn’t even own a car. I rode the bus. But this did not diminish 
the importance of my opinion. It seemed that I was viewed as an authority in such matters simply 
because I was a “westerner,” which seemed to carry an assumption of taste, at least with regard 
to clothing and cars. Ang’s constant questioning about such things were a testament to his 
ongoing search for items that would mark him as one with taste that would be admired by those 
who he would come into contact with, whether they be locals, expats from Asia, or from the 
west. On the other hand, perhaps Ang wanted to demonstrate to me that he knew what items of 
conspicuous consumption would bolster his image. This speaks to how important it was for Ang 
and Mei to construct and maintain a global, transnational modern identity which would place 
them well outside local understandings about cross-Strait couples and the local population.    
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6.3 MEI: HONG KONG, SHANGHAI AND XIAMEN WOMEN COMPARED 
Several weeks I initially met Ang and Mei, my wife Qian and I were invited to join them for 
dinner. Upon meeting Qian, Ang commented that she was very tall and thin (often regarded as 
good traits in China) and that I must feel very lucky. Mei, who is about six inches shorter than 
Qian, and of medium build didn’t appreciate this comment which set the tone for the evening. 
Qian and Mei’s conversations revolved around western opera, classical music and Broadway 
plays. It seemed to me that they were competing with each other about their knowledge and 
appreciation of Western arts. For example, Mei mentioned that she enjoyed opera, to which Qian 
asked what particular style of opera she liked. Mei had trouble answering and was clearly 
embarrassed. To compensate Mei began to focus on her Hong Kongness. She explained that she 
moved to Hong Kong at least 10 years before she was 18 (which conflicts with her earlier claim 
of moving to Hong Kong after she was 18), and considered herself a Hong Kong girl. At one 
point Ang started to tell one of his usual entertaining stories when Mei cut him off and told him 
to stop being so active just because Qian was there. Ang tried to remedy the situation by moving 
closer to Mei and putting some food on her plate (a common sign of closeness between couples 
in China) but Mei asked him to not do so. Ang then turned to me and tried to start a conversation 
about cars, and Mei interrupted him and asked me about my research. As soon as I mentioned 
Xiamen, she explained that she and Ang had moved to Xiamen because of the slow pace, clean 
air, and good seafood. This was an explanation I would hear many times in my interactions with 
them. 
Soon after, the conversation shifted to the status of women in China. This is when she 
made the comment below as mentioned in chapter 4. 
 
  158 
Women in Xiamen are too easily controlled. The men are in charge here. Women don’t 
argue with their husbands. They do whatever the man wants to do. The men here yell at 
their wives and beat them if they don’t listen. At home the woman has to cook, but 
usually doesn’t eat with her husband. She eats in the kitchen. Ang and I are not like that. 
 
 I had intended to explore this further, but her next comment shifted the focus to 
Shanghai women. Knowing that my wife is from Shanghai, she commented “Xiamen women 
think too little of themselves, but Shanghai women think too much about themselves.” She shook 
her head “it’s too much.”  After an uncomfortable silence, Qian deflected the comment by 
complementing Mei on her dress. Mei suggested we all visit her store.  
When we arrived at the store it became clear that Mei’s goal was to convince Qian to buy 
a particularly expensive dress. Ang ushered me to the back room and whispered that he would 
like to take me with him to a wedding on the following day. I later found out that he was 
whispering so that Qian would not hear. They did not invite her along.  
The next day when Ang picked me up, he looked at me sheepishly and asked, “Is your 
wife upset about this?” “No,” I said, “She’s very busy anyway.” Once I was in the car, Mei 
continued the conversation that had ended abruptly over last night’s dinner.  She explained that 
money is not the most important thing in life and that she and Ang enjoy their lives rather than 
working all of the time. “Money is not so important” she repeated. Ang raised his eyebrows at 
me in the mirror. Mei, like many people in China, consider Shanghai women as being too 
overbearing or gold diggers or at least obsessed with accumulating money. Ang interceded and 
asked if we would ever consider living in Xiamen for good. I told him I liked Xiamen but that 
both of us wanted to get jobs in the United States. Mei asked why Qian didn’t want to live in 
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China since “she is Chinese.” I explained that after living in the United States for over five years 
she felt that her personality was a better cultural fit there. Qian had told me that many Chinese 
consider her to be too strong and outspoken. Mei said that at Qian’s age (she was 35 at the time) 
she felt the same way, but after 10 years away she missed her home and wanted to live near her 
family. This was the only time that I heard Mei openly refer to Xiamen as her natal home, and 
describe her desire to live in Xiamen as a longing to be close to her family. She also described 
herself as someone who enjoys life and doesn’t work all the time.  
I found the latter comment strange as well, as she spends the majority of her time away 
on business. Perhaps she wanted to further differentiate herself from what she perceived as a 
negative trait related to money-driven Shanghai women. Part of the reason for Mei’s sharp 
comments about Shanghai women probably stem from Ang’s experiences with his first wife, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, as discussed in chapter four, the characterization 
of Shanghai women as manipulative, self-serving gold diggers is quite common in China. 
Mei made it a point to differentiate herself from both Shanghai women and Xiamen 
women by characterizing them as two extremes, while attempting to define herself as a more 
moderate and reasonable Hong Kong woman. While the aggressive manner in which she treated 
Ang may have been a reaction to him complimenting Qian, it also differentiated her from 
subservient Xiamen women and marked her as a strong woman who doesn’t take a back seat to 
her husband. At the same time her comments about Shanghai women attempted to differentiate 
her from women who are too strong. Mei’s self-portrayal as a Hong Kong woman, allows her 
more social space in which to reconfigure her identity. Identifying herself as an outsider in 
Xiamen allows Mei to move beyond expected gender roles at the local level. Her ability to do 
this is closely related to her marriage to Ang, himself an outsider. If she were married to a local 
  160 
man she would be hard pressed to claim that she was not what she considers a typical Xiamen 
wife. A Hong Kong couple, on the other hand, would be expected to act in ways that are outside 
of the local norm. My experiences with Ang and Mei revealed that the practice of cross-border 
marriage can also (in some cases) offer the migrant’s partner the social space in which to 
reconfigure their identity as well. The fact that Mei’s conversations often involved reinforcing 
her identity as a Hong Kong woman points to the fact that this is an ongoing process that requires 
constant maintenance.      
6.4 A “TRADITIONAL” WEDDING IN ZHANGZHOU 
On our way to what Ang later jokingly referred to as the “traditional” wedding I asked Ang and 
Mei what their relationship was to the wedding couple. Mei explained that they were attending as 
a favor for a business associate and that we wouldn’t stay for long. They were just obligated to 
make an appearance.  
When we pulled up to the hotel, a red carpet ran from the entry to the sidewalk flanked 
by no less than 30 men in black suits passing out cigarettes to every guest. In the entryway the 
couple stood in western style white dress and black suit, and greeted each guest. This was all 
documented by a professional camera crew. The bride’s mother stood beside her and collected 
red envelopes (hongbao) from the arriving guests. These were recorded in a ledger by another 
women sitting at a small desk.  
We were escorted upstairs to a huge banquet hall and were seated at the Xiamen table. 
Each circular table seated 12 and there were well over 40 tables on each side of a central red 
carpet, which led to a large stage. On the wall by each table there was a flat-screen plasma 
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television which showed the couple greeting the guests at the entrance. A sound and light 
technician booth was at the back of the room with three people operating the controls. The 
speakers played current Mainland Chinese pop love songs. 
A waiter offered us baijiu (a strong grain alcohol), red wine or juice, and poured us all 
tea. The room was only half full and we waited for over an hour before all the guests were 
seated. As each couple arrived at our table Ang introduced himself, Mei and me (my American 
doctor friend). During that time I learned that the groom had studied in New York and earned a 
masters degree (no one seemed to know in what subject), and had returned to his hometown to 
marry a local girl and take over his father’s business (a factory of some sort).    
As the couple made their entrance the Bridal March played as they walked through the 
heavy smoke (created by a fog machine). Once they reached the elevated stage area they sat at 
the head table with their family members. The Master of ceremonies walked on stage and began 
a half-hour routine welcoming the guests and telling amusing antidotes about the couple. Next a 
young woman, probably in her mid-20’s appeared holding a saxophone and “played” several 
Kenny G songs although it was clear to me that the music being played over the speakers was a 
Kenny G recording. Next, the couple stood on each side of what appeared to be a Menorah 
complete with nine unlit candles. As each of them touched a candle on either side it was 
electronically lit. When they got to the ninth candle they both touched it at the same time. 
Immediately following, the father of the bride danced with the bride and shortly after several 
couples joined in.  
Dinner was served in twelve courses starting with oysters Rockefeller, sharks fin soup, 
fresh seafood, and much later, culminating with a whole roasted piglet for each table. Towards 
the end of the evening the couple cut the wedding cake (western style) and fed each other a 
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violent mouthful. Throughout the evening the couple and their parents stopped at each table 
thanking the guests for coming. They made it a point to stop at our table and speak with Mei and 
Ang who introduced me to the couple. I thanked them for allowing me to attend and wished them 
luck. The groom said something in English which I could not understand but I smiled and 
nodded and they moved on to the next table. 
Throughout the meal it seemed that the others at our table thought highly of Mei and 
Ang, often asking questions about potential business opportunities and real estate investments. 
Most were curious about me and asked me a lot of questions about life in the United States. 
Throughout the meal Mei and Ang chatted quietly with the other couples at the table and acted 
quite reserved compared to most of the others at our table, and for that matter those at the 
surrounding tables. At several of the tables the baijiu had begun to take its toll and some became 
loud and belligerent. As the party began to get louder, Ang and Mei suggested we leave early so 
we could get back to Xiamen by mid-night. This was the most subdued I had ever seen Mei and 
Ang in a public setting.  
6.5 DISJUNCTURE AND RECOVERY IN HAIWAN PARK 
One evening I asked Ang what he thought about the new bar that had opened in Haiwan Park. He 
said he hadn’t heard about it and suggested we go and check it out. This bar was opened by a 
man from Sweden (Ulf) and his Chinese wife. It is situated on the beach, has live music and 
offers a nice view Gulang Yu Island in the evening. It is frequented almost exclusively by 
Westerners. This bar is somewhat unique in that its owners discourage meimeis from 
approaching the customers. In an earlier conversation Ulf had told me that westerners are 
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bothered by Chinese women plying them for drinks and attention at every bar in Xiamen. He and 
his wife wanted to offer customers a different experience. I was curious about what Ang might 
think about that kind of setting. 
When we arrived, it was not too busy and all and the customers were Westerners. In fact, 
aside from the employees Ang was the only person who appeared to be Chinese. While I had 
become accustomed to him taking the lead, in this situation he was much louder and much more 
aggressive than usual.  He began barking orders at the help, and moved from one table to the 
next until he was satisfied with the view. By the time we were seated at our third table, I felt self-
conscious and scanned the room.  No one, however, seemed to take notice of Ang’s behavior 
even as he yelled across the room for someone to hurry over to light his cigarette. As we settled 
in, he seemed impressed with the place, but later he became frustrated when he couldn’t find any 
meimeis to sit with us. Ang suggested that in the future he should bring his own meimei with him 
since none are available at the bar. In his frustration this was one of the few times I heard him 
refer to young women so openly as commodities that should be readily available.  
Later that evening he repeatedly tried to call a meimei on his cell phone to join us, but she 
did not answer and he became very agitated. When she did call back about an hour later she 
apologized and said that she was out having fun. A few minutes later I heard him angrily tell her 
not to bullshit him. When I asked him what was wrong, he said the girl told him she loved him 
and missed him. He ended the call telling her he would go to see her tomorrow.  After hanging 
up, however, he told me that he would never call her again and deleted her number from his 
phone.  Not surprisingly, soon after he suggested that we call it a night.  
 On our way to the car two attractive young women walked past us. Ang smiled widely 
and said (in English) “Hello.” Both of the girls scowled at him and hurried by us. Ang was 
  164 
furious. He yelled (in Chinese) “I have traveled all over the world and those xiaojie think they 
are better than me! They have probably never been out of Xiamen.” For a moment I thought he 
was going to follow them and tell them off but eventually he calmed down. This was the only 
time I witnessed Ang losing his composure in public and afterwards he was clearly embarrassed. 
On the way home he told me that he would be really busy the next few days so would not have a 
chance to contact me as Mei would be coming back from Hong Kong soon.   
The following week Ang called and asked if Qian and I would like to join him and Mei at 
Haiwan Park. Much to my relief, Qian and Mei seemed to get along well and walked together 
well behind us so we wouldn’t overhear their whispered conversation.  Ang for his part was quite 
relaxed. We were shown to our table without incident and spent a relaxed evening in quiet 
conversation. While Mei and Ang were not quite as subdued as they were at the wedding 
discussed above, but they were more soft spoken than usual. Mei and Qian spent most of the 
evening talking about women’s fashion. At one point Qian mentioned that Xiamen women tend 
to wear cheap, ugly clothes. Much to my surprise, Mei was not offended in the least. In fact she 
agreed wholeheartedly and continued the conversation. After a few minutes, Ang who was 
clearly not interested in the topic of conversation leaned over and pointed out a group of about 
20 Chinese men and women who were standing on the beach staring at those of us in the bar, 
openly pointing at various people, commenting and laughing, as though we were performing on 
stage. After staring at them for a bit, Ang turned to me and said, “locals, they don’t know how to 
act” as he shook his head.   
As discussed in chapter 5, Ang is very careful about differentiating meimei places and 
wife places. After our uncomfortable first visit, he seemed to have recognized that Haiwan Park 
was not a meimei place or a typical Xiamen bar. Towards the end of the evening Mei mentioned 
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that it was Ang’s idea that we all get together at the park. As I know that Ang prides himself on 
his ability to adapt to different social settings, this led me to think that he might have wanted to 
redeem himself from his previous experience. Having Mei with him allowed him to do just that 
while also allowing him to further differentiate himself from those who “don’t know how to act.”       
6.6 A SHORT MEETING WITH MEI: DANCING IN HONG KONG 
Mei called me one afternoon and asked if I could help her with her English and I readily agreed. 
We met at a coffee shop where she insisted we sit away from everyone else. This could have 
been because she was embarrassed by her English, sitting with me (a foreign male), or 
embarrassed by the fact that someone was teaching her. I have noticed in group conversations 
she likes to add English words whenever possible, and I have heard her friends comment on her 
good English. So it was possible she didn’t want anyone to know that she couldn’t speak fluent 
English. Perhaps this is because if she was from Hong Kong she would have studied English in 
School.  
I started by asking her how her recent trip to Hong Kong was. She opened the 
conversation by explaining that she was very busy in Hong Kong but loves it there because there 
are a lot of fun places to go. “Like where” I asked. She leaned forward and said that she likes to 
go dancing but can’t go with Ang because he moves “like a stone.”  “He hates dancing” she 
added.  So sometimes after work, she explained, she likes to go to dance clubs. Then she laughed 
and said that the funny part was that every time she goes, Ang calls her. So she has to turn off 
her cell phone and tell Ang later that she couldn’t hear the call. “He gets so mad,” she said 
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smiling. Just then her phone rang and she said she had “business” to take care of and had to 
leave.  
This was my only one-on-one meeting with Mei and it lasted all of fifteen minutes.  Her 
reason for meeting with me seemed ultimately to have little to do with learning English.  I highly 
doubted that she was unaware of Ang’s activities with meimeis and perhaps Mei wanted to tell 
me these things about herself to highlight the fact that she too had her own recreational activities 
that did not include Ang. She was not a stereotypical submissive wife (read Xiamen wife) who 
was under her husband’s control. Her comments about Ang getting so upset when he couldn’t 
reach her coupled with her wide smile drove the point home.    
6.7 A FAILED CROSS-STRAIT MARRIAGE 
Ang picked me up in the afternoon and announced that we were going to meet Feng, who was in 
town for the day. I asked if he was visiting from Beijing and Ang explained that Feng had moved 
back to Jinmen Island a few months ago. As Feng walked up to the car I could tell he wasn’t his 
usual happy-go-lucky self. He forced a smile and told me it was nice to see me again. He began 
an animated conversation with Ang in Minnan dialect.  Ang asked a lot of questions and the 
conversation seemed quite serious. After a few minutes I asked what the problem was. Feng 
replied he was very close to finalizing his divorce. He continued, “My baby girl is only three 
months old so it doesn’t matter.” Then he turned towards Ang and continued their conversation.  
During a break in the conversation I asked Feng why he was getting divorced. He replied, “My 
wife is from the country…and she is Christian…so she does not believe abortion.” I told him I 
didn’t quite understand and he shrugged it off and continued his conversation with Ang.  
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Ang drove us to Seaside, the same restaurant we had visited when I first met Feng.  Our 
room overlooked the beach as before and was well furnished. Ang ordered a bevy of dishes and a 
case of beer. About 30 young women crowded into the room and Ang told Feng to pick one to 
cheer him up. After walking up and down the line of girls Feng settled on a tall young woman of 
about 20. Ang chose one for himself and one for me. He saw I was still uncomfortable with this 
type of arrangement and whispered to me “just to pour drinks and sing.” We spent most of the 
afternoon playing kai (a dice game) and listening to Feng sing duets with the young woman he 
had chosen. Ang allowed Feng to be the focus of the afternoon by downplaying his personality. 
After several hours Ang said we had to go soon and suggested that Feng take his meimei to the 
second floor. After a half an hour they both returned and Ang gave the young women 200RMB 
each and Feng tipped the meimei who was with him another 100RMB. This is one of the few 
times I have seen Ang openly pay the young women at Seaside. On this occasion Ang seemed 
more focused on trying to cheer Feng up than to bolster his own status.  
As we walked to the car I asked Feng again about his divorce. He half staggered over to 
me put his arm around me and said, “it doesn’t’ matter. There are many meimeis in China. 
Anyway, the PRC can send a rocket to the moon, but the people in the countryside don’t even 
know about toilets yet.” He fell asleep in the car as Ang drove me home. I told Ang I was aware 
of a population imbalance of women on the Mainland relative to men and he explained that in 
the countryside that may be true because many women move to the city. “In the cities there are 
plenty of women,” he said. I asked Ang what the story was with Feng and he waved his hand, 
palm out and shook his head, to indicate that he didn’t want to talk about it.   
Several days later Ang called and asked me out for coffee. He explained that this is a very 
busy time for him so he didn’t have much free time, only a few hours. He drove us to a very 
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expensive coffee shop near the area where he lives. As we walked in, as usual, he quickened his 
pace and started ordering the staff to find us a good table, settling on one in the corner. He flirted 
with the waitress and introduced her as his meimei. I responded that he had a very large family. 
To which they both laughed. Then he said “beautiful girl” in English and I said “sure.” He then 
told me she was Chinese, and told her I was his American doctor friend.  Next he ordered some 
Taiwanese sausage and a club sandwich for us to split. Then he said “newspaper” in English and 
led me to the newspaper display. He asked the manager if there were any English language 
newspapers and she smiled and said no. I didn’t think there would be. In this part of Xiamen I 
had never seen anyone who appeared to be a Westerner. Ang told the manager that he brings a 
lot of laowai here so she should have some next time. She nodded okay.  
We returned to our table and quietly read our newspapers until the food arrived. This 
gave me an opportunity to ask him about Feng’s divorce. I said that Feng had told me that his 
wife was Christian and would not get an abortion. So I wondered if that was why he was getting 
a divorce. Ang laughed and said “no, he was just drunk that day. He’s getting divorced because 
his wife is from the countryside and doesn’t think like he does.” “What do you mean?” I asked. 
Ang answered, “She’s from the country, uneducated and is kind of stupid. For example, Mei and 
I invited them to our home several months ago and Feng’s wife was mesmerized by the amount 
of clothes Mei had in her closet. So the next day she went out and bought a ton of clothes. Feng 
wouldn’t have minded but she didn’t buy them for any particular person, she just bought clothes. 
Feng asked her, “Who are these for? You? Me? The baby?” She couldn’t answer.” Ang 
explained “She just wanted to buy clothes. Mei and I didn’t know what to say. This is just one 
example, but these things happen all the time.” Then he grabbed his cell phone and called Feng, 
who was on Jinmen Island. Feng answered but couldn’t talk because he was holding his sleeping 
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baby. After Ang hung up I asked if the baby had a Taiwanese passport and he said “sure, that 
way it can travel anywhere.” I asked, “does the baby live with the mother on the Mainland or 
with Feng in Taiwan?” “Both,” he said. He abruptly changed the subject to the weather…rainy 
and cold.  
Despite my attempts in the following months to learn more about Feng’s situation, I 
could get no more information. Feng’s comment regarding the baby being a girl “so it doesn’t 
matter” coupled with his comment on abortion, could be related the common preference for male 
children. Perhaps the divorce was related to his wife’s refusal to get an abortion, but Ang didn’t 
think that was the reason. The fact that the baby was at Feng’s home on Taiwan’s Jinmen Island, 
given his earlier comments, was surprising. Given Feng’s circumstances and his views regarding 
Mainland women, I had thought that he might abandon both the baby and the mother. Children 
born on the Mainland can be brought to Taiwan, but whether in this case it was within or outside 
the law is unknown. Finally, this reinforces a point made in the previous chapter, that both Ang 
and Feng clearly express a low opinion of rural Mainland women. This brought up an interesting 
point.  
While Mei’s regular characterization of herself as a Hong Kong woman works to 
differentiate her from local women and works to elevate her social location, this claim also 
worked to set Ang apart from Taiwanese men who marry rural Mainland women. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, Mainland brides in Taiwan are often portrayed in the media as uneducated, poor 
women from rural areas, while their husbands are typically depicted as older, poor, mostly rural 
men who cannot find a wife in Taiwan. Although Xiamen is on the East Coast it is still 
considered by many to be somewhat off the beaten path and in many ways it is considered a 
“traditional” town. Mei herself has discussed the low status of women in Xiamen which is tied to 
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customary patriarchal practices. It seems the adoption of Hong Kong as a surrogate homeland 
simultaneously differentiated Mei from Xiamen women, and Ang from men who marry 
uneducated, and according to Ang, plentiful rural women.  Mei’s identity as a “Hong Kong 
woman,” therefore elevated their social locations as individuals and as a couple in Xiamen.  
 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
Mei and Ang’s decision to settle in Xiamen, rather than Taiwan involves a number of factors that 
go well beyond the “clean environment” and the “pace of island life.” Settling in Taiwan, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, was never a serious consideration given Mei’s reaction to my questions 
about living there. Why would they consider moving to a place where both their social locations 
would suffer? She would be referred to as a “Mainland bride,” who in Taiwan are often 
portrayed as “prostitutes,” “uneducated,” and “poor.” Even advocates for Mainland brides in 
Taiwan portray them as marrying primarily for economic purposes (Hsia 2009). Further, 
Taiwanese husbands are regularly described as undesirable “peasants” who are too undesirable to 
find Taiwanese brides (Hsia 2009:27). It is no wonder Mei laughed at the idea of living in 
Taiwan.   
The possibility of improving his economic situation was the primary reason that Ang 
moved to the Mainland. Recall that when I asked Ang why he had moved to the Mainland his 
response was “to make money.” Ang had taken advantage of the PRC’s preferential policies by 
opening a factory in a special economic zone outside of Shanghai which supplied him with a 
substantial income. In Mei’s case her store relied heavily on Xiamen’s tourist industry. Her 
  171 
customers, tourists, who for the most part had come to Xiamen on holiday from other parts of 
China or abroad, had the means to afford her products whereas most locals did not. Xiamen’s 
status as a popular tourist destination was an important factor. In addition, the overall cost of 
living in Xiamen, considering its location is quite reasonable. However, Ang and Mei’s reasons 
for remaining in Xiamen go well beyond economics. 
Although Mei only included missing her family and home as a reason for moving back to 
Xiamen on one occasion I believe it was an important factor in her decision probably subsumed 
within her comments about the “nice environment.” While I did not meet her family (aside from 
her sister-in-law Leslie), on several occasions I accompanied Ang when he went to pick her up 
from her parent’s home, which she did visit regularly. Although I could not see the building 
where her family lived, it was situated in an old, very cramped, low income section of Xiamen. 
The narrow streets packed with pedestrians could barely accommodate Ang’s SUV. Mei’s 
expensive clothing differentiated her from the rest of the crowd as she emerged from a narrow 
alley. When returning from her visits Mei was always in a good mood, laughing, and very 
talkative and spoke strictly Minnan hua, aside from greeting me in Mandarin.      
It also seems clear that Minnan culture plays a role in their decision to settle in Xiamen. 
While Ang and Mei both spoke Cantonese and Mandarin, their native language was Minnan hua. 
I often had to politely remind them that they were speaking Minnan hua when they spoke to me. 
They often hadn’t realized they had switched languages in mid-sentence. While I was not privy 
to them participating in all of the traditional practices associated with Minnan culture, such as 
publicly burning “money” for their ancestors, which is wide-spread in Xiamen and Taiwan, I do 
know that they visited a temple dedicated to Mazu a deity discussed in chapter 4, who is honored 
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on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.86 Ang showed me the temple one afternoon and introduced 
me to the keeper, who asked if he and Mei would be visiting again soon.  Also Ang prides 
himself on preparing and enjoying tea in the “Minnan way” which is a reflection of his pride in 
Minnan culture. Given these issues, living in a Minnan cultural area would appeal to both Mei 
and Ang.  
Xiamen’s close proximity to Taiwan and Hong Kong is also important for several 
practical reasons. Mei needs to regularly visit her store in Hong Kong. They both visit Taiwan 
via Hong Kong regularly. Ang’s parents still live in Taiwan, and Mei and Ang own property 
there. Xiamen’s location coupled with its reputation as a popular tourist site also helps them 
maintain social networks on the Mainland and abroad.  Feng was only one of many visitors that 
Ang and Mei regularly received in Xiamen. During the course of my fieldwork they received 
guests from Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and England, as well as quite a number of domestic 
guests.  
Xiamen’s location also offers them a hidden benefit: the ability to be “foreigners” while 
not being too foreign. It allows them enough social space to act outside of the local norms, while 
not being cast as clear outsiders. This position however, requires constant reinforcement.  
Ang and Mei’s ability to sidestep local understandings about cross-Strait couples is 
highly reliant on maintaining flexible, situational identities which allowed them to adapt to 
various social environments. In the two situations that I witnessed in which they did not 
accomplish this, Mei’s comments about Shanghai women over dinner, and Ang’s first visit to 
Haiwan Park, they both made it a point to repair the situation. Recall Mei’s taking no offence to 
Qian’s comments about Xiamen clothes (doing so would cast her as a local woman), and Ang 
                                                 
86 See Strathern and Stewart 2003, 2007 and Mayfair  Mei-hui Yang 2004. 
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pointing out those who “don’t know how to act.” This also points to their initiative, persistence 
and flexibility, personality traits that greatly aid them in presenting what Kondo has described as 
“the illusion of a seamless and coherent whole” self (1990:14).   
 Differentiating themselves from local understandings  of cross-Strait couples on in 
Xiamen is an ongoing process for Mei and Ang. Mei prides herself on being a successful Hong 
Kong woman, and her marriage to Ang (a pseudo-foreigner) allows her more social space in 
which to negotiate this identity.  In turn, Ang’s marriage to Mei (a Hong Kong woman) offers 
him the social space to differentiate himself from Taiwanese men who marry Mainland women. 
While their case is certainly not typical, it does highlight the connections between, cross-border 
marriage, identity and class. Most importantly it emphasizes one of the ways in which cross-
border marriage can be a source of power that can be employed to avoid commonly held views 
of those involved in these relationships resulting in higher social status at the local level. In 
essence, Ang and Mei “speak and act themselves…into cultural reality” (Liechty 2005:3).  
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has addressed some of the ways that geopolitical issues, media representations, 
local histories and understandings influence the processes of migration and family formation in 
both the ROC and PRC. Just as important, however, are the ways in which individuals and 
couples respond to these processes, which are related to their level of initiative and creativity and 
have a powerful influence on their lives and marital relations. While the bulk of my data was 
collected in Mainland China, I also considered media representations, government policies and 
academic literature originating in Taiwan. 
As discussed in chapter 2, despite the various marriage law reforms which affirm that 
men and women have equal rights, the long-term practice of interpreting and enforcing marriage 
law based on local, traditional, often patriarchal understandings regarding marriage and gender 
roles have brought about recovery of “patriarchal domination” particularly in China’s rural areas 
(Harrell 2001:8). Traditional marriage practices, such as patrilocal marriage it has been argued, 
have “defined and shaped women’s place in Chinese society more than any other set of factors” 
(Johnson 1983:3, Watson 1991). Also discussed in Chapter 2 were government policies and 
programs such as the hukou, and danwei systems have further influenced marital migration 
patterns in the PRC. The well documented inequalities of the hukou system effectively reinforced 
a system of spatial hypergamy which encourages potential brides to migrate from poorer areas to 
more prosperous ones. It has recently become more common for brides to migrate over longer 
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distances across provincial borders for marriage. After migrating, however, often with the intent 
of “marrying up,” many of these women face discrimination in their new environment and are 
considered “double outsiders” as they are looked upon as outsiders both in the community and 
within the household. Mainland Chinese men, on the other hand, seldom migrate for marriage 
because it is most often considered a humiliating experience for the husband. Given the cultural 
understandings about marriage and gender in the PRC it seems that within the PRC, the 
migrating spouse, whether it be the husband or wife, is often at a disadvantage.  
For those involved in cross-Strait marriages, political relations between the PRC and 
ROC, particularly issues related to Taiwan’s status as a sovereign nation, have a profound effect 
on their lives (Friedman 2010a, b). Mainland brides living in Taiwan are often portrayed in the 
media and in government studies as a threat to Taiwan’s population quality, prostitutes, spies, 
and potential “run-away brides” (Chang 2003, Hsia 2007, 2009, Taipei Times 2003,United Daily 
2006, Wang and Belanger 2008).  Wang and Belanger argue that “differential legal and social 
citizenship” places these brides at the “bottom of the social hierarchy in Taiwanese society” 
(2008:91). In some cases, Taiwanese men married to Mainland women in Taiwan, are also 
considered a treat to Taiwan’s population quality, and are often described as desperate, 
unpatriotic or peasants (Hsia 2009, Wang and Belanger 2008, Yiu 2004).  
Those cross-Strait couples who settle on the Mainland, however, are treated quite 
differently. Consider the case of Mei and Ang. Mei lived a short drive from her natal home and 
had easy access to family and support networks. She often pointed out the ways in which her 
marriage to Ang was more egalitarian than traditional marriages in Xiamen. Both Ang and Mei 
benefitted from the preferential economic policies offered in the SEZ’s.  They were also both 
accustomed to living in the Minnan Cultural Area. Economic and social policies in the PRC and 
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ROC clearly, played a large role in both Ang’s decision to migrate to the Mainland, and the 
couples’ decision to settle in Xiamen rather than in Taiwan. These decisions were aligned with 
the Mainland government’s agenda of increasing economic and social integration between 
Taiwan and Mainland China and in part, as a result, Ang and Mei both experienced upward 
economic and social mobility. In chapter 1, I alluded to Warner’s (1999), argument; that 
marriage works to connect intimate desires with government agendas. The experiences of Ang 
and Mei, in part, demonstrate the ways that governments reward those whose practices support 
these agendas.  
It is important here to note that while both partners may experience upward social and 
economic mobility, Taiwanese men on the Mainland have greater freedom with regard to the 
ability to move across administrative and political borders than Mainland brides. This issue was 
also discussed by Newendorp in her (2008) study of Mainland women’s experiences migrating to 
Hong Kong and their subsequent reunions with their families. In this study, the author 
emphasizes the anxieties that “migrating across political difference” evoke (Newendorp 
2008:18). As a result of Hong Kong’s immigration policies, Mainland women who have Hong 
Kong husbands often have to wait years before they can legally become Hong Kong residents 
and reunite with their families (Newendorp 2008:13). While on the other hand their Hong Kong 
husbands enjoy the privilege of freely traveling across these administrative borders without so 
much as a visa (Newendorp 2008:13). Taiwanese men living in Mainland China also enjoy this 
freedom while the movement of Mainland women across these borders, as discussed in chapter 
4, is strictly limited and controlled. With regard to this study, Taiwanese husbands have the 
ability to return to Taiwan at will, leaving their Mainland brides and families behind. This is one 
clear example of the way in which migration is often a gendered process.   
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But being a Taiwanese migrant in the PRC is not without its problems. In Xiamen, local 
discourses about Taiwanese men on the surface spoke of cultural continuity, but there were also 
those who described them as “infected by Japanese culture”, pompous, unreliable, and lustful. 
The fact that none of my Taiwanese informants dared to speak about cross-Strait political issues 
reflects the high level of self-censorship that each of them practiced. On the one occasion when 
Ang referred to himself as a foreigner in public, it did not go unnoticed. 
 The different social locations that Ang, Feng and Chin-Lung occupied in the PRC 
emphasize the importance of individual characteristics in shaping migrant experiences. Chin-
Lung imagined himself living in a dangerous land wherein the PRC government and citizens 
were preying upon him. His constant articulations about the differences between himself and 
Mainland citizens reinforced these ideas. While Chin-Lung was living in Xiamen, his sterile 
apartment with a view across the Taiwan Straits and a suitcase at the ready by the door made it 
clear that his stay on the Mainland was temporary and his thoughts were of returning home to 
Taiwan.  
Feng tended to reinforce local stereotypes about Taiwanese men. Although he had, in 
some way, attempted to establish a family and possible kinship network on the Mainland, he 
considered Mainland women to be much like inexhaustible commodities that would always be 
available to him insofar as he could afford them. His eventual divorce and return to Taiwan was 
similar to those stories of abandonment often connected to Taiwanese businessmen and 
husbands.  
Ang’s case, on the other hand, seems more complicated. Perhaps this is because I spent 
more time with him than either Chin-Lung or Feng. Ang seemed committed to his life on the 
Mainland. His marriage to Mei helped facilitate his ability to “fit in,” at some level in Xiamen. 
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Mei and Ang’s transnational cosmopolitan identities coupled with their cultural competence 
regarding Minnan culture allowed them more flexibility with regard to gender roles. Mei’s 
frequent business trips and Ang’s tendency to stay near home demonstrate this. While Mei made 
it a point to differentiate herself from the traditional Xiamen wife, Ang seemed to try to 
differentiate himself in some ways, from the stereotypical Taiwanese husband in the PRC, who is 
sometimes viewed as undependable, uncultured and unfaithful. At the same time, however, 
Ang’s relatively easy access to meimeis on the Mainland allowed him to express his masculinity 
by “surrounding himself with beauty.” Abstaining from sexual relations with these young 
women bolstered his status well above those who used money or political power to purchase 
sexual favors. Rather Ang worked to portray himself as a charming, cosmopolitan man who 
rather than desiring young women was himself the object of desire.   
Piper and Roces (2003) in their edited volume have argued that conventional studies of 
migration tend to ignore marriage as a result of labor migration, but rather uncritically categorize 
Asian female migrants as either labor or marriage migrants. In the course of my research I found 
that marriages that formed as a result of migrating for work were often overlooked with regard to 
Taiwanese men in the PRC. Rather, these men are viewed simply as workers. I argue that further 
studies are needed which focus on the practice of men marrying and settling in their partners 
homeland as a result of the process of migration. I expect that this will reveal that this practice is 
more common than previously thought. Exploring this practice will contribute to the literature on 
transnationalism as it will offer a more nuanced view of the process of migration as it relates to 
family formation and gender. Constable’s (2005) term “global hypergamy,” most often refers to 
brides from less developed regions who attempt to “marry up” by finding a husband in richer, 
more developed regions. The experiences of Ang and Mei add an interesting twist to this 
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concept. In this case it was a male, who had migrated from a more developed region to one that 
was in the process of being developed. As a result of migrating, he married Mei and both 
experienced upward social and economic mobility. In this case, both Mei and Ang could be 
thought of as “marrying up.” In Constable’s (2005), nuanced study she concludes that because of 
the complexities involved in the process of migration and marriage the term “marrying up” is 
problematic. Therefore I use this term loosely when referring to Ang and Mei.  
 It is important to stress here that cross-Strait marriages in the PRC, have emerged, for the 
most part, as a function of larger, global economic shifts that have occurred in recent years. The 
growing number of Taiwanese people migrating to the Mainland reveals how powerful the 
prospect of economic gain can be in the decision making process. The preferential treatment that   
Taiwanese investors in China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) enjoy including tax breaks and 
access to cheap labor are fairly straightforward, but there are other factors also at work here.  
 In Ong’s (1999) study she argued that Mainland women considered overseas Chinese 
men “good catches,” in part, because of their perceived overseas connections (guanxi ) that could 
result in economic benefits and the possibility of eventually migrating to  areas where they could 
enjoy greater wealth and personal freedom (154). However, as Constable’s (2003, 2005) studies 
of cross-border marriages reveal, it is not uncommon for migrating brides’ experiences to fall 
well short of their expectations. Consider the situation of Mainland brides living in Taiwan 
discussed above and in greater detail in chapter 4.  
I argue that Mainland China’s recent emergence as an economic power has resulted in 
marriage patterns that for many, in the not too distant past, would have been unimaginable. 
China’s booming economy, I argue, has resulted in a marked increase in the perceived value of  
what Ong refers to as “network capital” (guanxi) within Mainland China’s borders, particularly 
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from the point of view of those who want access to China’s economic opportunities (1999:154). 
While in Ong’s (1999) study, Mainland women were drawn to overseas Chinese men in part, 
because of their perceived connections and the benefits that they might provide, in recent years, 
the perceived guanxi that potential Mainland brides and their families may possess has become 
increasingly important. This network capital, I argue can both empower Mainland women and 
result in them being viewed as more suitable or desirable potential brides. This network capital is 
particularly valuable for those whose natal home is nearby China’s Special Economic Zones.    
Recall Buoka’s story, for example, in which Lin’s family connections (in Xiamen) were a major 
factor in his economic success as they allowed him to side-step import regulations and avoid 
paying exhorbant bribes to local officials. Recall also Mei who laughed when I asked her if she 
and Ang planned to move to Taiwan. I would doubt whether either of these couples had any 
intention of leaving these economic and kinship networks wherein both partners enjoyed the 
benefits.   
In the years since Ong’s (1999) study there has been a fundamental global economic 
shift. This is evidenced by China surpassing Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 
August 2010 (Tabuchi 2010:B1). This shift, I argue has influenced marriage patterns and as a 
result marital relations in the PRC, particularly in and around China’s SEZ’s. While connections 
beyond the borders of China are clearly still important, access to domestic networks within China 
have become crucial. Overseas Chinese capitalists are drawn by dreams of freewheeling 
capitalism within China’s SEZ’s, but of growing importance to these “road-trip Romeos,” as 
Ong refers to them, are the potential benefits and protections that can be accessed through 
marriage, in the form of network capital (Ong 1999:155). Further, although many are initially 
drawn by economic opportunity and ready access to network capital, those who remain, do so for 
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a number of factors including, the benefits of upward social mobility and the possibility of more 
personal freedom. Here, however, we must not fall into the trap of overlooking the importance of 
emotional attachments and love. A particular phrase uttered by Ang when he was commenting 
on Feng’s practice of having frequent sexual relations with meimeis, comes to mind. “I would 
never do that to Mei,” he said, looking me in the eye. Although Ang’s practice of abstaining 
from sexual relations with meimeis did bolster his status in certain settings, perhaps his reasons 
are also connected to his feelings for Mei.   
Finally this project points to directions for new research. In chapter 4, I discussed some 
of the negative ways that Mainland brides are portrayed in the Taiwanese media, in recent years, 
however, media portrayals of Mainland brides and cross-Strait couples in Taiwan have become 
more diverse. In a future project, I plan to examine the different ways that migrating spouses are 
represented in transnational popular media in both the PRC and ROC. I am particularly 
interested in a new 40 episode dramatic series entitled “Moving to Taipei.” This is a 
groundbreaking collaborative effort between Taiwan and Mainland China that focuses on the 
lives of three Mainland brides who have moved to Taipei to live with their Taiwanese husbands. 
The series will be filmed in both the Mainland and Taiwan, will be jointly produced, and aired in 
both sites. By examining the production, distribution and reception of this series in Taiwan and 
Mainland China, I will more deeply explore some of the themes raised in my dissertation, 
specifically gender and transnationalism, migration and family formation. Importantly, the fact 
that this series exists, says much about the changing ways that these couples are portrayed in the 
popular media in Taiwan. As the series will be aired on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, I expect 
views of cross-Straits couples to be more nuanced than in the previous years. 
 
  182 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adrian, Bonnie 
 2003 Framing the Bride: Globalizing Beauty and Romance in Taiwan’s Bridal Industry.  
  University of California Press. Berkeley. 
 
Albrow, Martin 
1997 The Global Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Alford, William P. and Yuanyuan Shen 
2004  Have You Eaten? Have You Divorced? Debating the Meaning of Freedom in Marriage 
in China. In Realms of Freedom in Modern China. William C Kirby ed. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. Pp. 234-263. 
 
Allison, Anne 
1994  Nightwork. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Anderson, Benedict 
1983 [1991] Imagined Communities. London: Verso. 
 
Andors, Phyllis.  
1983 The Unfinished Liberation of Chinese Women, 1949-1980. Bloomington, Ind.:  
Indiana University Press. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun 
   1990  Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. Theory, Culture and  
      Society 7:295-310.  
 
   1996 Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. University of  
    Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 
 
Aretxaga, Begona 
2003 Maddening States. Annual Review of Anthropology 32:393-410. 
 
Banister, Judith 
 2004  Shortage of Girls in China Today. Journal of Population Research. 21:19-46. 
 
  183 
Basch, Linda G. with Nina Glick-Schiller and Cristina Szanton-Blanc eds. 
 1994 Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and  
  Deterritorialized Nation-States. Langhorn  PA: Gordon and Breach. 
 
Baudrillard, Jean 
   1988  Selected Writings. Mark Poster ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
 
Benhabib, Seyla and Judith Resnik eds. 
   2009  Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders and Gender. New York: New York  
      University Press. 
 
Berger, Suzanne ed. 
   2005  Globalization and the Future of the Taiwan Miracle. In Global Taiwan: building   
      Competitive Strengths in a New International Economy. Armonk, New York: East  
      Gate.  
 
Bhabha, Homi 
   1989  The Commitment to Theory. In Questions of the Third Cinema, J. Pines and Paul  
      Wellemen eds. London: British Film Institute. Pp 111-32. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre 
   1977  Outline of a Theory of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Harvard  
      University Press. 
 
   1984  Distinction: A Social Critique on the Judgement of Tastes. Cambridge: Harvard  
      University Press. 
 
Bourgon, Jerome 
   2004 Rights, Freedoms, and Customs in the Making of Chinese Civil Law, 1900-1936.   
      In Realms of Freedom in Modern China. William C. Kirby ed. Stanford: Stanford   
      University Press. Pp. 85-112. 
 
Bray, David 
   2005 Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins  
      to Reform. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Bray, William Theodore 
   1999  Sources of Chinese Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Brennan Denise 
   2004  What’s Love Got To Do With It?: Transnational Desires and Sex Tourism in the   
      Dominican Republic: Duke University Press. 
 
Brenner, Neil 
   1999  Globalization as Reterritorialization: the Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the  
      European Union. Urban Studies 36:431-51. 
  184 
 
Bristow, Michael 
   2010  China ‘Must Reduce Rich-Poor Gap’ Premier Wen. BBC News, March 5. 
 
Brown, Melissa J. 
   2004  Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing   
      Identities. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Cai, Yong and William J. Lavely 
   2003  Missing Girls in China: Numerical Estimates and Effects on Population Growth.  
      China Review 3(2):1-17). 
 
Chan, Kam Wing 
   2009  The Chinese Hukou System at 50. Eurasian Geography and Economics.  
      50(2):197-221. 
 
Chan, Kam Wing and Will Buckingham 
   2008  Is China Abolishing the Hukou System? The China Quarterly 195:582-606. 
 
Chang, Jui-Shan 
   1999   Scripting Extramarital Affairs: Marital Mores, Gender, Politics, and Infidelity in   
      Taiwan. Modern China 25(1):69-99.   
 
Chao, Antonia  
   2004  The Modern State, Citizenship, and the Intimate Life: A Case Study of Taiwan’s   
      glorious citizens and their Mainland wives. Taiwanese Sociology (8) 1-41. 
 
Chao, Emily 
   2005 Cautionary Tales: Marriage Strategies, State Discourse, and Women's Agency in a Naxi  
      Village of Southwestern China. In Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in  
      Transnational Asia. Nicole Constable ed. Pp. 34-52. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania  
      Press. 
 
Charsley, Catharine 
   2005 Unhappy Husbands: Masculinity and Migration in Transnational Pakistani Marriages.  
      Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 11(1):85-105. 
  
Chen, Mingxia 
   2004  The Chinese Marriage Law and the Rights of Chinese Women in Marriage and    
      The Family. In Holding Up Half The Sky: Chinese Women Past, Present and Future.   
      Tao Jie, Zhen Bijun and Shirley L. Mow eds. Pp. 159-171. New York: Feminist  
      Press. 
 
 
 
 
  185 
Chen, Pin 
   2000  Yi Ming Shanghai: Wo de Taiwan chinyen yu shanghaipai tsofo (Emigrating  
      Shanghai: My Taiwan experiences meet Shanghai style). Taipei: Shang-hsun  
      Publishing Co. Ltd. 
 
Chen, Shirong 
   2010 China Editorials call for End to Residency Permit Rules. BBC News, March 2. 
 
Chen, Zhiming 
   2007  Fujian focuses on Economic Area. China Daily, March 14. Pg. 2.  
 
China Daily 
2004  China’s Policy on Cross-Strait Exchanges Unchanged. China Daily, June 18.  
   Electronic document, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004- 
   06/18/content_340685.htm  
 
China Daily 
   2005 President Sets Forth Guidelines for Taiwan. March, 4. Electronic document, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/04/content_421902.htm 
 
China Daily, Hong Kong edition 
   2009 Mail Order Bride Brokers Outlawed and Shutting Down. China Daily, July 31.   
      Electronic document, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2009- 
      07/31/content_8495916.htm 
 
China Population Statistical Yearbook 
   2003  Jiehun [Marriage] Department of Population and Employment National Bureau   
      of Statistics of China. Pp. 282-283. China Statistics Press: Beijing.  
 
   2004 Jiehun [Marriage] Department of Population and Employment National Bureau of  
      Statistics of China. Pp. 100-101. China Statistics Press: Beijing.  
 
   2005 Jiehun [Marriage] Department of Population and Employment National Bureau of  
      Statistics of China. Pp. 118-119. China Statistics Press: Beijing.  
 
   2006 Jiehun [Marriage] Department of Population and Employment National Bureau of  
      Statistics of China. China Statistics Press: Beijing.  
 
   2007 Jiehun [Marriage] Department of Population and Employment National Bureau of  
      Statistics of China. China Statistics Press: Beijing.  
 
   2008 Jiehun [Marriage] Department of Population and Employment National Bureau of  
      Statistics of China. China Statistics Press: Beijing.  
 
 
 
  186 
China Times Daily 
   2005 Jiaobu changci yu waiji xinniang jieyu [Deputy Minister of Education appealed to  
      foreign brides to take birth control] China Times Daily July 7.  
 
Chinese Woman’s News 
   1999  Zhongguo Funu Bao. December 2 Pg.2. 
 
Chinoy, Daniel 
   2010  Growing Pains on Road to Urbanization. China Daily, June 18:1. 
 
Chiu, Chang and Tsuei-fen Lin 
   1994  Ikuo liangChi: liangan fenin paipishu (One country, two wives: The bluebook of  
      intermariages across the Taiwan Strait). Taipei: Chin-Mei Press.  
 
Chiu Chen, Lee-in 
2005  Taiwan’s Economic Influence: Implications For Resolving Political Tensions. In  
   Taiwan Strait Dilemmas: China-Taiwan-U.S. Policies in The New Century. Gerrit W.  
   Gong ed. Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. 
 
Chuanjiao, Xie 
   2008  Matchmakers to be put under regulation. China Daily, November 10: 6. 
 
Cohen, Jeffrey H. 
   1999  Cooperation and Community: Economy and Society in Oaxaca.   
      Austin: University of Texas Press.  
 
Congressional-Executive Commission On China. 
   2005 China’s Household Registration (Hukou) System: Discrimination and Reforms.  
      One Hundred Ninth United States Congress, First Session. September 2. 
 
Constable, Nicole 
   1999 At Home but Not at Home: Filipina Narratives of Ambivalent Returns. Cultural  
      Anthropology 14(2):203-228.  
    
   2003  Romance on a Global Stage: Pen Pals, Virtual Ethnography, and “Mail Order”   
      Marriages. Berkely: University of California Press.  
 
   2006  Nostalgia, Memory and Modernity: Bridal Portraits in Contemporary Beijing.   
      Visual Anthropology 19(1):39-55. 
 
   2007  Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Migrant Workers. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell  
      University Press.  
   
 Constable, Nicole ed. 
   2005 Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia.   
      Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
  187 
  
Constable, Nicole guest editor 
   2008  Introduction. Critical Asian Studies 40(4):551-566. 
 
Danforth, Loring M. 
 1995 The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World. New   
   Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
 
David, Beatrice 
   2001 L’action de I’Etat chinois contre les’ mauvaises coutumes’matrimoniales. In La   
      Coutume et la Norme. Jerome Bourgon ed. Pp 65-85. Paris: Universitaires de   
      Vincennes.  
 
Davin, Delia 
   2008  Marriage Migration in China: The Enlargement of Marriage Markets in the Era  
      of Market Reforms. In Marriage, Migration and Gender. Rajni Palriwala and Patricia  
      Uberoi eds. Pp. 63-77. London: Sage Publications.  
 
Davis Deborah and Stevan Harrell 
   1993  Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
De Regt, Marina 
   2008  High in the Hierarchy, Rich in Diversity, Critical Asian Studies, 40(4):587-608. 
 
Diamant, Neil J. 
   2000 Re-examining the Impact of the 1950 Marriage Law: State Improvisation, Local   
      Initiative and Rural Family Change. The China Quarterly 161:171-198.  
 
 2001 Making Love ‘Legible’ in China: Politics and Society during the Enforcement of                               
  Civil Marriage Registration, 1950-1966. Politics and Society 29(3):447-480. 
 
Doezema, Jo 
   1994  Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced Prostitution Dichotomy. In  
      Global Sex Workers. Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema eds. Pp.35-50. New York:  
      Routledge. 
 
Dutton, Michael R. 
   1992  Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to “the People”. New  
      York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ebrey, Patricia Buckley 
   2006  Confucianism In Sex, Marriage and Family in World Religions. Don S.  
      Browning, M. Christian Green and John Witte Jr. eds. Pp. 367-451. New York:  
      Columbia University Press. 
 
 
  188 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland ed. 
   2003  Globalisation: Studies in Anthropology. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Erwin, Kathleen 
   1999 White Women Male Desires: A Televisual Fantasy of the Chinese Transnational  
      Family. In Spaces of Their Own: Women’s Public Sphere in Transnational China.  
      Mayfair Mei-hui Yang ed. Pp 232-60. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Executive Yuan 
   1992  Zhonghaumingguo Renkou Zhengce Gangling [Population Policy Guiding   
      Principles, Republic of China]. Taipei: Ministry of Interior. 
 
Faier, Lieba 
   2008 Runaway Stories: The Underground Micromovements of Filipina Oyomesan in Rural  
      Japan. Cultural Anthropology. 23(4):630-659. 
 
Fan, Cindy C. 
   2008  China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household. New York:  
      Routledge.  
 
Fan, Cindy and Youqin Huang 
   1998  Waves of Rural Brides: Female Marriage Migration in China.  Annals of the  
      Association of American Geographers  88(2) 227-251.  
 
Fang, Xie 
   2007  A Wedding, for What it’s Worth. China Daily, March 6:19. 
 
Fang, Xie 
   2007  Doom and Groom:This Sad Song says so much. China Daily, March 6:19. 
 
Favell, Adrian 
   2003  Games without Frontiers? Questioning the Transnational Social Power of  
      Migrants in Europe. Archives Europeennes de Sociologie. XLIV(3):106-136.  
 
Ferree, Myra Marx, Judith Lorber and Beth B. Hess 
   1999  Revisioning Gender. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
  
Foner, Nancy 
   2000 From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration. New  
     Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Foster, Robert J.  
   1999  Melanesia in an Era of Globalization. Contemporary pacific 10(2): 140-58. 
 
Foucault, Michel 
   1995  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books. 
  189 
 
Freeman, Caren 
   2005  Marrying Up and Marrying Down: The Paradoxes or Marital Mobility for  
      Chosonjok Brides in South Korea. In Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility   
      in Transnational Asia. Nicole Constable ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania  
      Press. 
 
Freeman, Carla 
  2001 Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization. 
      Signs 26(4):1007-1037. 
 
Friedman, Sara L. 
   2005 The Intimacy of State Power: Marriage, Liberation, and Socialist Subjects in  
      Southeast China. American Ethnologist 32(2):312-327. 
 
   2006  Intimate Politics: Marriage, the Market, and State Power in Southeastern China.  
      American Anthropologist 109(2):344-379. 
 
   2010a. Determining the ‘Truth’ at the Border: Immigration Interviews, Chinese Marital  
      Migrants and Taiwan’s Sovereignty Dilemmas. Citizenship Studies 14(2):167-183. 
 
   2010b.  Marital Immigration and Graduated Citizenship: Post-Naturalization Restrictions on  
      Mainland Chinese Spouses in Taiwan. Pacific Affairs 83(1):73-93. 
  
Gabaccia, Donna R. 
   1999  Is Everywhere Nowhere? Nomads, Nations and the Immigrant Paradigm of    
      United States History. The Journal of American History 28(3):1115-1134. 
 
Gamburd, Michele Ruth 
   2000  The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant  
      Housemaids.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
 
Geertz, Clifford 
   1973  Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight. In The Interpretation of Cultures. New York:  
      Basic Books. 
 
George, Sheba Mariam 
   2005  When Women Come First; Gender and Class in Transnational Migration.   
      Berkley:University of California Press.  
  
Giddens, Anthony 
   1990  The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Ginsburg, Faye D., Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin eds. 
   2002  Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain. Berkeley: University of California  
      Press.  
  190 
 
Glen, Evelyn Nakano 
   1999 The Social Construction of Institutionalization of Gender and Race: An  
      Integrative Framework. In Revisioning Gender. Myra Marx Ferree, Judith Lorber,  
      and Beth B. Hess eds. Pp.3-43. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
 
Glick-Schiller, Nina 
 2001 Citizens in transnational nation-states: the Asian experience. In Globalisation and   
    the Asia-Pacific. Eds. L Olds, P Dicken, PF Kelly, L Kong, HWC Yeung Pp. 202-18.   
    London: Routledge.  
 
Glick-Schiller Nina,  Linda Basch and Christina Szanton-Blanc eds. 
 1992 Transnationalism: a new analytical framework for understanding migration. In  
    Towards a Transnational Perspective for Understanding Migration. New  
    York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol 645 Pp 1-24.   
 
Grewal, Inderpal and Caren Kaplan eds. 
   1993 Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices.  
      Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Guarnizo, Luis E. and Michael P. Smith eds. 
 2002 The Locations of Transnationalism. Pp.3-34. New Brunswick: Transaction  
    Publishers.  
 
Gupta, Akhil and James Ferguson 
 1994 Beyond Culture: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference in the Global  
     Cultural Economy. In The Anthropology of Globalization. Inda and Rosaldo eds.  
     Pp65-80. Blackwell 
 
Gutmann, Mathew C. 
   2007  The Meaning of Macho: Being a Man in Mexico City. 10th ed. Berkeley: University of  
      California Press. 
 
Han, Hua 
   2009  Living a Single Life: The Plight and Adaptations of the Bachelors in Yishala. In  
      Chinese Kinship: Contemporary Anthropological Perspectives. Susanne Brandtstadter  
      and Goncalo D. Santos eds. London: Routledge. Pp48-66.  
 
Han, Min and J.S. Eades 
   1995  Brides, Bachelors and Brokers: The Marriage Market in Rural Anhui in an Era of  
      Economic Reform. Modern Asian Studies. 29(4):841-69. 
 
Hanagan M.  
 1995 Irish Transnational Social Movements, Deterritorialized Migrants and the State  
    System: the Last One Hundred Forty Years. Mobilization (3) 1:107-126. 
 
  191 
Hannerz, Ulf 
 1989 Notes on the Global Ecumene. Public Culture 1(2):66-75.  
 
Harrell, Stevan 
   2001 The Anthropology of Reform and the Reform of Anthropology: Anthropological  
  Narratives of Recovery and Progress in China. Annual Review of Anthropology. 30:139-161.  
 
Harvey, David 
   1989  The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Hoffman, Lisa M. 
   2008  Post-Mao Professionalism: Self-enterprise and Patriotism. In Privatizing China:  
  Socialism From Afar. Li Zhang and Aihwa Ong eds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
 
   2006 Autonomous Choices and Patriotic Professionalism: On Governmentality in Late  
  Socialist China. Economy and Society 35(4):550-570. 
 
Honig, Emily and Gail Hershatter 
   1988  Personal Voices: Chinese Women in the 1980’s. Stanford: Stanford University  
      Press.  
 
Hsia, Hsiao-Chuan 
   N.d. Prospects and Impasse of Multicultural Citizenship in Globalization Era: The Case of  
  Immigrants Movement in Taiwan. Unpublished MS, Graduate Institute for Social  
  Transformation, Shih Hsin University. 
 
   2009 Foreign Brides: Multiple Citizenship and the Immigrant Movement in Taiwan. Asian and  
  Pacific Migration Journal 18(1):17-46.  
 
   2007 Imaged and Imagined Threat to the Nation: the Media Construction of the ‘Foreign  
  Bride’s Phenomenon’as Social Problems in Taiwan. Inter-Asia Cultural  
      Studies 8(1):55-85.  
 
   2006  Empowering “Foreign Brides” and Community through Praxis-Oriented Research.  
  Societies Without Borders 1:93-111. 
 
   2005 The Making of Immigrants Movement: Politics of Differences, Subjectivation and  
  Societal Movement. Presented at the 2nd International Conference on Transborder Diasporia:  
  Citizenship, Identity and Resistance. Shih Hsin University, Taiwan, December 9-10. 
 
Hsieh, Kuo-hua 
   2001  Do shi ernai je de hou (It is all about mistresses’ faults). Taipei: Seadove Publishing Co.  
  Ltd.  
 
 
 
  192 
Hsing, You-tien 
   1998 Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection. New York: Oxford University  
  Press. 
 
Huang, Philip C.C. 
   1998 Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing. Stanford: Stanford  
  University Press.  
 
   2001 Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China: The Qing and the Republic Compared.  
  Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Huang, Xiyi 
   2000  Power, Entitlement, and Social Practice, Resource Distribution in north China  
      Villages.Unpublished Ph.D. theses. University of Leeds.  
 
Huters, Theodore, R. Bin Wong and Pauline Yu eds. 
    1997  Culture and State in Chinese Society: Conventions, Accommodations and   
      Critiques. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
 
Inda, Jonathan and Renato Rosaldo eds. 
    2002 The Anthropology of Globalization. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell  
      Publishing.  
 
Isaacs, Harold R. 
   1975 Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. Cambridge: Harvard   
      University Press.  
 
Johnson, Kay Ann 
   1983  Women, Family and Peasant Revolution in China. Chicago: University of  
      Chicago Press.  
 
Jolly, Margaret and Lenore Manderson, eds. 
   1997  Sites of Desire, Economies of Pleasure: Sexualities in Asia and the Pacific.  
      Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Jones, Gavin and Hsiu-hua Shen 
   2008  International Marriage in East and Southeast Asia: Trends and Research   
      Emphases. Citizenship Studies 12(1):9-25. 
 
Jones, William C. 
   2004  Chinese Law and Liberty in Comparative Historical Perspective. In Realms of   
      Freedom in Modern China. William C. Kirby ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Kearney, Michael 
   1995 The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and  
    Transnationalism. Annual Review of Anthropology 24:547-65.  
  193 
 
Kelski, Karen 
   2001 Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams. Durham: Duke   
      University Press. 
 
Kempadoo, Kamala and Jo Doezema eds. 
   1998 Global Sex Workers. New York: Routledge 
 
Kennedy, Paul and Victor Roudometof 
   2003  Communities Across Borders under Globalising Conditions: New Immigrants  
      and Transnational Cultures. London: Routledge. 
 
Kipnis, Andrew B. 
   1997  Producing Guanxi. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
 
Kondo, Dorinne K. 
   1990  Crafting Selves: Power, Gender and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese  
      Workplace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Lan, Pei-Chia 
   2006 Global Cinderellas: Migrant Domestics and Newly Rich Employers in Taiwan.  
      Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Larson, Brooke 
   2003  Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths and Minds: The Gendered Politics of Rural  
      School Reform in Bolivia 1910-52. In Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in  
      Comparative Perspective. Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo eds. Pp. 183-209.  
      Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.  
 
Lavely, W.  
   1991  Marriage and Mobility under Rural Collectivisation. In Marriage and Inequality  
      in Chinese Society. Rubie S. Watson and Patricia Ebrey eds. Pp. 286-312.  Berkeley:  
      University of California Press.  
 
Lee, Sing and Arthur Kleinman 
   2003 Suicide as Resistance in Chinese Society. In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict  
      and Resistance. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Sheldon eds. Pp. 289-311. New York:   
      Routledge. 
 
Leng, Tse-Kang 
1996  The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan   
   Straits. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press. 
 
Lewellen, Ted C. 
   2002  The Anthropology of Globalization: Cultural Anthropology Enters the 21st   
      Century. Westport, Connecticut: Bergin and Garvey. 
  194 
 
Liechty, Mark 
   2005  Carnal Economies: The Commodification of Food and Sex in Kathmandu.  
      Cultural Anthropology 20(1):1-38.  
 
Lin, Miao-jung 
  1994 Marriage for Love or Money? Taipei Times, May 6. Electronic document,  
   http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/05/06/134812 
 
Loos, Tamara 
   2008  A History of Sex and the State in Southeast Asia: Class, Intimacy and  
      Invisibility. Citizenship Studies 12(1):27-43. 
 
Lorber, Judith 
   1994  Paradoxes of Gender. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
 Lu, Chia-wen 
   2008  Commercially Arranged Marriage Migration: Case Studies of Cross-Border  
      Marriages in Taiwan. In Marriage, Migration and Gender. Rajni Palriwala and  
      Patricia Uberoi eds. Pp. 125-151. London: Sage Publications.  
 
Lu, Li 
   1997  “Funu jingli diwei yu funu renli ziAng Guanxi de shizhen yanjiu” (Women’s  
      Economic Status and Their Human Capital in China). Renkou Yanjiu (Population  
      Research 21(2):50-54. 
 
Lu, Yilong 
   2004  Chaoyue Hukou: Jiedu Zhonggou Huji Zhidu (Beyond Hukou: Interpreting  
      China’s Household Registration System). Beijing: Zhonggou Shehui Chubanshe. 
 
Lyons, Lenore and Michele Ford 
   2008  Love, Sex and the Spaces in-between: Kepri Wives and their Cross-Border   
      Husbands. Citizenship Studies 12(1):55-72. 
 
Mahler, Sarah J. and Patricia R. Pessar 
   2001a Gendered Geographies of Power: Analyzing Gender Across Transnational   
    Spaces. Identities 7(4):441-459. 
 
   2001b Gender and Transnational Migration. Conference presentation “Transnational  
      Migration: Comparative Perspectives”. Princeton University June 30-July 1. 
 
   2003 Transnational Migration: Bringing Gender In. International Migration Review  
      (37)3:812-846. 
 
 
 
  195 
Manalansan, Martin F. 
 2003 Global Divas: Filipino Gay Man in the Diaspora. Durham: Duke University  
    Press. 
 
Margold, Jane A. 
   1995  Narratives of Masculinity and Transnational Migration: Filipino Workers in the  
      Middle East. In Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in  
      Southeast Asia. Aihwa Ong and Michael Peletz eds. Berkeley: University of     
      California Press. 
 
Massey, Doreen 
   1994  Space, Place and Gender. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Mills, Mary Beth 
   2001 Thai Women in the Global Labor Force: Consuming Desires, contested Selves.   
      New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Miller, Daniel and Don Slater 
   2003 Ethnography and the Extreme Internet. In Globalisation: Studies in Anthropology.   
      Thomas Hylland Eriksen ed. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Milwertz, Ceclia 
   1997 Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One Child Family  
      Policy. Richmond: Curzon Press.  
 
Ministry of the Interior 
   2008 Statistics on the Marriages between the Citizens and Foreigners. Available at   
      http://www.immigration.gov.tw/aspcode/9710.doc     
 
   2006  Neizheng Tongji Tongbao [Reports of Internal Affairs] Week 3 2006.  
 
   2004  Jiushier nian waiji yu dalu peiou shenghou zhuangkuang diaocha [Survey on  
      Living Conditions of Foreign and Mainland Chinese Spouses, 2003]. Taipei: Ministry  
      of Interior.  
 
Mix, Prapairat R. and Nicola Piper 
   2003 Does Marriage “Liberate” Women from sex Work? Thai Women in Germany. In   
      Wife or Worker: Asian Women and Migration. Nicola Piper and Mina Roces eds. Pp.  
      53-71. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield.  
 
Montgomery, Maureen E. 
  1989 ‘Gilded Prostitution’ Status, Money, and Transatlantic Marriages, 1870-1914.   
     London: Routledge.  
 
Morokvasic, Mirjana 
   1984  Birds of Passage are also Women. International Migration Review 18(4)886-907. 
  196 
 
Newendorp, Nicole Dejong 
   2008 Uneasy Reunions: Immigration, Cuitizenship, and Family Life in Post-1997 Hong Kong.   
      Stanford: Stanford University Press.    
 
Ong, Aihwa 
   1993  On the Edge of Empires: Flexible Citizenship among Chinese in Diaspora.    
      Positions 1(3):745-778. 
 
   1999 Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke  
   University Press.  
 
   2006  Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham: Duke   
      University Press. 
 
Ong, Aihwa and Li Zhang eds. 
   2008  Privatizing China: Socialism From Afar. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Ortner, Sherry B. 
   1996 Making Gender: The Politics of Erotics of Culture. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Oxfeld, Ellen 
   2005  Cross-Border Hypergamy? Marriage Exchanges in a Transnational Hakka Community.  
     In Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia. Nicole Constable ed.  
     Pp. 17-33. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
  
Park, Jung-Dong 
1997  The Special Economic Zones of China and Their Impact on Its Economic   
   Development. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 
 
Patterson, Thomas 
   1999 Change and Development in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Berg. 
 
Ping, Zhuang 
   1993  On the Social Phenomenon of Trafficking in Women in China. Chinese  
      Education and Society 26(3):33-50. 
 
Piper, Nicola and Mina Roces eds. 
   2003  Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration. New York: Rowman and  
      Littlefield.  
 
Potter, S.H. and J.M. Potter 
   1990  Chinese Peasants: The Anthropology of a Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge  
      University Press.  
 
 
  197 
Ritzer, George 
   2000  The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character  
      of Contemporary Social Life. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Rofel, Lisa 
   2007 Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture. Durham:  
      Duke University Press.  
 
Roudometof, Victor 
   1999 Nationalism, globalization, Eastern Orthodoxy: “Unthinking” the “Clash of   
     Civilizations” in Southeastern Europe. European Journal of Social Theory  (2) 2:19-  
     41. 
 
Sassen-Koob, Saskia 
   1982  Recomposition and Peripheralization at the Core. Contemporary Marxism 5:88-   
      100. 
 
Sangren, Steven, 
   2000  Chinese Sociologics: An Anthropological Account of the Role of Alienation in  
      Social Reproduction. London: Athlone Press.  
 
Schein, Lousia 
   2005  Marrying Out of Place: Hmong/Miao Women Across and Beyond China. In  
      Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia. Nicole  
      Constable ed. Pp. 53-79. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Sensenbrenner, Julia S. 
   2000  Commercializing  Childhood: Parental Purchases for Shanghai’s Only Child. In  
      The Consummer Revolution in Urban China. Deborah S. Davis ed. Pp. 54-79.  
      Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Shen, Hsiu-Hua 
   2008  The Purchase of Transnational Intimacy: Women’s Bodies, Transnational  
      Masculine Privileges in Chinese Economic Zones. Asian Studies Review. (32)57-75. 
 
Shih, Shu-mei 
 1996 Gender and the Geopolitics of Desire: The Seduction of Mainland Women in  
    Taiwan and Hong Kong Media.  In Spaces of Their Own. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, ed.  
    Pp. 278-307.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Siu, Helen F. 
   1993  Reconstructing Dowry and Brideprice in South China. In  Chinese Families in the   
      Post-Mao Era, Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell eds. Berkeley: University of   
      California Press. Pp 165-88. 
 
 
  198 
Smart, Alan and Josephine Smart 
 Urbanization and the Global Perspective. Annual Review of Anthropology   
   32:265-285. 
 
Smart, Alan and George C.S. Lin 
   2007  Local Capitalisms, Local Citizenship an Translocality: Rescaling from Below in  
      the Pearl River Delta Region, China. International Journal of Urban and Regional  
      Research.31.2:280-302. 
 
Smith, Michael Peter 
   2001 Transnational Urbanism. New York: Blackwell. 
 
So, Alvin Y. 
   2004  One Country Three Systems? In Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong. Agnes S.  
      Ku and Ngai Pun eds. New York: Routledge-Curzon.  
 
Solinger, Dorothy J. 
   1999 Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: The State and the Logic of the Market.   
      Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Sommer, Matthew Harvey 
   2000 Sex, Law and Society in Late Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford University   
      Press.  
 
State Statistical Bureau 
   1991  Zhongguo 1990 Nian Renkou Pucha 10% Chouyang Ziliao (10 percent Sampling  
      of the 1990 Population Census of the Peoples Republic of China) Beijing: China  
      Statistical Publishing House.  
 
Stacey, Judith 
   1983  Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China. Berkeley: University of California  
      Press. 
 
Steinfeld, Edward S.  
2005  Cross-Strait Integration and Industrial Catch-Up: How Vulnerable Is the Taiwan   
   Miracle to an Ascendant Mainland. In Global Taiwan: Building Competitive   
   Strengths in a New International Economy. Suzanne Berger and Richard   
   K. Lester eds. Armonk, New York: East Gate. 
 
 Strathern, Andrew and Pamela J. Stewart eds. 
   2007 Asian Ritual Systems: Syncretisms and Ruptures. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.  
 
Strathern, Andrew and Pamela J. Stewart. 
   2003  Divisions of Power: Rituals in Time and Space among the Hagen and Duna  
      peoples, Papua New Guinea. Taiwan Journal of Anthropology 1(1):51-76. 
 
  199 
Sui, Cindy 
   2010  Taiwan Festival Proves China Lure. BBC News. April, 19. Electronic Document,  
      http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8629453.stm 
 
Sun, Wanning 
   2009  Maid in China: Media, Mobility, and a New Semiotic of Power. New York:  
      Routledge.  
 
Szonyi, Michael 
   2007  The Virgin and the Chinese State: The Cult of Wang Yulan and the Politics of Local  
      Identity on Jinmen (Quemoy). In Asian Ritual Systems: Syncretisms and Ruptures. Pamela L  
      Stewart and Andrew Strathern eds. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press. 
 
Tabuchi, Hiriko 
   2010  China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy. New York Times, August 16:B1. 
 
Tian, Bingxing 
   2003 Zhongguo Diyi Zhengjian (China’s No. 1 Document). Huizhou, China:  
      Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe. 
 
Taipei Times 
   2001   A Match Made in Hell. November 5: 8. Electronic document,  
      http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2003/11/05/2003074668 
 
Taipei Times 
   2009  Chinese Spouses Demand Right to Work in Taiwan. October 29:2. Electronic    
      document.    
      http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/10/29/2003457147 
 
Tan, Lin and Susan E. Short 
   2004 Living as Double Outsiders: Migrant Women’s Experiences of Marriage in a   
      County- Level City. In On The Move: Women in Rural-to-Urban Migration in  
      Contemporary China. Arianne M. Gaetano and Tamara Jacka eds. New York:  
      Columbia University Press.  
 
Telford, Ted A. 
   1992  Covariates of Men’s Age at First Marriage: The Historical Demography of  
      Chinese Lineages. Population Studies, (46) 19-35. 
 
Thai, Hung Cam 
   2005  Clashing Dreams in the Vietnamese Diaspora: Highly Educated Overseas Brides   
      and Low-Wage U.S. Husbands. In Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in  
      Transnational Asia. Nicole Constable ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania  
      Press. 
 
 
  200 
Thornton, Arland and Hui-Shen Lin eds. 
   1994  Social Change and the Family Taiwan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
 
The US-China Business Council 
   2007  Foreign Investment in China. Electronic document,  
      http://www.uschina.org/info/forcast/2007/foreign-investment.html. 
 
Tolentino, Rolando B. 
   1999  Bodies, Letters, Catalogs: Filipinas in Transnational Space. In Transnational  
      Asia-Pacific: Gender, Culture and the Public Sphere. Shirley Geok-Lin Lim and  
      Wimal Dissanayake eds. Pp. 44-68. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Tomlinson, John 
   1999 Globalization and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Toyota, Mika 
    2008 International Marriage, Rights and the State in East and Southeast Asia: editorial  
      introduction. Citizenship Studies 12(1):1-7. 
 
Tsai, Y. and Hsiao, M H H 
   2006  The non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) for foreign workers and foreign  
      spouses in Taiwan: a portrayal.  Asia Pacific Forum (Taipei), 32, 1-31. 
 
Tsay, Ching-lung 
   2004  Marriage Migration of Women from China and Southeast Asia to Taiwan. In  
      (Untying the Knot: Ideal and Reality in Asian Marriage. Gavin Jones and Kamalini  
      Ramdas eds. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.  
 
United Daily 
   2006  Liao Angyan, yingcha yueniang youwu youdi [Legislator Liao Angyan, we   
      should inspect chemical pernicious remnants in Vietnamese brides’ body]. United  
      Daily, 4 January.  
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel 
   1974  The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the   
      European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. 
 
Wang, Fei-Ling 
   2004 Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: Hukou System in the  
      2000s. The China Quarterly. 177(2):115-132. 
 
Wang, Hong-zen and Daniele Belanger 
   2008  Taiwanizing Female Immigrant Spouses and Materializing Differential  
      Citizenship. Citizenship Studies 12(1):91-106. 
 
 
  201 
Wang, Hong-zen and Chang, Shu-ming 
   2002  The Commodification of International Marriage Business in Taiwan and   
      Vietnam. International Migration 40(6):93-114.  
 
Wang, Hong-zen and H.H. Michael Hsiao 
   2002  Social Capital or Human Capital? Professionals in Overseas Taiwanese Firms.  
      Journal of Contemporary Asia. 32(3):346-362. 
 
Wang, Hong-zen and Shu-ming Chang 
   2002 The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-Border Marriage  
      Business in Taiwan and Vietnam. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
 
Wang, Hong-zen and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao eds. 
   2009  Cross-Border Marriages with Asian Characteristics. Taipei: Academia Sinica 
 
Wang, Jianmin and Hu Qi 
   1996  Zhongguo Liudong Renkou (China’s Floating Population). Shanghai: Shanghai  
      University of Finance and Economic Press.   
 
Wang, Qiwei 
   2008   爸爸的厦门金山梦 (Father’s Xiamen Golden Mountain Dream). Electronic  
      document, http://qun.51.com/wangqiwei111/topic.php?pid=344 
 
Wank, David 
   1996  The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in  
      a South China City. China Quarterly 147:820-38. 
  
Warner, Michael 
   1999 The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life. New York:  
      Free Press. 
 
Watenabe, Satoko 
   1998  From Thailand to Japan: Migrant Sex Workers as Autonomous Subjects. In   
      Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition. New York: Routledge. 
 
Watson, James L. 
   1997  Golden Arches East: McDonald’s in East Asia. Stanford: Stanford University  
    Press.  
 
   1985. Standardizing the gods: The promotion of T’ien Hou (“empress of heaven”)   
      along the South China coast, 960–1960. In Popular culture in late imperial China,  
      edited by David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and Evelyn S. Rawski. Berkeley:  
      University of California Press. 
 
 
 
  202 
Watson, Rubie S. 
   1991  Afterward: Mariage and Gender Inequality. In Marriage and Inequality in  
      Chinese Society. Rubie S. Watson and Patricia Buckley Ebrey eds. Pp. 347-68.   
      Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Wolf, Arthur P. and Hill Gates 
    2005  Marriage in Taipei City: Reasons for Rethinking Chinese Demography.   
       International Journal of Asian Studies 1(2) Pp. 111-133. 
 
Wolf, Margery 
   1968  The House of Lim. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
 
   1985  Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford  
      University Press.  
 
Wu Jiao 
   2007  Cross-Strait Exchanges Irreversible. China Daily, November 3:2. 
 
Xiaoyong 
   1999 Burang Tigao Suzhi (Not Allowed to Improve Quality). Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern  
  Weekend), May 11:11. 
 
Xie,Gaoqiao 
   1989  Taiwan Jiating Shenghuo Moshi de Banhua (Changes in patterns of Family Life     
      in Taiwan). In Dangjin Funu Juese yu Dingwei (The Role and Position of Women   
      Today).Taipei: Gouji Chongta She. Pp. 115-51. 
 
Yan, Hairong 
   2003  Neoliberal Governmentality and Neohumanism: Organizing Suzhi/Value Flow through  
      Labor Recruitment Networks. Cultural Anthropology 18(4):493-523. 
 
Yan, Yunxiang 
   1996  The Flow of Gifts. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
 
Yang, Dennis and Cai Fang 
   2003  The Political Economy of China’s Rural-Urban Divide. In How Far Across the  
      River: Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium. Nick Hope, Dennis Yang and Mu  
      Yang eds. Pp 389-416. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui 
    2004 Goddess across the Taiwan Strait: Matrifocal Ritual Space, Nation-State, 
      and Satellite Television Footprints. Public Culture 16(20) Pp. 209-238. 
 
   1997  Mass Media and Transnational Subjectivity in Shanghai: Notes on    
      (Re)Cosmopolitanism in a Chinese Metropolis. In Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural    
      Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism. Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini eds.    
  203 
      Pp. 287-319. New York: Routledge.  
 
    1994 Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China. Ithaca:  
      Cornell University Press. 
 
Yeoh, Brenda S.A. and Katie Willis 
   1999 ‘Heart’ and ‘Wing’, Nation and Diaspora: Gendered Discourses in Singapore’s  
      Regionalisation Process. Gender, Place and Culture. 6(4) Pp. 355-372. 
 
Yoda, Akira 
   1981 Otoko ni Totte Onna towa Nanika? (What are Women to Men?) Tokyo: Ninhon  
      Jitsugyo Shuppan. 
 
Zeng, Yi et al. 
   1993 Causes and Implications of the Increase in China’s Reported Sex Ratio at Birth.  
      Population and Development Review 19(2):283-302. 
 
Zhang, Hong 
   2009  Labor Migration, Gender, and the Rise of Neo-Local Marriages in the Economic  
      Boomtown of Dongguan, South China. Journal of Contemporary China. 18(61):639- 
      656. 
 
Zhang, Li and Aihwa Ong eds. 
   2008  Privatizing China: Socialism From Afar. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
 
Zheng, Tiantian 
   2009  Red Lights: The Lives of Sex Workers in Postsocialist China. Minneapolis:   
      University of Minneapolis Press. 
